

SAFE FILE: America, Britain, China, Dutch East Indies (ABCDPowers) I





December 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT:

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

I.

1. With a view to the more effective prosecution of warfare against Germany, Italy and Japan, a Supreme War Council is created composed of H. B. M. Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, the President of the United States of America, the President of the Executive Yuan and Generalissimo of the Armies of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the President of the Soviet of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in respect of warfare against those countries with which the Soviet Union is at war. They may designate a member of their government with full power to represent them.

2. The Chiefs of State or of government above named pledge themselves not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agreement.

3. The function of the Supreme War Council is

to

to supervise and coordinate the general conduct of the war and to provide for its successful prosecution.

4. The Supreme War Council may determine theatres of war and may provide for representation of any other government actively engaged in war against a common enemy in such theatres.

5. The Council will be responsible for coordinating distribution of available resources of all categories between various theatres of war.

6. The Supreme War Council shall be charged with effecting unified command in any theatre of war determined by it.

## II.

1. The Supreme War Council will create a Staff responsible to it and consisting of representatives of the armed forces of each of the members of the Council, who may be the highest ranking officers of the different branches of the respective armed forces.

2. The

2. The Staff may draw up general war plans, and shall review general war plans drawn up by the competent authorities of each country. It shall follow the execution by each country of the part allotted to it in any general operation or undertaking, but shall not exercise any of the powers of the commanders-in-chief in the field. It shall perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Council.

3. The members of the Staff shall receive from the government and the competent authorities of their respective countries all proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war. They shall watch, day by day, the situation of the armed forces and the means of all kinds of which the armed forces and the enemy armed forces dispose.

4. By direction of the Supreme War Council, the Staff may designate a Staff Division to serve in respect of any theatre of war and may provide for representation


of

of the armed forces of any other power engaged in active war against any of the common enemies in such theatre.

5. The general staffs and military, naval and air commands of the armed forces of each power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective governments, subject to the creation of any unified command which may be agreed upon.


6. The Staff shall sit continuously and shall establish headquarters for itself or for any Staff Division at such place or places, or in any region, as may be approved by the Supreme War Council.





SECRET

# AA AMMUNITION—HE 3" and 90 mm


STATISTICAL BRANCH - GENERAL STAFF  
WAR DEPARTMENT

SECRET

SECRET


Total Guns in Bn.  
AA Regt. (Mobile)  
24 37mm AA Guns

### 37mm AA Guns Bns. available



NAVY'S BALANCE - CONTROL STAFF  
NAVY'S BALANCE

SECRET


AA Ammunition  
37mm



SECRET

# AA Ammunition \*

## Cal. 50 AP



 PRODUCTION BRANCH - GENERAL STAFF  
 WAR DEPARTMENT

SECRET

SECRET

# Cal. 50 AA Machine Guns and Mounts Bns. available

Total Guns in Bn.  
AA Regt. (Mobile)  
(12 Cal. 50 AA Machine  
Guns Each Bn.)




NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

SECRET

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Total Guns in Bn.  
AA Regt. (Mobile)  
32 40mm AA Guns  
Each Bn.

## 40mm AA Guns




EXCLUDED: BUREAU - GENERAL STAFF  
WFO DEPARTMENT

SECRET

SECRET

# 3" and 90 mm AA Guns Bns. available


Total Guns in Bn.  
AA Regt. (Mobile)  
(12 3" or 12 90mm  
Guns Each Bn.)



SECRET

SECRET

## 40mm AA Ammunition—HE



STANDARD GRADE - GENERAL STAFF

SECRET



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Air Mail

Vichy, November 22, 1941

Personal and ~~Strictly Confidential~~

My dear Mr. President:

With the removal of General Weygand from Africa in obedience to a German "dictat", and the beginning of a British offensive in Cyrenaica, which two occurrences are presumably closely related, Thanksgiving Day, 1941, was far from dull in this capital of a captive nation.

Upon hearing that Weygand was to be recalled, at which time we had no information that a British offensive in Africa was about to commence, I arranged on November 19th for an interview with the Marshal who saw me alone and discussed with me at length the matter of Weygand's removal.

I pointed out to him very clearly that the heretofore friendly and sympathetic attitude of the American Government was based on an assumption that he would not in his relations with the Axis powers go beyond the requirements of the Armistice Agreement, and that a removal of General Weygand under German pressure cannot be considered by anybody to be necessitated by the Armistice Agreement.

I told him that in my opinion such an unnecessary surrender to Axis demands, particularly at a time when Germany is so thoroughly involved in Russia, would have a definitely adverse effect on the traditional amity between our two peoples, that it would probably bring about an immediate suspension of the economic assistance that is being given to the French colonies, and that it might very possibly cause America to make a complete readjustment of its attitude toward his Government of France.

I requested that his decision announced to me the preceding evening be reconsidered in view of its certainly adverse effect on the future prospects of France and the French overseas Empire.

He replied that since last December Germany has constantly exerted increasing pressure on him to remove

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Weygand ...

ABC file

PSF  
Safe File

FEB 6 1972

By J. C.

Weygand, that he has until now consistently refused, but that now there is nothing for him to do but yield to the demand.

In reply to a question as to how far the Germans have gone in their threats, he replied that their demands included everything, among other things the bases and the fleet, to which he refused to accede. Yesterday however the Germans sent him a "brutal" "dictat" threatening in the event of refusal to occupy all of France, to feed the army of occupation with French foodstuffs, and to permit the native population to die of hunger.

Being himself a prisoner and being concerned primarily with the fate of his people to whom he has dedicated himself he had found it necessary to yield to the German threat and recall General Weygand from Africa. He went on to say that there will be no change in the situation in Africa, that no successor to Weygand will be appointed, that he remains determined to preserve the Empire, and that the general command of African forces will be administered from Vichy.

Command from Vichy to me means only command by Admiral Darlan, Minister of National Defense.

Upon inquiry as to his estimate of the reason for German objection to General Weygand he replied that Weygand was disliked by the Germans first because he had communicated to them the Armistice terms in 1918, and second because he is "undiplomatic" and "indiscreet". In this reply I must assume the Marshal knew he was not telling the whole truth.

While the great inarticulate and leaderless mass of the French people remain hopeful of a British victory and continue to hope that America will in the end rescue them from their present predicament without their doing anything for themselves, the Government of France today headed by a feeble, frightened old man surrounded by self-seeking conspirators is altogether controlled by a group which, probably for its own safety, is devoted to the Axis philosophy.

Leaders of this group are:

Admiral Darlan, Vice President and heir apparent,  
M. Pierre Pucheu, Secretary of Interior,  
M. Benoist-Méchin, Secretary of State to the  
Vice President,  
M. de Brinon, French Ambassador in Paris,

M. Paul ...



M. Paul Marion, Secretary of Information and Propaganda,  
M. Yves Bouthillier, Secretary of Finance; and  
M. François Lehideux, Secretary of Industrial Production.

Admiral Darlan, as you know, has been legally designated to succeed the eighty-six year old Marshal.

I am reasonably sure that Darlan sometime ago promised Hitler the use of French African base facilities but in this promise he has until now been blocked by Weygand.

M. Pucheu has recently effected a very great expansion of the secret police which are completely under his control. He is busily engaged now in building up via the Légion des Anciens Combattants what is intended to become an effective Ku-Klux Klan and which is already operating as such to some extent.

Darlan and Pucheu are both said to be ambitious to succeed to the Marshal's office, and while they are at the present time working together it is reasonable to assume that they will be tearing at each others' throats in the reasonably near future.

As a pure gambling chance and in consideration of their form sheets one should place his money on Pucheu.

Both will certainly be eliminated from the political picture if not "liquidated" when and if Germany is defeated.

During my conference with the Marshal he was as always agreeable and friendly in spite of my having to point to several disagreeable prospects for France involved in his surrender to Germany in the matter of Weygand, and upon my departure he expressed a hope that our personal regard for each other would not be injured by the action which he has been forced to take.

In view of his willingness under German and collaborationist pressure to sacrifice Weygand, who is a very close and loyal personal friend, it is not reasonable to expect him in the future to refuse under the same pressure the use of African bases, or the employment of the fleet for the Axis account, or any other demand that Germany may consider of sufficient importance to its military effort.

While ...




While one may be fully justified in looking at the difficulties of the Marshal's ending years with understanding sympathy, it seems necessary to reluctantly relinquish what was perhaps always only a faint hope that it might be possible for me through friendly personal relations and pertinent advice to give some semblance of backbone to a jellyfish.

The pro-Axis, anti-British group which surrounds the aged Marshal is responsive only to positive action. Admiral Darlan is reported by one of our friends, a subordinate in his office, to have said before the event that America would not take any positive action if Weygand should be removed.

It would appear to promise some effect in strengthening the Marshal's opposition to future demands of the Axis and its supporters within his Government if we should now seize the initiative to the extent of directing the American Ambassador to inform him that the United States is seriously concerned in regard to probable future demands of the Axis powers in Africa, and that if the Axis powers are hereafter granted in the colonies or in France any further privileges or assistance, that are not specifically required by the Armistice Agreement and that will be of assistance to their military effort, the United States will recall its Ambassador and will take such action in regard to French possessions in America and in Africa as is considered advantageous to our defensive preparations.

If the Ambassador should be directed to make such a statement to the Marshal, we must be prepared and determined to carry it out. To avoid a reaction contrary to our interests it must not be a bluff.

Most respectfully,

  
William D. Leahy

safe: ABCD folder  
PSF

KD  
am EP

GRAY

(Moscow)  
Kuibyshev

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd. 3:48 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2085, December 19, 6 p. m.

VOLSKAYA KOMMUNA today publishes without comment a Tass despatch from Tokyo dated yesterday and briefly summarizing the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister before the special session of Parliament. Togo is quoted as stating in respect of Soviet-Japanese relations that Japan has not altered its policy of assuring security in the north and that the Soviet Government has also repeatedly declared its intention of adherence to its neutrality pact with Japan.

DICKERSON

ESM

M. Paul Marion, Secretary of Information and Propaganda,  
M. Yves Bouthillier, Secretary of Finance; and  
M. François Lehideux, Secretary of Industrial Production.

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While ...

C  
O  
P  
Y

CHINA DEFENSE SUPPLIES, INC.  
1601 V STREET N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 12, 1941

Dear Mr. Welles:

In connection with our conversations last Tuesday, I am in receipt of a cable from General Chiang Kai-shek dated Chungking, December 10th, and reporting among other things, "the Chief Soviet Military Advisor expresses his personal opinion when I saw him again today that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan is merely a matter of time and of procedure. The Soviet, he indicates, will make an open declaration of war only after a general coordinated war plan has been arranged between the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet. This differs considerably with the attitude of scepticism and disappointment that he assumed two days ago. I cannot fathom whether the change in his attitude is due to new instructions received from his Government for communication to me."

Hoping that the above may be of interest,

Yours sincerely,

T. V. SOONG

Honorable Sumner Welles  
Under Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

A01D01-  
A01D86



PET 20/12/41  
MAILED  
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 13th, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary of State,

I enclose herewith a personal message which I have just received and which I have been asked by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable John Curtin, to convey to the President.

I also attach copy of an appreciation of the situation regarding the defence of Rabaul and New Caledonia by the Australian Chiefs of Staff, which is referred to in Mr. Curtin's message to the President.

Yours sincerely,

*McCasey*

The Secretary of State of the United States,  
Washington, D.C.





AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 13th, 1941

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been asked by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following personal message:-

"On the entry of the United States of America into the war with Germany and Italy as well as with Japan, I desire on behalf of the people of Australia to express to you as representative of the people of America, how greatly we have been heartened and strengthened by the knowledge that the English-speaking world and the majority of mankind are now arrayed against the common foe.

2. We in Australia are firmly resolved, come what may, to do our utmost to defend to the limit of our capacity, the Commonwealth of Australia and adjacent territories of the South West Pacific, and to cooperate in the general plan of the defeat of the enemy. As you are no doubt aware, we have land, sea and air forces in Malaya and in the Netherlands East Indies area.

3. When risks to Australia were not as great as at the present time, we sent some of our naval and air forces as far afield as Britain, and we have three Army Divisions and units of our Air Forces in the Middle East. We have also contributed several thousand men to the Empire Air Training Scheme, and we hope to be able to continue our part in it.

4. As a Nation bordering on the Pacific Ocean, the entry of Japan into the war has brought a new threat near to our country. We deeply deplore the losses sustained by your naval and air forces at Hawaii, and by the British Navy at Malaya. For some time these events will no doubt minimise the otherwise deterrent effect of American and British sea power on Japanese operations.

5. The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia has warmly welcomed the opportunity of cooperating with the United States Forces in the provision of a naval base at Rabaul, and aerodrome facilities in territories under the control of the Commonwealth and in New Caledonia. However, the changed naval

situation/

situation has had such repercussions on our local defence position and cooperation in overseas theatres that our military resources are insufficient to meet commitments for defence of Pacific Islands in which you and we are vitally interested. I am forwarding separately to the Australian Minister a review of the position as it has been put to us by our Service advisers, and it would be deeply appreciated if you and your Service authorities could consider what help you may be able to give in providing forces to deny these bases to the enemy."

*McCarty*

13th December, 1941.

APPRECIATION OF SITUATION REGARDING DEFENCE  
OF RABAU AND NEW CALEDONIA BY AUSTRALIAN  
CHIEFS OF STAFF.

The following appreciation has been submitted to the Australian Government by the Australian Chiefs of Staff.

(1) Fleet Base at Rabaul.

1. Three courses of action are open in respect of Rabaul, namely,

- (a) to reinforce the existing garrison up to the strength of a brigade group;
- (b) to withdraw the existing garrison and abandon Rabaul;
- (c) to retain the existing garrison.

2. In considering these courses we have had in mind the fact that the existing garrison was originally despatched to Rabaul to protect the air operational base. In recent months a joint United States-Australian project has been agreed to for expanding the defences of Rabaul to make it suitable for use as a fleet base for British and American Naval Forces. Time has not permitted the consummation of this plan, and we are now advised that it is most unlikely that it will be proceeded with in the near future. The function of the present garrison accordingly remains the same as that existing when the garrison was first despatched to Rabaul and on this basis we reject course (a), i.e., reinforcement. An additional reason for this conclusion is the very great difficulties and hazard which would be involved in transporting reinforcements from the mainland to Rabaul and in maintaining increased forces at that place.

3. Dealing with courses (b) and (c) we consider it essential to maintain an advanced observation line to give the earliest possible indication of an enemy move to the South. We must therefore rule out any question of withdrawal. In coming to this conclusion we are also influenced by the difficulties of sea

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY RXP, PAIR  
FEB 7 1974



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DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY RXP, PAIR  
FEB 7 1974

The time factor is an important consideration, but the Chief of the General Staff, who has been granted authority to call up for training a further 114,000 men for the Australian Army in addition to 132,000 already in training, feels unable to recommend provision of the considerable strength necessary for the defence of New Caledonia, in view of Army commitments for local defence, forces despatched to Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Rabaul, and those to be despatched to Port Moresby. The strength of the Australian Imperial Forces abroad is 120,000, together with 30,000 in training in Australia.

We also lack air forces to provide the necessary air cooperation for the military force that would be necessary to defend New Caledonia, while anti-aircraft defences could only be provided by denuding vital centres in Australia.

We think the position as regards New Caledonia should be frankly put to the United States Government so that they may be invited to consider whether they can see their way clear to assist in its defence by providing a garrison or by any other means.

(3) Supplies for American forces which may use Australian bases.

The attention of the Commonwealth Government is also drawn to the information we have received regarding the imminent arrival in Brisbane of a United States convoy containing troops, aircraft and ammunition which has been diverted from the Philippines.

We recommend that the United States Government should be approached with the suggestion that certain ammunition, spare parts, bombs and the like should be sent to Australia at the earliest possible moment for the use of United States warships, aircraft or military forces which may use bases in Australia either for operations or as transit points.

43CN  
—  
AMT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Safe: ABC & Teller  
London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

~~By~~ By Releasable Date

15 1971

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6147, December 19, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE SECRETARY

Your 6885 deeply appreciated. Eden's cables which I am forwarding in a summary statement confirm your judgment. The following is a summary of a four hour conversation that Eden had with Stalin:

It began with a full survey of the political situation when Stalin produced draft projects of two treaties, one to cover mutual military assistance irrespective of the war and the other political collaboration now and after the war. The terms do not greatly differ from those which Eden had foreshadowed and the latter gave Stalin a draft prepared on the approved basis. A further meeting was to take place on the following day to evolve an agreed text which Eden thought would not present any insuperable difficulty.

Stalin then suggested the signature of a secret  
protocol

-2- #6147, December 19, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from London.

protocol embodying the joint views of the British Government and the Soviet Government for a settlement of postwar frontiers and outlined in detail his conception of such a settlement for Europe as a whole which was drastic and severe upon Germany. Eden told him that for many reasons it was impossible for him to enter into a secret agreement; he was pledged to the United States Government not to do so; the British Government's own discussion of a peace settlement had not advanced to this point and he would have to consult his colleagues. He would, however, take back a full account to London where the proposal would be studied and the matter could then be taken up through diplomatic channels.

WINANT

GW

BS  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd. 8:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Stalin agreed to this and also to the pro-  
posals being communicated to the United States Gov-  
ernment. His desire was to establish that our war  
aims were identical as then our alliance would be  
stronger. If our war aims were different then,  
he said, there was no true alliance.

The war situation was then discussed. Stalin  
said his military advisers believed Germany had  
given Japan about 1500 aircraft. Eden urged the  
difficulties of transit but Stalin said he had come  
to believe that this was not a Japanese war in the  
Far East. He thought that some of the Japanese pilots  
had been trained in Germany and that others were Ger-  
mans.

Eden gave Stalin some account of the British  
Government's military objectives in Africa and he  
fully endorsed these. Hitherto the war policy of the  
Soviet Union had been to fight rear guard actions with  
the object of gradually wearing down the German forces.

Now



-2- #6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from London

Now the latter were beginning to feel the tension. German soldiers were tired and their commanders had not prepared for a winter campaign. The arrival of new Soviet reinforcements had made possible the change seen in the last two weeks. The Germans had tried to dig in but they had not made very strong fortifications. Soviet troops had been able to hold their own and were now able to attack. Counterattacks were gradually being developed into counter-offensives. The Germans were reorganizing their forces and creating new formations but he did not think that these would be ready before two months. In any case his army would continue to keep up the offensive all winter. He thought Russia had now slight superiority in the air but emphasized that the Germans had great superiority in tanks. He said that the position in the South was satisfactory and that the arrival of fresh Russian reinforcements had resulted in the recent successes.

UNCLINT

GM

4

-2- #6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London

(End Summary)

There was a military reference in a detailed section of Eden's report which I think is important because I have understood that the army air service has held a contrary view. The reference reads as follows: "As regards rocket bomb, Stalin stated that this had not turned out to be very useful against tanks, though it was useful against troops. Russians had found that airplanes fitted with cannon were better against tanks than those fitted with rocket bombs."

Would you please see that General Arnold gets this information but make sure that Eden is protected as conversations were informal and confidential in character.

Eden sent an additional special note today which reads as follows:

"Stalin's attitude about the Far East is perfectly loyal and in fact he stated that he would be in a position to help us there in the spring. He is, however, clearly determined not to provoke Japan at present and considers that he is not in a position to do so. In these circumstances I felt that it would not only be useless but also unwise to speak to him about the United States use of air bases in Siberia.

Please

-2- #6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE:) from London

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Please



-3- #6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London

Please explain the position to Mr. Winant who spoke to me about this just before I left England and say how sorry I am not to have been able to do more."

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

KLP

DEYOU

1st Safe File!  
"ABCD"

A01E01-  
A01E04

Personal and ~~Secret~~

Following from Prime Minister.

Begins:

Part I

I am of course leaving arrangements for forthcoming conference entirely in the hands of the President and his advisers. Nevertheless you might like to have a few suggestions, gist of which you could pass to the President in appropriate form.

2. On first evening (Monday) we should like to comply generally with practice by an exchange of views informally and with the President and Chiefs of Staff with Joint Staff Mission, Chiefs of Staff would be glad of your views and advice early.

3. After hearing views of Joint Staff Mission, Chiefs of Staff will complete Tuesday morning a short paper they have prepared on allied strategy. After tea Tuesday I suggest joint United States and British Staffs confer. We think it essential this should be on highest level with President in the chair. I shall have already given the President my views on general situation and am prepared to develop them at conference.

4. Unless American Chiefs of Staff would prefer to table paper of their own on joint strategy suggest our Chiefs of Staff paper should form basis of our first formal discussion. Joint strategy must be settled and agreed at outset before we can decide dispositions and programme.

Part II follows.

PW

REGRADED  
UNCL/SSIFIED

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
Safe  
ABCD

December 13, 1941.

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending a draft which may assist you in framing a message to Chiang Kai-shek for such conference in Chungking as you suggested this morning.

Since leaving you I find that there is here already a military mission from Great Britain duly authorized to confer on just such matters as you are suggesting; also that there are fully qualified representatives of Australia, the Dutch East Indies, and China, who could confer with us here on just such matters as you suggested for Singapore. I suggest that such a preliminary conference might be held here instead of at Singapore.

So far as the Moscow conference is concerned, I do not feel that I am in possession of sufficient acquaintance with the addressee or familiarity with what you propose to discuss with him to make any attempt at such a draft by me of very much use to you.

Faithfully yours,



Secretary of War.

The President,  
The White House.

DEYOU.

Following is part II of my telegram 7105. Begins.

5. Subsequently joint conference might meet daily in the morning. I should hope that we can limit numbers attending as far as possible say to maximum of 8 on our side and 10 on American side.

6. Once strategy has been agreed staffs can get down to dispositions and supply experts can go fully into action.

7. I am attracted by the idea of holding Supreme Allied War Council meeting towards end of conference to which Stalin and General Chiang Kai-shek representatives would be invited.

If the President favours this proposal I should like to sound Moscow and Chungking at once.

Ends.

:HK

Draft

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint <sup>military</sup> conference to take place in Chungking not later than December ~~16th~~ <sup>17th</sup> to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies. ~~I~~ I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States, and ~~if possible~~ the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder. I venture to hope that such a conference in Chungking may eventually lead to the establishment of a more permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

60  
25  
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340  
120  
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370 1520  
1480

3

14

One

*Sal: ABCD folder*  
*PSF*

BS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd. 8:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

By J. Schachtel DEC 19 1941

RUSH

6148, December 19, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE SECRETARY AND THE  
PRESIDENT.

Stanley Bruce, High Commissioner of Australia, has consistently been friendly to the United States and has always been in support of collaboration with us. I see him often. He has been helping me get support for the text of the new draft of Article seven of the Lend-Lease Agreement. Today he gave me the text of a confidential memorandum he was sending his own Government. I asked him if he would give me a copy and allow me to forward it to you both. He said he would be glad to have me do so but would like to be protected. The text follows:

WIMANT

G.



December 14, 1941

*From the President to The Generalissimo*

DRAFT

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action <sup>particularly in Eastern Asia</sup> which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

*It should also be communicated by the*  
~~the~~ Russian, British and Dutch ~~Governments~~ *representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective governments*

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

*I am working hard on continuing our contribution to your supplies and am trying to increase it. And you my very warm personal regards*  
*Roosevelt*

MEV

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd 10:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH. *(Section two)*

6148, December 19, 8 p.m.

The entry of the United States of America and Japan into the war means an alignment of the great powers of the world in a fight to a finish. The British Empire, the United States of America, Russia and China on one side and Germany, Italy and Japan on the other. In this struggle Germany and Italy are really subject to one direction owing to the overwhelming dominance of Germany. Japan is far distant and in a sense is operating separately but we have seen enough of German methods to know that she will insist on the closest coordination of plans with Japan and will exercise a considerable control over their execution.

To meet this combination it is essential that the four great powers opposing the Axis should have an agreed plan of cooperation which will enable their combined forces, supplies and resources to be pooled and utilized

-2- #6148, December 19, 8 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from London.

and utilized in whatever manner is best designed to achieve the common purpose namely the defeat of the ENEMY.

The first essential is that there should be leadership and that there should be a definite policy. The leadership should come from President Roosevelt with his unrivaled prestige and authority. The policy should be formulated between the President and the Prime Minister between whom the closest contact should be maintained in its development in the light of events. The policy should cover the military, political and economic fields. It should deal both with our immediate problems and our long range planning. It should visualize the war as a whole and should provide for the allocation and utilization of the total land, sea and air forces and the resources and supplies of the allies in whatever manner is necessary to achieve the common objective.

Having determined the policy it will then be the task of leadership to persuade the powers associated with us to accept and implement it.

This implementation would involve the acceptance of the allocation and utilization of the allies for the time being limited resources in the carrying out of the policy agreed upon.

In order

-3- #6149, December 19, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from London.

In order to arrive at such a policy it is necessary to visualize the great issues that confront us and determine our line with regard to them. In a first attempt to do this I set out below some of the major questions which we now have to face.

WINANT

WMC



DRAFT

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

I would communicate it in the utmost secrecy to the Russian, British and Dutch Governments.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

BS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd. 10:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

6148, December 19, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

One. The Far East.

The initial success which Japan has achieved at sea has altered the whole balance of power in the Pacific and has, for the time being, rendered any United Kingdom--United States naval combination adequate to deal with Japanese naval strength impossible.

The question has to be faced of what our strategy in the immediate future should be in the Far East.

It would appear to be of a defensive character at sea, aimed at harassing the enemy, interrupting her communications and denying her the benefit, so far as possible, of any new sources of supply she may obtain, e.g. rubber and rice from Thailand.

The best method of achieving this would be by the largest possible concentration of submarines and aircraft based upon the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Singapore.

With regard to submarines, the Dutch have a certain number available but their reinforcement would have to come



-2- #6148, December 19, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London

to come from the United States of America and if Russia were at war with Japan from the USSR which has some 90 submarines based on Vladivostok.

With regard to the air, reinforcements would have to come from the United States of America and the United Kingdom and the determination of what can be sent would necessitate a review of the requirements of all theaters of operation and a determination as to the degree of priority to be accorded to each.

The provision of submarines and aircraft which has been suggested above is for the defensive side of the war in the Far East. A defensive strategy, however, is not sufficient as it would probably only result in the consolidation of her gains, the replenishment of her vital supplies and the strengthening of the position of Japan.

Our strategy must, therefore, contemplate the offensive also. Offensive action on the sea would appear to be postponed for some considerable time.

VINLNT

KLP

DRAFT

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action particularly in Eastern Asia which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

It should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Dutch representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective Governments.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and

EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd 1:40 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

6148, December 19, midnight. (SECTION FOUR)

China, with her almost unlimited man power, would appear to present the most promising opportunity for offensive action.

The intensification of operations in China would seriously embarrass the Japanese, wearied by four years of war; would relieve Japanese pressure in other directions and if successful, e. g. the driving of the Japanese out of southeast China, might have very far reaching results.

In order to stage a successful offensive, however, the Chinese would have to be substantially reinforced in the air and with munitions and supplies. The two questions in relation to reinforcing China in these directions are--

(one) Where would the reinforcements come from, and

(two) How would they be got to China?

With regard to (one), notwithstanding the protestations of aid to China she has received relatively

little

-2-/#6148, December 19, midnight (SECTION FOUR) from  
London

little and her priority has been extremely low. If the decision of the Allies was that China was the instrument through which Japan was to be attacked, her priority would become very high and the United Kingdom, United States and Russia might well be prepared to make sacrifices to ensure China obtaining what was necessary.

With regard to Russia, her own interests might well be served by affording the maximum possible assistance to China as a great offensive by China would go far to remove any menace that Japan presents to Russia in Siberia.

With regard to (two) as long as the Burma Road remains open supplies can go in over this route and I understand they could also be brought in over the Turkestan route from Russia.

Maximum help to China by Russia and through Russia would probably lead to war with Japan. This result would require examination from the angle of the effect upon Russia in her war with Germany of involvement in war with Japan at the same time.

WINANT

EMB

As I OI

PSF  
Safe  
"ABCD"

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

14th December, 1941.

My dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of the 14th December with the messages to Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek an hour ago, and the necessary telegram is on its way to London.

Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt ,  
President of the United States of America.



EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd 6:12 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH.

6143, December 19, midnight. (SECTION FIVE)

One point in this connection is clear namely that if it suited Japan's interests she would immediately declare war on Russia and the fact that she has not done so has considerable significance. It has also to be borne in mind that she will declare war just so soon as it suits her. What has to be examined is whether it is equally in Russia's interests to avoid war with Japan. The fact that Russia's entry into war with Japan would make available the 90 submarines in the Far East as well as enabling air bombardment of Japan to be undertaken from Vladivostok are of great importance.

Two. Russia.

The fact that the Germans have abandoned their offensive is of the greatest significance. It is of paramount importance, however, to determine whether this is due to the Germans being in serious difficulties as to which there is considerable evidence or  
whether

-2-#6148, December 19, midnight (SECTION FIVE) from  
London

whether it is due to a decision to withdraw troops  
from Russia with a view to an offensive elsewhere,  
E. G. the Iberian Peninsula or North Africa.

If it is due to a set back then the question  
of whether the Russians can effectively exploit the  
position has to be determined and if the decision is  
that she can then all other considerations would have  
to be waived in favor of giving her every ounce of  
assistance that can be afforded in order to enable her  
to do so.

WINANT

EMB

Ad1J01-  
Ad1J02

1 PSF  
"A/B CP  
Safe

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

15 December 1941

Time: 2305

General Watson says  
that Lord Halifax read  
over the phone the  
following message just  
received from Anthony  
Eden "We welcome the  
President's initiative.  
Duff Cooper at Singapore  
is doing what the  
President suggested  
and calling a conference  
— We are also

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

arranging to be  
represented at the  
other two conferences  
the President suggested."

Received by telephone.

Respectfully  
L. P. Schurz  
Lt., US Navy

ALH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd 7:40 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

6148, December 19, midnight (SECTION SIX)

On the other hand, if the finding were that the Germans have not suffered a serious set back but have stabilized the Russian line with a view to an offensive elsewhere, e.g., attack on the Iberian Peninsula or a substantial move into North Africa the possibility of counter action by combined British and United States of America forces has to be considered.

If the finding on the Russian situation were that the Germans have suffered a substantial reverse and have been compelled to stabilize the line in order to withdraw, rest, and reorganize divisions but that it is not possible for the Russians during the winter substantially to exploit the position consideration has to be given to the possibility of any Anglo-American action which would divert German forces and prevent their utilization against Russia when active operations recommenced in the spring.

Three. Middle East.

(1) Libya. And westward.

Immediate Anglo-American consideration has to be  
given



-2- #6148, December 19, midnight (SECTION SIX) from  
London

given to the policy to be pursued with regard to French North Africa including the possibility of steps to forestall German-Italian domination and control following on recent conversations with Petain and Ciano.

(B) Eastern Section.

This area involves consideration of both political and strategical problems. The outstanding political one is the position of and policy to be pursued toward Turkey.

WIN:NT

TDL

A01K01-  
A01K04

PSF

Safe: ABCD Green

December 15, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

FOR BIDDLE

NETHERLANDS SERIES NO.

Please deliver following message to Her Majesty  
Queen Wilhemina from the President at the earliest possible  
moment:

QUOTE. In my judgment it is of the highest importance  
that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our  
common action against our common enemy. To this end I have  
suggested to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek that he call a  
joint military conference to take place in Chungking not  
later than December 17 to exchange information and to  
consider the military and naval action, particularly in  
Eastern Asia, which may most effectively be employed to  
accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies. I suggested  
that the conferees might well consist of representatives of

China, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the Netherlands and the United States and I stated that I was prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as the representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John MacGruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December 20; it should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Netherlands representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective governments.

I have also communicated with Mr. Josef Stalin suggesting that he talk with Chinese, American and British representatives in Moscow and let <sup>me</sup> ~~him~~ have his views from the northern viewpoint.

I have proposed to the British Government that they call a military and naval conference in Singapore, to meet simultaneously with the proposed conference in Chungking and to report operational plans as they see the situation in the southern zone. I have suggested to the British Government

that the Singapore conference include Chinese, American and Netherlands officers as well as representatives of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

The estimates and recommendations of these conferences will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem. It may well be that these preliminary conferences may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

I hope that Your Majesty's Government will find it possible to give immediate instructions to the end that the Netherlands will be represented at the Chungking and Singapore meetings.

I send you my warm personal regards. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.

Eu:JDH:RIC

See Correction p. 2  
OK  
72R

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 17, 1941

Rec'd 1:11 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

December 17, 4 p.m.

NETHERLANDS SERIES 61.

FROM BIDDLE

Your 53, December 15, and my 60, December 16.

Following message for the President from Queen Wilhelmina:

"Mr. Biddle has conveyed your message to me, which I have read with the greatest interest. Instructions have at once been given in order that representatives of my Government attend the conference at Chungking as well as at Singapore. It is a matter of deep satisfaction to me that, thanks to your initiative, measures will be concerted to impart to our common war effort its greatest efficacy, and I am happy to send you my warmest wishes for the success of the conversations.

I send you my very best greetings, Wilhelmina."

Foreign Office states Counsellor of Legation is in Chungking and will attend meeting there.

WINANT

LPL



EJ  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd 7:58 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH.

6148, December 19, midnight. (SECTION SEVEN)

The strategical problems have to be considered in the light of the Germans either reaching the great oil supplies through the Caucasus or failing to do so. In the latter event the German oil situation will quite possibly become serious and the staging of a great offensive through Turkey unlikely.

In the former event such an offensive in the spring would appear probable and it is imperative that the Allies' plans to meet it should be fully prepared and coordinated.

In addition to the coordination of the Allies' plans for the prosecution of the war militarily using the word in its widest significance it is essential that the Allies' plans for the conduct of the war in the political sphere should also be coordinated.

To Hitler's "new order in Europe" and Japan's "Asian co-prosperity" we must put forward in clear  
terms

-2-#3148, December 19, midnight (SECTION SEVEN) From  
London  
terms our own policy for the new world we propose  
to create after the war.

Such a policy would be the basis of our political  
warfare which may well be as important as military  
warfare. Backed by intelligent propaganda it will do  
much to weaken the will to resist of the German  
people and will strengthen the determination of the  
people of the occupied countries passively for the  
time being and later actively to continue the struggle.

Without cooperation and direction on the highest  
plane in the conduct of war both in the strategic,  
and political spheres the powers opposing the Axis  
will be seriously handicapped and the period of hos-  
tilities prolonged.

What steps are being taken to bring about this  
coordination and direction".

(END OF MESSAGE).

WIMNT

NPL

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Will you please show to the President the  
attached letter received today from Mr. T. V. Soong  
enclosing copy of telegram from Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek.

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War.

For The President  
from the Secretary of War

**SECRET**

EXACT COPY

RADIOGRAM

BJS - 1712.

AG 381 (12-22-41)MSC

DECEMBER 23, 1941.  
3:10 AM

FROM MANILA

TO THE ADJT GENL

\* \* \* \* \*

NO. 40 DECEMBER TWENTY SECOND

ONE OF THE MAIN FEATURED OF OUR ATTEMPT AT AIR REINFORCEMENT  
HERE WAS THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN MY RADIOS OF DECEMBER  
THIRTEEN AND FOURTEEN REGARDING PURSUIT AND DIVE BOMBER REINFORCE-  
MENT BY MEANS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER STOP PRESENT ENEMY AIR ENCIRCLE-  
MENT PERMITS INTERRUPTION OF FERRY ROUTE TO SOUTH DUE TO DAY  
BOMBARDMENT MINDANAO FIELDS STOP EARLY REINFORCEMENT BY CARRIER  
WOULD SOLVE PROBLEM STOP YOUR RADIOS MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THIS  
FEATURE STOP CAN I EXPECT ANYTHING ALONG THAT LINE QUERY QUERY  
IN THIS GENERAL CONNECTION CAN YOU GIVE ME ANY INKLING OF STRATEGIC  
PLANS PACIFIC FLEET QUERY

MACARTHUR

EXACT ACTION COPY TO: A. C. of S., WPD, Copy No. 1.

EXACT INFORMATION COPIES TO: Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 2.  
Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 3.

EXACT COPY

**SECRET**

10-19-66

*Carl L. Spicer*



~~SECRET~~

Op-12A-4-drc  
(SC) L21-1/VZ  
Ser. 0150212

EXACT COPY

Navy Department  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington

~~SECRET~~

December 23, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
To : The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.  
Subject: Transportation of short range aircraft to the  
Philippines.  
References: (a) General MacArthur's secret radiogram of  
December 23, 1941.  
(b) Asst. Chief of Staff, WPD, U. S. Army,  
secret memorandum of December 23, 1941.

1. In the existing strategic situation delivery of aircraft to the Philippines over the direct route from the Hawaiian area is not practicable in any type of ship.

2. Diversion of aircraft carriers from their necessary functions as fighting ships for the purpose of movement of short range aircraft to the Philippines via the southern route is likewise impracticable in the existing strategic situation.

3. As agreed after extensive consideration of previous proposals of a similar nature, the best way to move Army pursuit and dive bombers to the Far East at the present time is by shipment in cargo vessels, including those converted for use as aircraft transports. It is recommended that no change be made in our present plans for movement of aircraft to the Far East by cargo vessels.

4. The question raised concerning the strategic plans of the Pacific Fleet will be covered separately.

(Sgd.) H. R. Stark  
H. R. STARK

10-21-66

Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

C  
O  
P  
Y

CHINA DEFENSE SUPPLIES, INC.  
1601 V Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

P.F.  
Sader  
"AB2L"

December 16, 1941

ORIGINAL

Dear Mr. Stimson:

For your information I enclose copy of a telegram Stalin sent to Chiang Kai-shek, dated Moscow, the 12th of December. A copy of the same has been given to the State Department.

Yours sincerely,

T. V. SOONG

Enclosure

The Secretary of War  
Washington, D.C.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

State Dept copy of telegram, Stalin to Chiang,  
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 747.

C  
O  
P  
Y

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM STALIN

(Translation from Chinese)

"Your telegram only reached me yesterday. I am deeply appreciative of your kind consideration. I am in perfect agreement with you that the long heroic struggle China has put up against Japan, and the present anti-Japanese front in the Pacific are part and parcel of the general anti-Axis front. At the same time the anti-German front assumes special significance in the anti-Axis front, because Germany is the strongest partner of the Axis.

"Soviet Russia today has the principal burden of the war against Germany. And Soviet Russian victory over Germany constitutes a great hope of the other members of the anti-Axis front, Great Britain, the United States and China. It is my opinion that under the circumstances the Soviet today ought not to divert its strength to the Far East, when it is beginning to attack the German armies, for by dispersing our strength the difficulties of the German armies will be lessened. I beg you therefore not to insist that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

"Soviet Russia must fight Japan, for Japan will surely unconditionally break the Neutrality Pact. We are preparing to meet that situation, but it takes time to prepare. Therefore I again implore you not to take the lead in demanding that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

Stalin"

Moscow, December 12, 1941

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ARMY RADIOGRAM

PARAPHRASED COPY

FROM: CHUNGKING  
20 DECEMBER 1941

GENERALISSIMO ASKED THAT I INFORM YOU THAT HE IS SORRY HE IS UNABLE TO REPORT RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS OF JOINT PRELIMINARY MILITARY CONFERENCE BY THE PARTICULAR TIME REQUESTED X IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT GENERAL WAVELL WILL ARRIVE PRIOR TO TWENTY-SECOND OR TWENTY-THIRD X ON DECEMBER TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL BRETT WILL ARRIVE FROM RANGOON X IT HAS BEEN REQUESTED OF THE GOVERNOR OF DUTCH EAST INDIES THAT HE SEND SOMEONE TO REPRESENT HIM X THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT IN LONDON HAS GIVEN AUTHORITY TO THE HEAD OF ITS MISSION TO ACT UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE REGULARLY APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE X NO ORDERS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE MILITARY MISSION FROM RUSSIA X DIFFICULTIES IN COMMUNICATIONS HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO NOTIFY GENERAL BRETT THE EXACT CONTENT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS BUT HE HAS BEEN URGENTLY REQUESTED TO ARRIVE IN CHUNGKING AS SOON AS HE CAN GET HERE X THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND CHIEF OF STAFF HAVE BEEN FURNISHED WITH THE ABOVE INFORMATION X

MAGRUDER.

2230, 21 December 1941.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Presidents Copy  
CIP  
Presidents Library  
10-19-66  
(10/20/50)

10-19-66

Signature: Carl J. Spicer



*about*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


December 17, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith the reply from Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek which I read to you on the telephone.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

Your telegram only reached me yesterday. I am deeply appreciative of your kind consideration. I am in perfect agreement with you that the long heroic struggle China has put up against Japan, and the present anti-Japanese front in the Pacific are part and parcel of the general anti-Axis front. At the same time the anti-German front assumes special significance in the anti-Axis front, because Germany is the strongest partner of the Axis.

Soviet Russia today has the principal burden of the war against Germany. And Soviet Russian victory over Germany constitutes a great hope of the other members of the anti-Axis front, Great Britain, the United States and China. It is my opinion that under the circumstances the Soviet today ought not to divert its strength to the Far East, when it is beginning to attack the German armies, for by dispersing our strength the difficulties of the German armies will be lessened. I beg you therefore not to insist that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

Soviet Russia must fight Japan, for Japan will surely unconditionally break the Neutrality Pact. We are preparing to meet that situation, but it takes time to prepare. Therefore I again implore you not to take the lead in demanding that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

STALIN

*File: ABC D folder*  
*RSE*

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

Dated December 20, 1941

Rec'd 4:45 a.m.; 21st

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*State Dept. 12-20-41*

*By J. Schachtel Date 12-20-41*

TRIPLE PRIORITY

12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

My 10, December 19, 6 p.m.

Eden confirmed the statements made to me yesterday by Molotov and expressed the fear that Soviet insistence that a commitment be entered into at this time recognizing the Soviet frontiers of 1941 may make it impossible for him to reach an understanding with respect to post war, i.e., construction. In this connection he stated that the Soviet demands not only embrace the Baltic states and Bessarabia but also seem to imply some expansion to the west, presumably by advancing the Lithuanian borders into East Prussia. It also appears to be desired by the Soviets that in addition to the reestablishment of the Finnish frontier certain additional naval and air bases in Finland must be obtained. Eden said that he had based his opposition to the Soviet desire  
for an

-2- #12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow.

for an agreement on frontiers at this time not only on the general inadvisability and impropriety of such action by Great Britain independently of its commonwealth associates but also on his intention to be guided by the message transmitted to Churchill by the President through Hopkins some months ago in which the hope was expressed that no commitments regarding post war settlements should be reached without consultation with the United States. He said he had every intention of holding to this course. Stalin's position was, Eden said, that the Soviet Government would be quite prepared to acquiesce in and support any plans the British Government might have with respect to post war rearrangements such as, for example, the establishment of British bases in Holland or elsewhere on the Atlantic Coast of Europe but that for its part it expects full recognition of its own frontiers and security problems.

With respect to the "Pact of Mutual Assistance," Eden stated that the arrangement contemplated is merely the implementation of the existing war cooperation and that the scope of any agreement of this nature would be confined to the war against Germany - and would not envisage any eventual hostilities elsewhere

-3- #12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow.

elsewhere, as, for example, in the Orient.

As to the attitude of the Soviet Union with respect to the war in the Pacific, he said that the subject had been discussed of course and that Stalin had said that the Soviet Government considers that it is not now in a position to take action in this area - but that by next spring the situation may have changed.

Eden said that had brought up the question of the situation in the Near East and that Stalin had indicated that the Soviet Government is satisfied with the position in Iran and has no uneasiness with regard to Turkey.

I mentioned the President's desire to have conversations take place in Moscow on the general war effort and Colonel Faymonville's presence here for that purpose.

THOMPSON

KLP

BS  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)  
Kuibyshev

Dated December 20, 1941

Rec'd. 11:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Eden stated that he was, of course, aware of this proposal but that he was without specific instructions regarding it. He added that the British military mission is to remain in Moscow and will consequently be in a position to participate in such conversations when they take place.

With respect to the manner in which the American Government is to be kept informed by the British of the results of the conversations being held in Moscow, Eden stated that he had instructed the Foreign Office to show to Ambassador Winant all his telegrams from Moscow.

The British Ambassador at Ankara and the British Minister at Tehran have been so delayed by bad weather that the plan to have them come to Moscow has been abandoned. Eden plans to leave Moscow on his return journey tomorrow night. Thurston.

(END OF MESSAGE)

THOMPSON

WEC



One

ABC

PSF Safe: ABCD folder

AF  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)  
Kuibyshev

Dated December 17, 1941

Rec'd 11:14 a.m.; 18th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

2070, December 17, noon.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

Department's 1284, December 13, 3 p.m.

One. It is not unlikely that Sikorski expressed sentiments similar to those reported from London during his visit to the Soviet Union (as it is probable that from the Polish viewpoint it is preferable that the Soviet war effort against Germany should not be diminished by additional activities in the East), but as he had returned to Moscow prior to the Japanese attack on us he presumably did not address his remarks to Stalin.

Two. The British Ambassador called on me the day of the Japanese attack. In discussing the probable attitude of the Soviet Government he expressed the opinion that it might well be that of neutrality. His statements in this respect did not at the time convey

By J. Schenck 1284 100

-2- #2070, December 17, noon from (Moscow) Kuibyshev.

convey to me the impression that he advocated such a policy. The Chinese Ambassador however, with whom I carefully explored this subject last evening, stated explicitly that Cripps seemed to favor Soviet abstention from war with Japan. Upon Cripps return from Moscow I shall endeavor definitely to ascertain his attitude in this respect.

Three. The Chinese Ambassador has informed me that insofar as he is aware Stalin has not replied to Chiang Kai Shek's note of December 8 (a copy of which he understands was handed to Ambassador Gauss). He believes however from the general attitude of the Soviet officials with whom he has conversed that the Soviet Government will not be disposed to engage in hostilities with Japan at this time if they can be avoided.

Four. With respect to Litvinov's exposition to the Secretary of the decisions arrived at by his government I may say that, as the Department is aware, Soviet foreign policy is superlatively realistic. It may be taken for granted therefore that until the Soviet Government can be convinced of the advantages of entering the war against Japan no other considerations (such as the general wisdom of such action or the help

-3- #2070, December 17, noon from (Moscow) Kuibyshev.

the help that would thereby be rendered us and the British) will affect its decision. In this connection, it has been reported to me by persons having some association with Soviet citizens, and the same opinion was expressed to me last night by a Soviet official who may be presumed to know the present "party line", that the Soviet Government would be disposed to participate in the War of the Pacific only if Britain establishes a second front with Germany on the continent - the North African campaign being definitely regarded as a minor operation in no way capable of diminishing Germany's effective strength against the Soviet Union.

THURSTON

RR

~~SECRET~~

Safe  
"ABCD" Folder

The following received from Military Attache, Singapore.  
Sent Singapore time, 10:03 P.M., December 21, Washington time, 9:03 A.M.,  
December 21.

Complete report Singapore conference forwarded via British Cipher  
purpose speed and security. WD representative presented Presidents and  
MacArthur's views forecast situation and insisted they be used as guide in  
developing plan. All measures suggested by MacArthur adopted definite  
air and sea communication routes for air and land reinforcements to  
Philippines and Malaya have been designated and critical points along these  
routes are to be given special protection. Movement of L S air from Australia to  
Philippines to be expedited Singapore Conference clearly indicates an immediate  
need for one supreme head over a combined allied staff for detailed coordina-  
tion of USA British Australian and Dutch measures for movements to their  
designated locations, institution and maintenance of air and sea lines of  
communication and the strategic direction of all operations in Pacific area.  
For example, any projected convoy movement thru this area requires coordinated  
employment of British Dutch and Australian air for protection of such convoys,  
British Dutch and Australian Naval escorts and the establishment of striking  
forces for operation against Japanese units which may attack such convoys.  
The employment of protective air forces will frequently call for displacement  
air units to designated air dromes of other countries along the convoy route.  
Such unified command is necessary to meet both the immediate defensive situation  
and to originate plans for and conduct of the subsequent offensive operations  
necessary for expelling Japanese from the area. The logical location of such  
an allied command headquarters appears to be Sandoeng. At present control is  
loosely exercised over British Dutch Australian and New Zealand units by  
CINC Far East and CINC Eastern Fleet requiring usually specific consent of  
country concerned to requests for employment of its major units. Necessity  
for communication between the various countries invariably results in delayed  
execution which would not occur were command to be exercised over an allied  
staff in one location. Believe Chinese should be included. Unofficial  
opinions expressed here indicate USA Commander acquainted with the Pacific  
area would not only be acceptable but desirable.

BRINK

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~~SECRET~~

[Dec. 17, 1941]

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 760.

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF  
Safe  
"ABD"

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM J. STALIN

I received your message on the 16th December.

As there was no mention of the object of the suggested conferences in Chungking and Moscow, and that there was only one day left before their opening, I thought I might be able, in conversation with Mr. Eden, who has just arrived in Moscow, to elucidate the question of the objects of the conferences, and to find out whether they could be postponed for some time. It transpired, however, that Mr. Eden has no information on this point, either. In view of the above, I should be glad to receive from you the necessary details, to ensure that the participation of representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in these conferences should bring results. Allow me to thank you for the feelings you express with regard to the successes of the Soviet army. I wish you all success in your struggle against the aggression in the Pacific. I send you and Mr. Hopkins my warm personal greetings.



DRAFT

ASF  
Safe  
"ABCD"

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is suggested that as soon as a preliminary decision is reached as to the delimitation of the Southwest Pacific Theater, and in agreement with the British and Dutch authorities, a communication in substance as follows, be dispatched to Chiang Kai-shek:

1. In order to insure coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater, which includes Burma.
2. The advisability of a similar coordination and control of activities of the Associated Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident, in agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch governments, I desire to suggest that you should exercise such coordinating control of all forces of the Associated Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

It is our thought that, in order to make such coordination effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, Dutch, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might well be included.



This staff would function under your supervising control .

The supreme commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters and your joint planning staff. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable. Such liaison would make possible the quick movement of suitable forces from one theater to another in case of an emergency, as well as provide an agency for long term planning. Your view of this matter will be greatly appreciated by the American, British and Dutch Governments.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 757.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Safe  
"ABCD"

December 17th, 1941.

My dear Mr. President,

A message has been received from Mr. Duff Cooper at Singapore on the subject of the proposed naval and military conference there, to the following effect:-

"I have now secured representation for Australia, New Zealand, United States and Netherlands and am arranging that conference shall start December 18th. If we were to await arrival of representative from Chungking there would be much delay and report by December 20th as requested by the President would certainly be impossible/

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

-2-

"impossible. Should representative  
from Chungking arrive in time we  
shall of course be delighted to  
receive him."

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

PSF  
Safe  
"ABCD" Folder

~~SECRET~~

From: Special Naval Observer, London.

(Paraphrased by Leahey)

The Far Eastern Situation was extensively discussed on 15 December by the originator, the British Assistant Chief of Staff, Naval, Foreign Section; the Dutch Minister of Marine, and the Plans Division of the Admiralty.

It was stated by the Assistant Chief of Staff that (a) security of communications around the Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East and the Persian oil fields, and (b) support of the defense of Australia and New Zealand are commitments of Britain in the Far East.

These commitments will be met by the British concentrating in the Indian Ocean a force of four aircraft carriers and four battleships of the "R" class which are now escorting troop convoys around the Cape of Good Hope. The troop convoy now in the Indian Ocean has already been diverted from the Middle East to Bombay.

Britain would defend Australia and New Zealand if a choice were forced. Apprehension is felt at the present time that the enemy forces now attacking the Malay Peninsula might close communications to Singapore through the Malacca Straits by seizing the northern end of Sumatra. This would be a stepping stone to the southeast for aircraft operations. Japanese establishment in northern Malaya will constitute a menace from air, mines and submarines in the Malacca Straits even though they do not attack Northern Sumatra.

The most secure lines of communications to Singapore in either case would be through Sunda Strait (between southern Sumatra and Java), via Banka (an island off the southeast coast of Sumatra).

The ability of the Allies to deny the Davao, Waigui and Natuna Islands lines to the enemy governed in a large measure the defense of the Malay barrier. (NOTE: Waigui (Waigeo) Island is approximately 30 miles N.W. of N.W. end of New Guinea. Natuna Island is approximately 270 miles N.E. of Singapore) The Dutch now believe that the next point of attack will probably be at Tarakan or Sangkilaran Bay on the East Coast of Borneo. The Japanese have had concessions here.

It was pointed out by the British that destruction of the oil fields in Borneo and Sumatra would necessitate the use of about fifty tankers to supply Australia and New Zealand from the Persian fields. These ships can be spared only with difficulty.

The Dutch Minister of Marine declared that Dutch are now patrolling Daveo-Waigui line and that very little Dutch land and air strength was available for defense of northern Sumatra since it was now employed in Java and around the Java Sea. They have about two hundred fighter planes around the Java Sea.

The British stated that the immediate need in Malay Peninsula is for fighters and medium bombers, and emphasized the necessity of fighter umbrellas.

A staff representative from British War Office said that the indications from the Malaya front seemed to indicate that the Japs had driven two wedges through the three brigades defending the Kedar sector.

He stated that Kota Bharu did not present any particular difficulties, that at present there were no signs of enemy landings further down the eastern coast of Malaya, nor had any further information been received of the reported presence of large Japanese convoy off Indo-Chinese Coast.

All parties to the conference agree that if practicable an Allied Naval and Air offensive delivered promptly and unexpectedly at this time would upset Japanese present plans and prove of great benefit.

Spenavo recommends that a vigorous attack by Russian planes and submarines and by U.S. planes basing on Russian fields would be of great assistance if such action by Russia would not reduce their European strength.

PSF  
Safe  
"ABCD"

AF  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)  
Kuibyshev

Dated December 17, 1941

Rec'd 10:36 a.m.; 18th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2075, December 17, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Department's 1289, December 17, 9 p.m.

One. The Counselor of the British Embassy  
states that he believes Eden and Cripps will re-  
main in Moscow for several days. I informed him  
of the reason for my inquiry.

Two. I plan to leave in the morning by air,  
taking Edwin Smith with me and sets of the (?) -1  
and D-1 codes, of which sets I also will remain  
in Kuibyshev.

Three. I informed Vyshinski this evening of  
the purpose of my visit to Moscow. After request-  
ing me to explain which I regarded my mission as  
"observer" to signify

THURSTON

WSB



MEV

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)

Kuibyshev

Dated December 17, 1941

Rec'd 10:48 a.m., 18th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

2075, December 17, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

(To which I replied that I would venture to hope that Molotov and Eden and Cripps would find it possible to inform me of any phases of their discussions which might concern or be of interest to the United States but that I had of course no intention of intruding otherwise.) He expressed his approval.

Four. Should I fail to reach Moscow in time, I shall endeavor to obtain information regarding the conference from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Cripps.

Five. I informed the correspondents last week that I planned to go to Moscow shortly to visit Thompson.

Six. Dickerson will be in charge of Kuibyshev during my absence.

(END OF MESSAGE)

THURSTON

RR

By J. Sch...  
DEC 23 1971

PSF  
Safe  
"ABCD"

KD  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)  
Kuibyshev

Dated December 21, 1941

Rec'd. 9:39 a.m., 22d

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

13, December 21, 11 p. m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

My 12, December 20, 9 p. m.

Sir Alexander Cadogan informed me this evening that it became apparent at the most recent meetings between Eden and Stalin that it would be impossible to reconcile the British and Soviet drafts of the proposed pacts on the joint war effort and European post-war problems, in view of the Soviet attitude with respect to the recognition of the 1941 frontiers. It was accordingly agreed that the project to conclude pacts on these two points should be abandoned and that a joint communique on the Moscow conversations should be issued instead. This communique is to be released Monday December 29.

Although Cadogan did not permit me to read the communique (a copy of which he said would be handed to Ambassador Winant) he informed me that it asserts  
that as a result

(Moscow)  
-2- #13, December 21, 11 p. m., from Kuibyshev.

that as a result of the Moscow conversations between the delegation headed by Eden and the Soviet representatives he added by Stalin full agreement was found to exist with respect to the joint conduct of the War which is to be prosecuted until Hitlerite Germany shall have been definitively vanquished. Thereafter steps will be taken to prevent the recurrence of German aggression. It also states that insofar as post war reconstruction is concerned the conversations have brought about an understanding between the parties which will facilitate further discussion of the subject.

When I asked Cadogan whether the reference to further discussion meant that the conversations just ended would be resumed in the near future he replied that the next step to be taken by his Government will be to consult with the Government of the United States. He expressed the opinion that it might be found advisable for the American and British Governments to agree as to their attitude toward post war problems and to present their agreement jointly for the consideration of the Soviet Government.

In the course of our general conversation I again inquired with respect to Stalin's attitude  
toward the

(Moscow)  
-3- #13, December 21, 11 p.m., from Kuibyshev.

toward the establishment of a second front against Hitler in Europe. Cadogan confirmed Eden's statement that while the subject had been explored Stalin had recognized the validity of the British argument against such a course at this time and had displayed no inclination to press the matter.

With respect to Soviet participation in the War against Japan he also confirmed Eden's statement that Stalin had indicated that the Soviet Union is not in a position to engage in hostilities with Japan at present but that it may be by next Spring.

He also informed me that Stalin appears to be most optimistic with respect to the present military situation and that he had expressed the belief that Germany will be defeated within one year and Japan possibly within six months.

Probably because General Nye and other members of the Mission are visiting the front today Eden's departure has been postponed until tomorrow.

THURSTON

ALC

"UPCP" PSF  
Safe

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of December eighteenth relative to the important question of a meeting with the British and the Dutch concerning raw materials.

In accord with your request I am glad to assign Mr. Thomas K. Finletter as a member of the group and have advised him accordingly.

Sincerely yours,



The President,  
The White House.

Safe: <sup>PST</sup> ABCD  
file

PD  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London  
Dated December 21, 1941  
Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

~~SECRET~~  
By J. Schaefer Date OCT 15 1971

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND ~~MOST SECRET~~ TO THE SECRETARY AND  
THE PRESIDENT.

Following up my number 6147 December 19, 11 p.m.

This afternoon I went down to the Foreign Office  
Sir John Anderson, who has been anonymously acting  
as Secretary of State during Eden's absence, the  
ranking civil servant, Sir Orme Sargent, and Richard  
Law, the Parliamentary Secretary, were absent because  
it was Sunday. I took advantage of Eden's instructions  
to his Private Secretary, who was present, that I  
should see all messages from him from Russia and was  
given them to read.

The negotiations did not continue on the same  
easy basis at the first meeting (see my telegram under  
reference) but they concluded on a cordial note and  
ended in a banquet given by Stalin to Eden.

It was mutually agreed to postpone an actual  
agreement



-2- #6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from London

agreement but a communique is to be issued instead and released by wireless on midnight December 28-29 Greenwich meantime. It will state identity of views in regard to the conduct of the war especially as regards defeat of Hitlerite Germany and prevention of future German aggression. It will also state that there was an exchange of views on post war problems relating to peace and security which it will be said have provided useful material for future collaboration of concrete principles.

WIKANT

CSB

PD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 21, 1941

Rec'd 7:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I am attaching at the end of this message the draft memorandum given to Eden and approved by the Cabinet on his departure from London. His messages do not indicate to what extent he made use of the memorandum but I felt you would be interested in its content.

During the early phase of the discussion Stalin told Eden he had a message from President Roosevelt asking that Russia be represented by an observer at a conference to be called at Chungking the following day. He further asked Eden if he knew anything about the object of the conference. Eden said that a similar message had reached the British Foreign Office and gave him the gist of the telegram forwarded by the British Government in reply to the President. Stalin then told him that the Soviet Government was prepared to attend  
any number of

-2- #6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from London

any number of conferences if it would be helpful but that they could do nothing about the conference at Chungking as they had had no information about its subject matter.

I was told that Stalin had been informed about the conference to be held in Washington but this information did not appear in any of Eden's cables which were shown to me. I personally believe it is important in the days immediately ahead to keep Stalin sufficiently informed through Litvinov to give him a sense of being included in war and peace plans. You of course will have information on this phase of the Washington negotiations that I am not acquainted with here.

WIRANT

CSB

JW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 21, 1941

Rec'd 9:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

Sl66, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

(Begin memorandum) "His Majesty's Government are anxious for early consultation with the Soviet Government in order to determine the best means of uniting their efforts for the winning on the war and for devising and maintaining a durable peace.

Two. The conduct of the war must be the subject of a confidential exchange of views, the result of which clearly cannot be given out to the workers.

Three. Plans for the peace settlement, on which the views of the United States Government will, of course, be essential, should perhaps in great part remain known only to the three Governments.

Four. But it seems highly desirable that the Soviet Government and His Majesty's Government should forthwith mark their association in a public declaration in the same way as the United States Government and His Majesty's Government have already, by the Atlantic charter, together subscribed to certain guiding principles.

Thus.

-2- # 6166 December 21, 10 p.m. from London

Thus would be manifested the determination of the three great powers to strive together for the utter defeat of totalitarian aggression, and for the restoration and maintenance of peace.

Five. Plainly, the first objective is the total defeat of Germany and it is suggested that the two Governments might pledge themselves not to lay down their arms until the German military power has been so broken as to render it incapable of further threatening the peace of the world, and not to make peace with any government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.

Six. Secondly, as regards the after war period, it will be desirable to plan to keep Germany deprived of the military means of aggression against other countries.

Seven. As regards the peace settlement and the planning of postwar reconstruction, the Atlantic charter, of which the Soviet Government has already intimated their acceptance, might be taken as a starting point.

Eight. His Majesty's Government for their part  
would

-3- #6166 DECEMBER 21, 10 p.m. from London

would wish to associate themselves with the statement made by M. Stalin on the 6th November when he defined the war aims of the Soviet Government and their attitude towards other countries. M. Stalin's statement ran as follows:

"We have not, and we cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territory, the subjugation of foreign peoples, whether it concerns the peoples and territories of Europe, or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Persia. Our first aim consists in liberating our territories and our peoples from the German Fascist yoke.

WINANT

KLP



ALH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

London

Dated December 21, 1941

Rec'd 1:20 a.m., 22nd

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6163, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

"We have not, and we cannot have, such war aims as the forcing of our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or any other enslaved European peoples, who are expecting our assistance. Our aim consists in helping these peoples in their struggle for liberation against Hitlerite tyranny, and later permitting them freely to settle their own destiny in their own land. No interference in the internal affairs of other people."

Nine. At this moment it will probably be found premature to attempt to reach any conclusions as regards the post-war territorial settlement, having regard to Clause 2 of the Atlantic Charter, which decrees any territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government recognize the need in any eventual settlement to strengthen the smaller countries of Europe so as to put them, both economically and strategically, in a

position

-2- #6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR), from  
London.

position to resist successfully pressure by Germany. For this purpose they welcome the negotiations between the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments for a confederation. They would hope that this federal system might be extended so as to include other states of Central Europe. It is understood, moreover, that this is the intention of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments. His Majesty's Government also hope that the various Balkan states may combine to form a similar system. Such confederations should contribute to the establishment of such a permanent system of general security as is foreshadowed in the 8th clause of the Atlantic Charter.

Ten. In the matter of economic reconstruction His Majesty's Government hope that the Soviet Government will participate in the coordination of post-war economic policy generally, and His Majesty's Government trust that the Soviet Government will be ready at the appropriate moment to participate in discussions on the various aspects of this far-reaching (?)

Eleven. His Majesty's Government recognize the justice of requiring Germany to make restitution as far as is possible for the spoliation of which she has been guilty during the period of the war. This is a subject,  
however,

-3- #6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR), from  
London

however, which His Majesty's Government would desire to examine and discuss further with the Soviet Government at a later stage when circumstances will make it easier than at present to reach definite conclusions.

Twelve. His Majesty's Government will for their part be prepared to assist, in so far as lies in their power, in the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union after the war.

Thirteen. On all of the above matters the association of the United States Government is essential and the Soviet Government will no doubt agree with His Majesty's Government that, with this end in view, the United States Government should be kept fully informed of their discussions.

Fourteen. It is, of course, recognized that there are many other questions affecting the peace settlement which will have to be discussed between the British and Soviet Governments in consultation with the other Allies and the United States when the elements of appreciation are sufficient to make it possible to reach conclusion."

End memorandum.

END OF MESSAGE.

WINANT

HSM

~~SECRET~~

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

IMMEDIATE

Following message has been received from  
H.M.S. Duke of York, 18.12.41.

1. It is hoped to reach agreement to following main points during conference.

- (i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
- (ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of immediate Military measures, including re-distribution of forces.
- (iii) Allocation of joint forces to harmonise with (i).
- (iv) Long term programme based on (i), including forces to be raised and equipped required for victory.
- (v) Set up joint machinery for implementing (ii) (iii) and (iv).

2. Under the direction of Prime Minister Chiefs of Staff are preparing short general review as a basis for discussion under paragraph 1 (i) above, to be followed by paper on (ii), (iii) and (iv).

3. Chiefs of Staff are giving much thought to machinery for post conference joint collaborations.

AO1tt01-  
AO1tt06


Safe File : ABCD folder

Memorandum for the President:

PSF

Dec.22/1941

Herewith is a redraft of our views on the subject of the British memorandum of December 18, in accordance, so far as I understand, with your directions.

  
Chief of Staff.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tentative U.S. Views on Subjects  
of British Memorandum, Dec. 18

(i) The broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers is the defeat of Germany and her Allies. While initially maintaining the strategic defensive, conduct local offensives in appropriate theatres. Ultimately conduct an all-out offensive (1) against Germany and her European Allies, (2) against Japan. Since a successful air offensive must precede any other form of decisive offensive action, the early development of the required air forces, their logistic support and the ground forces necessary to secure their bases must be assured. The first consideration to each of the Associated Powers, Russia, the British Commonwealth, China and the United States, is its own national security. The common purpose demands maintenance of essential communications, especially sea communications via the North Atlantic and air communications via the trans-African Far East route.

(ii) The British Commonwealth is operating offensively against the Axis in the Middle East and with air power in Germany. The United States lacks defensive equipment against air raids on

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DDO 100-100000 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-5-70

Signature- *[Signature]*



~~SECRET~~

exposed critical production and naval facilities - the only type of attack that is presently indicated against our mainland. Russia is devoting her entire resources to the destruction of the German army, thereby compelling large-scale diversions of German manpower and materiel from other fronts. China is near complete isolation and needs military materiel. She is conducting limited offensives to assist in defense of Malaysia. The maintenance of adequate air and sea communications and the safety of China demand the defense of the Singapore - Philippine - Dutch Indies area. It follows that Malaysia is a theater of present urgent importance.

The following immediate military measures should be undertaken by:

China: Defend China, assist in defense of Burma, and provide facilities for air operations against Japanese homeland.

Russia: Continue offensive operations against Germany.

British Commonwealth:

a. In cooperation with United States maintain sea communications in Atlantic and to Middle and Far East.

b. Strengthen Singapore, Burma and Dutch East Indies to secure those areas and reduce the threat to China.

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c. Assist the United States in providing land and air equipment to Russia and China.

d. Defend present occupied areas and <sup>acquire</sup> ~~secure~~ additional areas that might further the ultimate objective. ✓

United States:

a. Cooperate with British Commonwealth in maintaining sea and air communications, and in establishing any additional bases necessary to this purpose.

b. Reinforce Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Australia to further the security of China and Southwest Pacific.

c. Supply Russia, China and the British Commonwealth with such ground and air equipment as can be made available.

d. Establish air and antiaircraft defenses to protect coastal military production and naval and shipping installations in the United States.

e. Equip and dispose forces necessary to secure outposts and vital sources of supply in the Western Hemisphere.

f. Strengthen naval power in Central Pacific including strong reinforcement of Hawaiian garrison.

g. Attain maximum scale in all military, air, shipping and naval production.

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All Associated Powers: Initiate preparations immediately to raise and equip forces and provide shipping for later large scale offensive operations.

(iii) Allocation of Joint Forces to harmonize with (i)

Only the British Commonwealth and the United States possess troops sufficiently free of enemy pressure or threat to permit of redistribution. Only such forces of the British Commonwealth and the United States are subject to redistribution as are not actively engaged with the enemy or required for immediate security tasks heretofore indicated for these Governments.

The following dispositions should be immediately initiated:

The United States to reinforce the Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies with ground and air forces with particular emphasis on aviation. The principal operating bases to be established in Australia.

The British Commonwealth to reinforce with land and air elements the forces in Singapore, Dutch East Indies and Burma.

Further detailed allocations cannot be indicated until missions enumerated herein are jointly agreed upon, and operations necessary to their accomplishment have been jointly planned.

(iv) In joint conference make necessary adjustments in the Victory Program to initiate the production of equipment and the creation of military forces contemplated in that program.

~~SECRET~~

(v) Create a Supreme Allied War Council to study joint problems and to recommend to the Associated Powers applicable policies, plans, programs and allocations.

Create at once a Military Joint Planning Committee and a Joint Supply Committee to propose the plans and take the actions necessary to implement approved recommendations of the Supreme War Council.

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ODD DM. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-5-70

Signature- RHP

~~SECRET~~

AC1001

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION ( Eu  
BUREAU ( .....

ENCLOSURE

TO

LETTER DRAFTED .....

ADDRESSED TO

The President

A01U02

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 2

MOST ~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE.

Following message has been received from  
H.M.S. Duke of York, 18.12.41.

1. It is hoped to reach agreement to following  
main points during conference.

- (i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
- (ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of  
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- (iii) Allocation of joint forces to harmonise  
with (i).
- (iv) Long term programme based on (i), including  
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for victory.
- (v) Set up joint machinery for implementing  
(ii), (iii) and (iv).

2. Under the direction of Prime Minister Chiefs  
of Staff are preparing short general review as a basis  
for discussion under paragraph 1 (i) above, to be  
followed by paper on (ii), (iii) and (iv).

3. Chiefs of Staff are giving much thought to  
machinery for post conference joint collaborations.



1014401-  
1014403

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Supplementing my suggestions regarding a Supreme War Council, I give you this additional outline of organizations that might function under it:

Military Council  
Naval Council  
Aviation Council  
Shipping Council  
Economic Council  
Food Committee  
Munitions Committee  
Raw Materials Committee  
Petroleum Committee

These auxiliary organizations were contemplated by the provisions in draft of the Supreme War Council wherein it was given responsibility for "coordinating distribution of available resources of all categories between various theatres of war".

CH

PSF  
Sofie  
"ABCD"

CH  
December 17, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:

In view of the experience of the United States and the Allies during the first World War, and in view of the circumstances of the present war, there is set out below a suggested outline for a Supreme War Council designed to provide for the most effective use of available human and material resources in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers.

Supreme War Council  
    Military Council  
    Naval Council  
    Aviation Council  
    Shipping Council  
    Economic Council  
        Food Committee  
        Munitions Committee  
        Raw Materials Committee  
        Petroleum Committee

Some of the principal problems in connection with the establishment and operation of a Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies are listed below with a suggested solution.

1. Representation: The Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies would be composed of representatives of the United States, British Empire, Soviet Union, China, and possibly the Netherlands. The Soviet Union, in view of its neutrality agreement with Japan, would be  
announced

announced as participating only in discussions of problems relating to the conduct of the war against Germany and Italy; however, in actual practice it would probably work out that most of the problems would relate directly or indirectly to this aspect of the war. Representation on the Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies would be limited to four or five powers because an organization composed of representatives of all the nations arrayed against Germany would be too large to be effective.

2. Decisions: The decisions of the Supreme War Council and the various subordinate bodies would be unanimous.

3. Seat of Council: The circumstances of this war would seem to make it desirable that the Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies be located at Washington.

4. Unity of Command: There would be no general unity of command of the armed forces throughout the world which are pitted against the Axis powers, except in so far as the Supreme Council itself would constitute a unity of command. However, the Supreme War Council, with the approval of the represented governments, might decide on unity of command in certain theatres of war as for example in the Far East or in the Near East.

Carlton Savage

A-L:CS:AMH

A01V01-  
A01V02-

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
TO THE PRESIDENT

ABCP

12/18/41

~~SECRET~~

COPY

P A R A P H R A S E

O-4-C

NPM 2737  
Filed 1430/17

RADIOGRAM

*BF*  
*Safe*  
*"ABCD"*

Received at the War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, DC.

Dec. 18, 1941  
705 AM

FROM CHUNGKING

TO ADJUTANT GENERAL

AMMISCA #109 SEVENTEENTH

THE COMMUNICATION WHICH WAS THE MESSAGE THAT THE PRESIDENT WROTE FOR  
CHIANG KAI SHEK ON THE 14TH WAS DELIVERED BY ME TO CHIANG KAI SHEK AT 1:30  
THE 16TH OF THIS MONTH.

THE GENERALISSIMO STATED HE WILL ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AND WILL  
PROCEED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION AS WAS SUGGESTED.

EXPECT THAT GENERAL BRETT WILL ARRIVE HERE ON THE 17TH OF THE MONTH.

MAGRUDER.

U.S. Library

10-21-66

Signature - Carl L. Spear

~~SECRET~~

AO1VV01-  
AO1VV09

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
\_\_\_\_\_  
THE SECRETARY

December 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring further to your personal inquiry of me at Cabinet as to whether I considered legal and valid that provision of the Supreme War Council draft to the effect that the President can pledge himself as a member of the War Council "not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agreement", I herewith enclose opinion by Mr. Hackworth prepared at my request which, in my judgment, makes clear the legal and constitutional validity of this provision. I hope you may have a chance to glance over it.

C.H.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE LEGAL ADVISER

December 20, 1941.

TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

The Secretary:

I do not feel that there is the slightest question regarding an undertaking by the President "not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agreement".

The Constitution declares that the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States". (Art. 2, sec. 2.) The Supreme Court in United States v. Sweeney stated that the object of this provision is "evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over all the military forces,--such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war." [Underscoring supplied.] (157 U.S. (1895) 281, 284.)

The power of the President as Commander in Chief and his duty to prosecute a war to a "successful" conclusion are no less extensive than those of the Congress "To declare war . . .; To raise and support Armies . . .; To provide and maintain a Navy", etc. (Art. 1, sec. 8.)

The Constitution itself contains no specific grant of power to any branch of the Government to make peace.

The

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The matter was discussed, however, at the Constitutional Convention, on August 17, 1787, in connection with the granting of power to Congress to make war. A motion was made to add the words "and peace" after the word "war", so as to give Congress the power to declare both war and peace. The motion was unanimously rejected. (II Journal of the Constitutional Convention (Hunt's ed., 1908) 188, 189.)

While Congress has authority under the Constitution to declare war, once it is declared it is for the President to determine when peace may be concluded. He may conclude an armistice or negotiate a treaty of peace, or both. The armistice is wholly a function of the President but a treaty of peace requires senatorial approval.

Hare, in his work on the Constitution, says that "it is the right of the President, and not of Congress, to determine whether the terms [of peace] are advantageous, and if he refuses to make peace, the war must go on." (I Hare, American Constitutional Law (1889) 171-172.)

In the report of the Judiciary committee to the Forty-ninth Congress on the treaty power, it is stated that "Congress cannot create the status of peace by repealing its declaration of war, because the former requires the concurrence of two wills, the latter but the action of one." (H. Rept. 4177, 49th Cong., 2d

\* <sup>sess.,</sup> Article IX of the Articles of Confederation had given Congress sole and exclusive power to determine on peace and war.

sess., p. 9 ; Henry St. George Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power (1915) 342, 356-357.)

In August 1919 Senator Fall of New Mexico presented the following question to President Wilson: "In your judgment, have you not the power and authority, by proclamation, to declare in appropriate words that peace exists and thus restore the status of peace between the Governments and peoples of this country and those with whom we declared war?" The President replied: "I feel constrained to say . . . not only that in my judgment I have not the power by proclamation to declare that peace exists, but that I could in no circumstances consent to take such a course prior to the ratification of a formal treaty of peace." (58 Cong. Rec. Pt. 4, pp. 4176, 4177.)

The question of the procedure for terminating war was raised by House Joint Resolution 327 of May 21, 1920 intended to repeal <sup>the</sup> Joint Resolution of April 6, 1917 declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and Germany, and the Joint Resolution of December 7, 1917 declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to declare a state of peace. (59 Cong. Rec. Pt. 7, p. 7423.)

The resolution was vetoed by President Wilson on May 27 on the ground that it did not "accomplish any of these objects" for which the United States had entered the war. He stated:

". . . I have

" . . . I have not felt at liberty to sign this joint resolution because I can not bring myself to become party to an action which would place an ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States. The resolution seeks to establish peace with the German Empire without exacting from the German Government any action by way of setting right the infinite wrongs which it did to the peoples whom it attacked and whom we professed it our purpose to assist when we entered the war. Have we sacrificed the lives of more than 100,000 Americans and ruined the lives of thousands of others and brought upon thousands of American families an unhappiness that can never end for purposes which we do not now care to state or take further steps to attain?

. . . . .

" . . . when we entered the war we set forth very definitely the purposes for which we entered, partly because we did not wish to be considered as merely taking part in a European contest. This joint resolution which I return does not seek to accomplish any of these objects, but in effect makes a complete surrender of the rights of the United States so far as the German Government is concerned.

. . . . .

"But the treaty as signed at Versailles has been rejected by the Senate of the United States, though it has been ratified by Germany. By that rejection and by its method we have in effect declared that we wish to draw apart and pursue objects and interests of our own, unhampered by any connections of interest or of purpose with other Governments and peoples." (59 Cong. Rec. Pt. 9, pp. 7747, 7748.)

However, on July 2, 1921, President Harding signed a Joint Resolution declaring "at an end" the state of war "declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America by the Joint Resolution of Congress approved April 6, 1917". It also  
declared



declared to be at an end the war between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government. (42 Stat. 105.) A joint resolution of Congress announcing the termination of war is undoubtedly valid so far as domestic law is concerned but so far as concerns the international situation, the attitude of the enemy must be taken into account. Peace between the United States and Germany, for example, was not formally restored until the exchange on November 11, 1921 of ratifications of the Treaty of Berlin. President Harding in proclaiming the treaty stated that the war terminated on July 2, 1921. His action in so doing is probably explainable by the fact that the treaty incorporated ~~in the preamble~~ parts of the Joint Resolution of that date.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared in a decision in 1930 that -

"The joint resolution of Congress of July 2, 1921, did not terminate the war. This resolution was not legally binding on Austria, and regardless of its political effect, it was not a legal restoration of peace as that can be accomplished only by a bilateral treaty of peace. . . ." (First Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Anglo-Oesterreichische Bank, for Use of Anglo-Austrian Bank, Limited, for Use of Grouf, 37 F. (2d) 564, 567-568.)

In the case of Arnold et al. v. Ellison et al., Appellants, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the war between the United States and Germany ended on November 14, 1921, the date when the President proclaimed the treaty of peace between the United States and Germany. The court said:

"Nor

"Nor can we give our assent to appellants' contention that the war was terminated by the joint resolution of Congress, passed July 2, 1921, (42 Stat. at L. 105, Sec. 1). A state of war cannot be terminated by a mere declaration by one of the belligerents that there is no longer any reason for its continuation. The actual termination of a war is a mutual matter evidenced by a treaty, duly ratified by both parties, and it cannot properly be said that a war has ended until the ratifications have been exchanged. True, the section of the Trading with the Enemy Act which we have quoted, after fixing 'the date of proclamation of exchange of ratifications' as the 'end of the war' added 'unless the President shall by proclamation declare a prior date.' This seems to contemplate, for the purposes of that act, the possibility of a proclamation declaring the war ended prior to the exchange of ratifications. No such proclamation was made. The only proclamation was that of November 14, 1921, reciting the exchange of ratifications and declaring the war to have terminated on July 2, 1921. We are not persuaded that this proclamation should be given the retroactive effect contended for; to do so would be equivalent to saying that a right of action, to which the statute would have been a bar within a few days after the end of the war, may, by a proclamation made three days later, be set back more than four months, with the effect that it could never be enforced." (96 Pa. Superior Ct. 118, 124 (1929).)

In the case of Kotzias v. Tyser, the Court of King's Bench held -

"the authorities show that, in the absence of any specific statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the general rule of international law is that as between civilized Powers who have been at war, peace is not concluded until a treaty of Peace is finally binding upon the belligerents, and that that stage is not reached until ratifications of the treaty of peace have been exchanged between them."  
[1920] 2 K.B. 69, 77.

Furthermore,



Furthermore, whatever may be said of the effect of the Joint Resolution of July 2, 1921, it is to be borne in mind that it was the joint act of the Congress and the President. If in the present situation Congress should pass a resolution with the President's commitment regarding hostilities still outstanding, he could veto it as President Wilson did in 1920 and it would not become operative even domestically unless passed over his veto.

The only way by which Congress could compel the President to "cease hostilities" would be by cutting off the appropriations. Even in such a situation he could do as President Theodore Roosevelt is said to have threatened to do when the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs reportedly announced that Congress would refuse to appropriate money to send the fleet around the world. In referring to the incident he stated:

" . . . However, I announced in response that I had enough money to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific. There was no further difficulty about the money." (Roosevelt, An Autobiography (1913) 592, 598.)

The resolutions of Congress declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Japan, Germany and Italy pledge "all of the resources of the country" to bring the conflict to "a successful termination".

Both

Both by the resolutions of Congress and by the Constitution the President is to be the judge as to how best to prosecute the war. Its successful termination may depend upon the ability of the President to make certain that Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China shall continue in the struggle until the enemies are defeated. The best way to be sure that this situation shall obtain is through a pledge by them not to cease fighting except by common agreement of all four Powers. The President could not obtain such a pledge from the other Powers without making one himself. He is justified in doing so by reason of his responsibility as Commander in Chief and his broad powers in the conduct of foreign relations. As stated by the Supreme Court regarding this latter prerogative:

"In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, and delicate and manifest problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).



Green H. Hackworth

A01W06—

A01W01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached papers show the situation in regard to Torpedo Bombers, Armor Piercing Bombs, and Aircraft Torpedoes.

Respectfully,

*J. R. Beardall*  
J. R. BEARDALL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

100-5200.9 (9/27/58)

In reply address not the signer of  
this letter but Bureau of Aeronautics,  
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS JHT-GB  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16 December 1941

MEMORANDUM for Captain Beardall.

SUBJECT: Situation regarding Torpedo Planes and Armor Piercing Bombs.

Torpedo Bombers - The Navy has on hand an even 100 Douglas torpedo bombers known as TBD (DEVASTATOR). This number is barely sufficient to meet minimum operating requirements. The present shortage was anticipated as far back as two years ago and every practicable effort has been made to cope with the situation. To save time I took the risk of going into production on a new type, the Grumman TBF (AVENGER), without waiting for completion of samples. Despite this action a shortage will persist for the next several months. There is attached a table showing estimated production from facilities now available. Further expansion of facilities is now being arranged. This expansion can not be expected to be reflected in production before a minimum of nine months to a year.

Armor Piercing Bombs. The Navy has on order 17,500 armor piercing bombs of the 1600 lb. variety. These bombs are of approximately the same weight as those used by the Japanese in the attack at Pearl Harbor. Tests have shown they should be capable of penetrating the heaviest deck from around altitudes of 12,000 ft. They carry a much higher proportion of explosive than any comparable armor piercing projectile. Delivery of completely loaded and fused bombs will commence in February 1942 at the rate of about 300 per month, which rate will build up to 1,000 a month by April 1942.

  
J. H. Towers

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DOD 662 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Refer to No.

Aer-PL-6-KHK

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS  
WASHINGTON

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Admiral Towers  
From: ~~The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.~~  
SUBJECT: Torpedo Planes - The following is the status  
of Torpedo Planes:

1. On hand -- 100 TBD's.
2. Production schedule of the new Grumman torpedo plane:

	NAVY	BRITISH	TOTAL	CUMULATIVE
Dec. 1941	2	-	2	2
Jan. 1942	3	-	3	5
Feb. 1942	8	-	8	13
Mar.	10	-	10	23
Apr.	20	-	20	43
May	30	-	30	73
June	30	-	30	103
July	40	-	40	143
Aug.	50	-	50	193
Sept.	45	15	60	253
Oct.	55	15	70	323
Nov.	65	15	80	403
Dec.	75	15	90	493
Jan. 1943	85	15	100	593
Feb.	85	15	100	693
Mar.	85	15	100	793
Apr.	85	15	100	893
May	85	15	100	993
June 1943	85	15	100	1093

3. There is in addition to the foregoing a limited  
production of torpedo planes in the United Kingdom estimated to  
total 86 a month *now building up to 125 by Dec'42.*

ASW.A



IN REPLY ADDRESS  
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT  
AND REFER TO No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE

S75-1(85)  
(A)

WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 17, 1941

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Captain Beardall:

Subject: Aircraft Torpedo Situation.

1. On November 30, 1941, the Navy had 768 aircraft torpedoes. Production at Newport will continue on this type until next month, bringing the total at that time up to 972, except of course for expenditures and losses.

2. After next month, no more aircraft torpedoes are due to come off the assembly lines until June, though we hope to cut this gap shorter if possible. The reason for this hiatus is that the Navy has three distinct types of torpedoes, as follows:

Mark 13 - for aircraft  
Mark 14 - for submarines  
Mark 15 - for destroyers and cruisers,  
and for a few of the later  
submarines especially designed  
to carry them.

Until the last six months, the Newport Torpedo Station was the only source of production for torpedoes. It has been found most economical, both in time and money, to produce only one type at a time. Hence the Station makes a long run on one type and then shifts to another. At present, Newport is manufacturing parts for the Mark 15 destroyer torpedo, while finishing up assembly of aircraft torpedoes. As soon as sufficient castings, forgings, etc., are available from outside sources, machining of parts for the Mark 13 will be resumed and assembly will start again in the late spring. The Naval Torpedo Station at Alexandria, Va., is now making the Mark 14 submarine torpedo.

3. Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a universal torpedo, suitable for use by all naval craft. The requirements vary widely, and a universal torpedo would be a "jack of all trades and master of none". We have been experimenting for some time at Newport with launching the Mark 14 and Mark 15 types from patrol planes, but with little success to date.

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S75-1(85)  
(A)

4. In addition to increasing the machining capacity, at both Newport and Alexandria, Newport has already done a great deal of subcontracting for torpedo parts, which will be assembled at both stations. Also, a new Government torpedo plant is being erected in Chicago for operation by the American Can Company, but this factory will not be in production until the end of 1942. The maximum production which we hope to reach from all sources will be 30 torpedoes per day, or 750 per month, based on a 6-day week. This figure includes all three types. It might be interesting to note that the British plan to produce in England only 300 per month. Their present rate is 200 per month, which is the same as our current rate. They have one contract in this country for submarine torpedoes, ten per week, and we are handling a lend-lease contract for them for aircraft torpedoes at ten per week, but neither of these companies has produced any torpedoes yet. They have recently placed another requisition for 2,000 aircraft torpedoes, and we are negotiating with a third company for that job.

5. The distribution of our existing aircraft torpedoes is shown on the enclosure.

*W. H. P. Blandy*  
W. H. P. BLANDY,  
Chief of Bureau.

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

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EX DIR. 5200.9 (9-27-68)

BW

(Enclosure)

S75-1(85)(A)

AIRCRAFT TORPEDO DISTRIBUTION

<u>SHIP OR STATION</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>ENROUTE</u>	<u>TOTAL ON BOARD AND ENROUTE</u>
USS SARATOGA	36	-	36
USS LEXINGTON	68	-	68
USS YORKTOWN	36	-	36
USS ENTERPRISE	36	-	36
USS HORNET	36	-	36
USS RANGER	12	-	12
USS WASP	0	12	12
USS POCOMOKE	48	-	48
USS ALBEMARLE	48	-	48
USS TANGIER	48	-	48
USS CURTISS	48	24	72
USS WRIGHT	48	-	48
USS LANGLEY	12	-	12
S/B Coco Solo (Patwing 3)	24	12	36
NAS San Juan	0	6	6
NAS NORFOLK	0	18	18
NAS ALAMEDA	0	10	10
NAS SAN DIEGO	6	16	22
Fleet Torpedo School San Diego	2	0	2
S/B Cavite	12	0	12
S/B Pearl Harbor (Patwing 2)	23	12	35
NTS KEYPORT (Patwing 4)	12	6	18
NTS KEYPORT (Pool)	2	0	2
NAS KODIAK	0	6	6
NAS SITKA	0	6	6
NAS KANEOHE	18	0	18
Believed to be on board SS "President Taylor", in San Francisco, under shipment to Asiatic Fleet	60	-	60
NOB NORFOLK for ComFIVE shipment to Asiatic	0	24	24
NTS NEWPORT, reserved for requirements Patron 52	12	0	12
	647	152	799


NOTE: Distribution listed above is as of December 12.

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DOD DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)



Red shaded area - Responsibility of U.S. Pacific fleet

UNCLASSIFIED  
 FEB 2 1972  
 Green shaded area = present proposals for boundaries of Pacific Theatre  
 R.G. CASEY

Blue shaded area = present proposals for boundaries of Pacific Theatre  
 Red shaded area = Responsibility of U.S. Pacific fleet

MANNATTEN DRAFTING CO. INC. N.Y.

~~SECRET~~

War Department  
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES  
Washington

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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
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Copy #1  
5/2/71

STATUS OF TACTICAL AIRPLANES  
December 15, 1941

Types of Airplanes	WEST COAST THEATER				AFRO LESS W.C. THEATER				OTHERS in U.S. 2/	ATLANTIC BASIS Hawaii Greenland Iceland	CARIBBEAN (Panama) Puerto R. Cuba etc.	ALASKA	HAWAII	PHILIPP. INDIES	ESTIMATED Production to 12/31/43	Balance of Being Pre- pared for Shipment to		REMARKS
	Out of Comm.	1st Class	2nd Class	Total	Out of Comm.	1st Class	2nd Class	Total								1	On	
1st BOMB LINE	9	11	15	26	3	0	13	13	100	6	3 2/		25	13	71		166	1/ Airplanes which have been "accepted" but are "not de- liverable" have been deducted from the col.
2nd BOMB LINE																		
Total	9	11	15	26	3	0	13	13	100	6	3		25	13	71		166	2/ (See 1st line)
1st FIGHTER LINE	36	98	42	140	16	26	17	43	102						29			
2nd FIGHTER LINE	1	0	12	12	11	0	53	53	213	1	63	12	13	17				3/ 23 are on way.
Total	37	98	54	152	27	26	70	96	226	1	63	12	13	17	29			
1st BOMB LINE		5	0	5	27	37	64	102	135		12		10		356			4/ 3 of these left on night of 17th. Re- maining 10 will leave as soon as weather permits.
2nd BOMB LINE					0	0	1	1	102					3		52		
Total		5	0	5	27	37	65	102	237		12		10	3	356	52		2/ 9 scheduled to leave after 18 leave for Copper. Those for Copper scheduled to leave when weather per- mits.
1st FIGHTER LINE	44	135	61	196	57	37	90	127	354	30	102 2/		42	50	415	163	165	
2nd FIGHTER LINE	6	0	7	7	20	0	45	45	91		37	20	42	51				2/ 9 scheduled to leave after 18 leave for Copper. Those for Copper scheduled to leave when weather per- mits.
Total	50	135	68	203	77	37	135	172	445	30	139	20	84	101	415	163	165	
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## ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITIONS ON WEST COAST

Seattle Area

3 regiments defending Boeing Plant  
and 14 Misc. Air Fields with:

36 3" Guns  
22 37-mm. Guns  
78 .50-Cal. Guns  
18 268 Sets

Portland Area

1 regiment defending Power  
System Airports with:

12 3" Guns  
24 37-mm. Guns  
24 .50-Cal. Guns  
6 268 Sets

San Francisco Area

3 regiments defending Mare Island  
Navy Yard, SF Bridges, oil storage,  
shipyards, airports with:

36 3" Guns  
50 37-mm. Guns  
62 .50-Cal. Guns  
18 268 Sets

Los Angeles Area

4 regiments (less 4 Btries), 2 Sep  
Gun Bns, and 1 Prov SL Bn defending  
Douglas Plants, Camp Haan Air Field,  
Lockheed Vega, North America & Northrup  
and Vultee Plant with:

64 3" Guns  
66 37-mm. Guns  
82 .50-Cal. Guns  
32 268 Sets


San Diego Area

2 regiments defending Consolidated  
and North Island Nav Air & IED with:

24 3" Guns  
12 37-mm. Guns  
54 .50-Cal. Guns  
12 268 Sets



## A circular scale, likely a protractor or a similar measuring instrument. The scale is marked from 0 to 180 degrees. The 0-degree mark is at the top, indicated by a star symbol. The 90-degree mark is on the right, and the 180-degree mark is at the bottom. The scale is graduated in degrees, with major markings every 10 degrees and minor markings every 1 degree. A pointer is visible at the 0-degree mark.





## ANTI-AIRCRAFT DISPOSITIONS ON EAST COAST

BOSTON - 2 regts. defending  
Navy Yard with:  
24 3" guns  
14 37mm guns  
80 .50 cal. guns  
12 268 sets

HARTFORD - 1 regt. defending  
Pratt & Whitney with:  
12 3" guns  
24 37mm guns  
20 .50 cal. guns  
6 268 sets

PATERSON - 1 regt. defending  
Wright Aero Corporation with:  
12 3" guns  
24 .50 cal. guns  
6 268 sets

NEW YORK AREA - 4 regts.  
defending Navy Yard, N.Y.  
& Brooklyn area with:  
48 3" guns  
18 37mm guns  
96 .50 cal guns  
24 268 sets

PHILADELPHIA-WILMINGTON AREA  
2 regts. defending Navy Yards  
and Ship Yards with:  
24 3" guns  
64 .50 cal. guns  
12 268 sets

BALTIMORE AREA - 1 regt.  
defending Glenn Martin  
Plant with:  
12 3" guns  
60 .50 cal. guns  
6 268 sets


WASHINGTON AREA - 1 regt. and  
1 battry defending Navy Yard  
with:  
12 90mm guns  
4 37mm guns  
80 .50 cal. guns  
9 268 sets

NORFOLK AREA - 2 regts and  
1 batt'y defending Navy Yard  
with:  
12 3" guns  
36 90mm guns  
6 37mm guns  
86 .50 cal. guns  
12 268 sets

SCALE

200 300 400 MILES







U. S.

BRITISH

COPY NO.

2

U.S. ABC-4/5 (Approved)  
British WW 6

(Supersedes ABC-4/5, WW 3 Final)

January 2, 1942.

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF



DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED



U. S.   
BRITISH 

January 2, 1941.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/5  
British Serial WW 6 (Approved)

Supersedes ABC-4/5, British WW 3 (Final)

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF  
AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER  
REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are or will be:-

- a. Stationed in the Area;
- b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

U. S. [REDACTED]  
BRITISH [REDACTED]

6. The general strategic policy will therefore be:-

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the international administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity.

U. S. [REDACTED]  
BRITISH [REDACTED]

In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing  
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.



U. S. [REDACTED]  
BRITISH [REDACTED]

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U. S. [REDACTED]  
BRITISH [REDACTED]

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Signed

(By Power furnishing  
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.



TELEGRAM

The White House  
Washington

The White House

Preliminary summary Halseys attack.

Many ships auxiliary and merchant type, sunk and damaged in Kwajelein atoll by torpedo and bomb attack. Several merchant type sunk beached and damaged: Kotjy by bombing and bombardment. Taroa island air base heavily bombed and bombarded extensive damage. Watje island believed severely damaged by bombardment. Roi and Kwajelein islands bombed and strafed intermediate damage. Many enemy planes destroyed on ground and in air. Fletcher reports heavily damaging two auxiliary type vessels in Jaluit.

Our damage Chester one bomb hit well deck can make thirty knots. Enterprise intermediate damage believed to be slight caused by near misses. Still under attack. Six planes failed to return.

USS Wakefield ex SS Manhattan damaged in singapore area by bomb hit, eleven men killed three wounded no underwater damage.

Will keep you advised.

MCCREA.

Feb 1 1942.

HLH  
1/20/42

February 18, 1942

Dear Jerry:

I have read your memorandum of the 17th relative to the ships for the ABDA area.

I approve your proposal for the particular use of ships, except I do not approve the taking of ships from Russia which are necessary to meet our Protocol requirements. I wish you would find some other ships than the ones ticketed for Russia, unless you have alternate plans for meeting the Russian Protocol.

Very sincerely yours,

(SIGNED) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Admiral Emory S. Land,  
Chairman,  
United States Maritime Commission.

HLH/lmb

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

February 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference (a): Conference with Honorable Harry Hopkins, General Somervell, Colonel Gross and Rear Admiral Land on February 14, 1942.

The War Department has submitted the request for the immediate assignment by the Maritime Commission of the following four (4) passenger vessels required for military movement:

URUGUAY, SANTA LUCIA, SANTA CLARA and SANTA PAULA.

The War Department proposes to furnish three (3) passenger vessels (making a total of 7), as follows:

PANAMA, PRESIDENT MONROE and QUEEN ELIZABETH (British).

The military movement also contemplates the assignment of approximately 16 cargo vessels.

We have also received a request from the Department of State looking to the assignment of two passenger vessels for the transportation of various Axis officials and non-officials from Latin American countries to the United States, and a third passenger vessel for the transportation of these officials to Lisbon. The same vessel would return to the United States, American officials now awaiting transportation. The same vessel would subsequently perform similar voyage to and from Lourenco Marques (American and Japanese interchange).

For this interchange of diplomats, etc. the War Department proposes to furnish two of the three vessels required; namely, the ETOLIN (Army Transport) and the ACADIA (Maritime Commission charter assigned to Army). The third ship is the S.S. BRAZIL which it is proposed should make the trip from the United States to Lisbon and upon completion of that trip make a second trip from the United States to Lourenco Marques.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 4(D) or (E)  
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-72  
By RHP, Date MAR 28 1973

The two vessels furnished by the War Department would make the West Coast of South America trip to the United States.

Assignment of the passenger vessels will have the following effect:

1. The discontinuance of American passenger service to the East Coast of South America formerly performed by the SSs URUGUAY, BRAZIL and ARGENTINA. (The ARGENTINA is now in the southwestern Pacific.)

2. Complete discontinuance of American passenger service to Venezuela and to the West Coast of South America. These services were formerly performed by the SSs SANTA ROSA, SANTA PAULA and SANTA ELENA (all three are now in military service) and by the SANTA LUCIA and SANTA CLARA, now required by the War Department.

(The only remaining American passenger service to the East Coast of South America will be four vessels operated from the Gulf by the Mississippi Shipping Company, each vessel having a capacity of approximately 45 passengers.)

3. The SANTA PAULA, now included in the new military movement, was about to perform a military mission to the Red Sea which would have to be postponed.

The assignment of approximately 16 cargo vessels for the proposed military movement would have the following effect:

1. It would involve the employment of 13 EC-2 vessels scheduled for delivery on the Pacific Coast during February and March. The remaining three vessels can undoubtedly be supplied from tonnage already allocated to the War Department.

2. The 13 vessels are suitable for the Russian service, are so intended, and their assignment for other purposes will further jeopardize the fulfillment of this commitment.

3. The maintenance of the contemplated movement would require the furnishing, beginning in April, of approximately four vessels monthly.

It is my understanding that the Army contemplates obtaining Navy clearance for the foregoing with respect to convoy, etc.

In view of the effects outlined above with regard to South America, diplomatic interchange and Russia, I am not prepared to approve these assignments without a directive from you.

There are forwarded herewith a copy of this memorandum for the Honorable Harry Hopkins, Admiral King and General Marshall, attention General Somervell.

*E. S. Land*

E. S. Land  
Chairman



SECRET

U.S.  
President  
and

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
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## “ ABDACOM ”

An Official Account of Events in the South-West Pacific  
Command, January—February 1942.



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" ABDACOM "

An Official Account of Events in the South-West Pacific Command,  
January-February 1942

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**" ABDACOM "**

**An Official Account of events in the South-West Pacific Command,  
15th January—25th February 1942.**

**SECTION I.—INTRODUCTION.**

1. *Object.*—The object aimed at in compiling this account is to record the organization of "ABDACOM", which was the telegraphic address and accepted short title for the Headquarters of the South-West Pacific Command; the area for which it was responsible; and the events which took place in that area during its existence, as soon as possible after their occurrence.

2. *Material.*—This account is based on the records preserved and removed from Java either prior to the dispersal of ABDACOM headquarters, or at the time of dispersal. So far as was possible, complete records were preserved, but the necessity for preventing secret information of value to the enemy from falling into Japanese hands, combined with limitations of transport at the time of dispersal, entailed the destruction of some material which might have been of value for establishing precisely and fully the course and results of certain events. Such gaps have, when possible, been indicated in footnotes.

3. *Layout.*—The main text, (Sections II to VI), records the area for which ABDACOM was responsible and the Directive on which it worked, its organization, the situation at the time of its creation, the main reinforcements allotted to the ABDA area and those which actually arrived, the leading events during the existence of ABDACOM, and the situation at the time of dispersal of the Headquarters.

References to cables or documents are serially numbered throughout. A list of these references is given in Appendix "C".

**SECTION II.—DATES OF ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND AND OF  
DISPERSAL, AND DEFINITION OF THE AREA FOR WHICH  
ABDACOM WAS RESPONSIBLE AND SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES.**

4. *Dates.*—*Summary of Dates.*

Preliminary instructions for the formation of ABDACOM issued from Washington . . . . .	30th December 1941.
Supreme Commander left Delhi for the Far East . . . . .	5th January 1942.
Supreme Commander arrived Singapore . . . . .	7th January 1942.
Supreme Commander with skeleton staff arrived Batavia . . . . .	10th January 1942.
Command assumed by Supreme Commander, 1200 hrs., G. M. T. . . . .	15th January 1942.

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ABDACOM headquarters, (still on a skeleton basis)  
 moved to Lembang . . . . . 18th January 1942.

ABDACOM headquarters ceased to operate, 0430  
 hrs. G.M.T. . . . . 25th February 1942.

Departure of personnel of ABDACOM headquarters  
 from Java completed, evening . . . . . 26th February 1942.

5. *Date of Assumption of Command.*—In a personal telegram dated 30th December 1941 (1) to General Sir A. P. Wavell, Mr. Churchill, who was then visiting Washington, stated that at the request of the President of the United States of America and his naval and military advisers General Wavell was to assume, as soon as possible, the duties of Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Area. In a later telegram, dated 3rd January 1942, (2) from the Lord Privy Seal to General Wavell the urgency attached to the assumption of his new responsibilities by the latter was emphasised.

General Wavell accordingly left Delhi on the morning of 5th January, 1942 by air, arriving in Singapore on the morning of 7th January. After visiting the Headquarters of the 3rd Indian Corps at Kuala Lumpur, and Divisional and Brigade Headquarters of 11th Indian Division northward of that place, on 8th January, General Wavell issued certain orders for the conduct of operations in Malaya. On 10th January General Wavell moved with a skeleton staff to Batavia, again by air, and Headquarters, Far Eastern Command, Singapore, ceased to exist from 0001 hours, G. M. T. on that day.(3) British authorities were instructed to deal thenceforward with the Supreme Commander as regards matters which fell within his functions.(3).

It was not until 1200 hrs., G. M. T., on 15th January 1942, however, that the Supreme Commander officially took over command in the newly created Area (4). In his telegram announcing his assumption of command, the Supreme Commander made it clear that he was not at that date in a position to establish an office or to exercise effective operational control, but that he considered it desirable, and in this was supported by American and Dutch representatives in Batavia, to assume at once official responsibility for taking general decisions affecting the whole area.

From 1200 hrs. G. M. T. on 15th January 1942, therefore, the Headquarters of the South-West Pacific Command were established, on a temporary basis and with much less than the minimum desirable staff, signals and clerical establishment, at the Hotel des Indes, Batavia, with the temporary telegraphic address ABDACOM, BATAVIA. On 18th January the Headquarters was moved to the Grand Hotel LEMBANG, situated in the foothills some ten miles by road north of BANDOENG, retaining the telegraphic address ABDACOM, BATAVIA. (which was intended to delay, so far as might be possible, enemy knowledge of the precise location of the Headquarters). By the time the Headquarters arrived at Lembang, the minimum essential signals communications had been installed; and embryo office accommodation in the sitting rooms of private suites and the ballroom and dining room of the hotel was available. During the stay of Headquarters in Lembang additions in the shape of improved signal communications, quarters for the guard detachment from the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, additional hatted office

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accommodation in the hotel garden and other accommodation for various purposes, were made, not all of which were occupied or in use at the time of dispersal of the Headquarters.

Expansion of the number of personnel at Headquarters necessitated, first, the acquisition of private houses and another small hotel in Lembang and of further private houses on the road Bandoeng-Lembang to serve as living quarters and offices for the Intendant General's Staff, and, later, the establishment of the offices of the Air Staff and the Combined Operations Intelligence Centre in the R. N. I. Military Academy in Bandoeng, with living quarters in Bandoeng for the personnel concerned.

6. *Date of Dispersal.*—When the course of events made it apparent that the retention of Java in Allied hands could not be expected to continue much longer, the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington stated (5) that they considered the timely withdrawal from Java of Headquarters South-West Pacific Command to be important. In view of the contracted area over which command could be effective, owing to the loss of Malaya and the greater part of the Netherlands East Indies, the Supreme Commander recommended (6) that the Headquarters should be abolished rather than withdrawn elsewhere. This recommendation was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (7). ABDACOM headquarters accordingly ceased to operate from 0430 hours G. M. T. (1200 hours local time) on 25th February 1942. The Supreme Commander left for India by air on the evening of that day to re-assume the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in India. The remainder of the Headquarters Staff, less those required to operate the Headquarters of the British, British Empire, U. S. A. and Dutch forces remaining in Java, left Lembang and Bandoeng by road on the morning of 26th February 1942 and sailed in H. M. S. Kedah from Tjilatjap for Colombo at 1800 hours the same day.

7. *Areas of Command.*—*Original Geographical Area of the South-West Pacific Command.*—The area included in ABDACOM is precisely defined in the directive issued to the Supreme Commander, *vide* Appendix 'A' and the sketch map attached thereto. In general terms it comprised the American—British—Dutch—Australian area which included Burma, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands. It did not include Australia, China, Indo-China and Thailand.

8. *Subsequent Modifications of the Area of the Command.*—(a) *Burma.*—Burma had been transferred from the Far East Command to the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India on 15th December 1941, soon after the outbreak of the war with Japan. General Wavell, who had repeatedly urged before the outbreak of war that Burma should form part of the Indian command, opposed its transfer back to the ABDA command (8), but was overruled.

When operational control passed to ABDACOM administrative control remained with India, subject to any overriding instructions which might be issued by the Supreme Commander (9).

Operational control was transferred back to India on 22nd February 1942. On resumption of complete control of Burma by India, the Western boundary of the ABDA area was modified to run along the Eastern (instead of the Western) frontier of Burma, thence along the west coast of Malaya to Singapore and thence along the meridian of Singapore,

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but Sumatra remained wholly in the ABDA area. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Cocos Islands were transferred to the India command. Control of 204 Mission also was transferred to India (10).

(b) *Darwin Area, Northern Australia.*—The Southern boundary of the ABDA area was originally defined (11) as "the northern coast of Australia from meridian 143 degrees east, westward to meridian 114 degrees east, thence north-westward to latitude 15 degrees south longitude 92 degrees east." This left the Supreme Commander's responsibility for the defence of Port Darwin in doubt and in his first telegram (12) after arriving in Batavia he requested definition of the position. It was suggested that because its defence must necessarily be dependent on control of the Timor Sea, which was in ABDA area, Port Darwin should be the responsibility of the Supreme Commander. After consideration of alternative suggestions it was decided that the defence of Port Darwin should be the responsibility of the Supreme Commander and that in order to enable him to discharge this responsibility an adequate portion of the hinterland should be included within his area of command. To give effect to this the Southern boundary of the ABDA area was extended to include the mainland of Australia northward of a line running from Onslow on the Western coast to the South-East corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria (13). Command of Royal Australian Air Force forces in this area was assumed by ABDACOM with effect from midnight 30/31 Jan. 1942, and of Army forces from midnight 7/8th February 1942 (14).

Command of all Australian land forces and operational control of any allied land forces within a new Darwin Sub-Command, as defined in paragraph 9 below, was to be exercised by an Australian General Officer with Headquarters at Darwin and responsible to the Supreme Commander.

The command and operation of naval forces stationed in the Darwin Sub-Command and those entering the area for operational purposes was to be exercised by ABDACOM through ABDAFLOAT (i.e., the Chief of the Naval Staff at Headquarters of ABDACOM, who was also Commander of the Allied Naval forces in the ABDA area) and Allied naval commanders under him. Forces employed in local naval defence in the Darwin Sub-Command were to continue to be commanded and operated as directed by the Australian Commonwealth Navy Board. (15).

Operational Control of all air forces stationed in the Darwin Sub-Command was to be exercised by the Commander of the Combined Air Forces ("ACH", i.e., Air Combined Headquarters), Darwin. (15).

9. *Sub-Areas of the South-West Pacific Command.*—(a) *Naval.*—No sub-division of the ABDA area for purposes of naval operations was made. The Chief of the Naval Staff (ABDAFLOAT) commanded Allied naval forces in the area, under the direction of the Supreme Commander. The command of naval forces of the various nations, under the direction of ABDAFLOAT, was exercised as follows:—

- (i) *Dutch.*—By the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Naval forces. Until Admiral Hart, U. S. N. resigned the post of Chief of the Naval Staff, this control was exercised by Admiral Helfrich. When Admiral Helfrich, R. N. N. assumed the duties of Chief of the Naval Staff, control was exercised under his direction by Rear-Admiral van Staveren, R. N. N.



(ii) *British (and Australian).*—Flag Officer Java (or Commodore Commanding China Force), Commodore J. A. Collins, C.B., R.A.N., commanded and operated all British naval forces stationed from time to time in the ABDA area, except those employed in the Local Naval Defence of Malaya and Australian ports, which were operated under the orders of Rear-Admiral Malaya and the Australian Commonwealth Navy Board respectively. Flag Officer Java was, in addition, specially charged with the provision of escorts for and routing of convoys carrying British personnel and supplies to ports in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. He was also instructed to co-operate with Rear Admiral Malaya in matters affecting the local naval defence of Malaya and the direction of convoys and shipping to and from Singapore (16). In order to secure close co-ordination with naval operations on adjacent stations the China Force was regarded as a detachment of the Eastern Fleet, but one acting under the control of ABDACOM instead of under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet. (17).

(iii) *American.*—The command of American naval forces in the ABDA area was at first exercised directly by Admiral Hart, U. S. N. through his deputy in the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Purnell, at Soerabaja, but after his resignation it was exercised by Rear Admiral Glasford, U. S. N., under the direction of ABDAFLOAT.

(iv) *"Task" Forces.*—Normally the naval forces in the ABDA area operated under their own national commanders as indicated in the preceding sub-paragraphs, under the general direction of ABDAFLOAT and the Supreme Commander. It was arranged, however, that when forces consisting of units of more than one nationality were formed for particular operations (i.e., Task forces), a commander for the particular operation was to be designated by ABDAFLOAT. (17).

(b) *Land Forces.*—The land forces branch of ABDACOM staff was under the control of Lieutenant-General ter Poorten, who continued to exercise his functions as Commander of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, and had operational control of all other allied land forces in N. E. I. territory.

As for Naval Forces, no definition of sub-areas for the operational control of land forces was necessary, because the respective commands had been in existence sufficiently long for their boundaries to be generally known. One exception to this was the Darwin Sub-Command, created as regards the control of land forces from midnight 7th/8th February 1942, where a mixture of Australian and Royal Netherlands East Indies Army units, in addition to some United States Army units, made it advisable to define the boundaries of the command. The army commands included in ABDA area were:—

- (i) *Burma.*—Commander, Lieut.-General T. J. Hutton.
- (ii) *Malaya.*—Commander, Lieut.-General A. E. Percival.

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(iii) Netherlands East Indies (from midnight 7th/8th February, less portion included in Darwin Sub-Area) Commander, Lieut.-General H. ter Poorten.

(iv) *Philippine Islands*.—Commander, General MacArthur.

(v) *Darwin Sub-Command*.—Commander, an Australian General Officer with his Headquarters at Darwin. Boundaries; East ABDA area eastern boundary to Cape York; South, a line running from Cape York along the eastern shore of the Gulf of Carpentaria to the south-east corner of the Gulf and thence a straight line to Onslow; West, a line north-eastward from Onslow to the eastern end of the island of Flores, thence to the eastern end of North Celebes and thence north to the 5 degrees north parallel of latitude. North, from the west boundary along the 5 degrees north parallel to the eastern boundary of ABDA area.

(c) *Air Forces*.—The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, exercised command of all the Allied air forces in ABDA area (except Naval Air Arms and their equivalent). Until Sir Richard Peirse arrived and took over his duties from 1200 hours on 28th January 1942, (18). Major-General Breteton, U. S. Army Air Corps, officiated, with Group Captain Darvall, R. A. F. as his Deputy. For purposes of the control of air operations the ABDA area was divided into sub-commands as follows:—

Sub-Command.	Area included.	Commander.
(i) NORGROUP	Burma . . . . . H. Q. Rangoon.	British.
(ii) WESGROUP	Malaya, Sumatra north of 3 degrees south and including Palembang I and II, and West Borneo. H. Q. Singapore; later Sumatra, then Java.	British.
(iii) CENGROUP	Java west of 110 degrees east and Sumatra south of 3 degrees south, excluding Palembang I and II. H. Q. Bandoeng.	Dutch (AHK Bandoeng).
(iv) EASGROUP	Java east of 110 degrees east, inclusive Flores, inclusive Celebes, exclusive Molucca Sea. H. Q. Bandoeng.	American.
(v) AUSGROUP	East of EASGROUP, inclusive Molucca Sea, to eastern boundary ABDA area, and including that portion of Australia north of a line from Onslow to the S. E. corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria (i.e. corresponding with the Darwin Sub-Command for land forces). H. Q. Darwin.	Australian or American.
(vi) RECGROUP	ABDA area, subdivided into :— <i>Western area</i> .—Malaya-W Borneo to 3 degrees south. <i>Central area</i> .—South of 3 degrees south—Sunda Strait-Java Sea—Sourabaya to S. E. corner of Borneo. <i>Eastern area</i> .—East Borneo-Macassar Strait—inclusive Molucca Sea to Timor. <i>Darwin area</i> .—Halmahera-Ambon-Timor-Onslow to ABDA boundary.	Dutch, with U. S. Deputy.

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10. *Directive issued to the Supreme Commander.*—The Directive issued to the Supreme Commander, as approved by the four Governments concerned, is reproduced in full in Appendix 'A'.

The geographical area of the South-West Pacific Command has already been outlined in paragraph 7 above. It is of interest to note that it exceeded 5,000 miles in length measured from the north of Burma round the islands to New Guinea and was almost 2,500 miles from North to South; the superficial area comprised within the boundaries of the Command was some 12 million square miles.

In the Directive the Supreme Commander was made responsible for the co-ordination within his command of the strategic operations of all armed forces of the American, British, Dutch and Australian Governments. He commanded all forces of those Governments which were:—

- (a) stationed in his Command,
- (b) located in Australian territory when such forces had been allotted by their respective Governments for service in, or in support of, the ABDA Area.

The Supreme Commander had no responsibility in respect of the internal administration of the forces under his command, but was authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war material.

In practice, however, it became necessary for the Intendant General's Branch of ABDACOM staff to make all administrative arrangements in respect of many units and details which arrived in the Netherlands Indies during the later stages of the existence of ABDACOM.

### SECTION III.—ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC COMMAND (ABDACOM).

11. *Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs.*—The senior appointments in the Headquarters of ABDACOM were filled as under:—

- (a) *Deputy Supreme Commander, and Intendant General.*—Lieut.-General G. H. BRETT, U. S. Army Air Corps.
- (b) *Deputy Intendant General.*—Major-General C. E. M. LLOYD, A.I.F.
- (c) *Chief of Staff.*—Lieut.-General Sir H. R. POWNALL.
- (d) *Chief of Naval Staff and Commander of Allied Naval Forces.*—Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. Navy; later Admiral HELFRICH, R. N. Navy.
- (e) *Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.*—Rear Admiral PALLISER, R.N.
- (f) *Commander of Allied Land Forces in the N. E. I.*—Lieut.-General H. ter POORTEN, Commander R. N. E. I. Army.
- (g) *Chief of the General Staff and Deputy for Gen. ter Poorten.*—Major-General I. S. O. PLAYFAIR.
- (h) *Chief of Air Staff and Commander of Allied Air Forces.*—Major-General BRERETON, U. S. Army Air Corps, acting until 28th January 1942 when Air Marshall Sir Richard PIERSE assumed command.

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(j) *Deputy Chief of Air Staff*.—Group Captain L. DARVALL, R. A. F., acting until 28th January 1942 when Major-General BRERETON, took over.

(k) *Deputy Director of Military Intelligence*.—Brigadier L. F. FIELD.

(l) In charge Public Relations, and Political Adviser—Sir GEORGE SANSOM.

12. *Organization of Staff*.—(a) *General*.—The detailed organization worked out for the headquarters staff of the South-West Pacific Command is given in Appendix 'B'. In general outline the organization was as follows.

(b) *Sub-Division*.—The staff was divided into five branches, Naval, Army, Air, Administrative and Intelligence. Co-ordination of the work of these branches fell within the province of the Chief of Staff, who normally effected this in daily, or more frequent, meetings with the Deputy Chiefs of Staffs.

(c) *Naval Staff*.—(ABDAFLOAT).—In the Naval Staff, officers were placed in charge of operations, convoy routing and escorts, maintenance of situation charts, etc. Their work was co-ordinated in daily meetings under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

(d) *General Staff*.—(ABDAMIL—telegraphic address never used).—The Army (General) Staff was organized in five sections, namely:—

- G. S. 1.—Co-ordinating section.
- G. S. 2.—Burma and Malaya.
- G. S. 3.—Netherlands East Indies.
- G. S. 4.—Australia and Australian troops.
- G. S. 5.—Philippine Islands.

As in other branches, co-ordination was ensured by daily meetings of the Staff officers in charge of sections in the office of the Chief of the General Staff. Out of a total of 20 staff officers demanded for the above sections only 8 had reported for duty at the time of dispersal and only 4 were present throughout the existence of ABDACOM. The available officers, therefore, had to be regarded as a pool for assignment to any urgent work rather than be given any fixed allotment of duties. In consequence the less important office routine work had necessarily to be neglected. The organization outlined above did not prove entirely satisfactory in view of developments in the situation and a revised organization was devised, as follows, to be taken into use on the arrival of a full quota of staff officers:—

- Future planning section.
- G. S. 1.—Staff Duties Section.
- G. S. 2.—Burma and Malaya.
- G. S. 3/4.—N. E. I. and Australia.
- G. S. 5.—Philippine Islands.

Time did not permit the adoption of the new organization.

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(e) *Air Staff*—(ABDAIR).—The Air Staff was divided into Operations and Administration sections. Originally these were housed with the remainder of ABDACOM headquarters at Lembang. Various additions to ABDACOM Staff, such as Combined Operations Intelligence Centre and the American Far East Air Force G.-4 (Supply) Section, together with the arrival of additional personnel made the accommodation available at Lembang unduly cramped. Accordingly all but a skeleton Air Operations Staff was moved from Lembang into Bandoeng, where the transferred portions began to operate in the Military Academy with effect from 0130 hours G. M. T. on 1st February 1942.

(f) *Intendant General's Branch*—(ABDAMIN).—This branch of the headquarters staff was established from the beginning in requisitioned private houses seven miles from the Supreme Commander's headquarters on the road Lembang—Bandoeng. Measures to secure co-ordination between its activities and those of other branches of the staff included the location of the Deputy Intendant General at the Supreme Commander's headquarters, his attendance at Commanders' and Staff conferences and frequent visits by administrative staff officers to other branches of the staff, in addition to the provision of direct line and secraphone communication. The Works Directorate had separate offices about one mile distant from I. G.'s Branch.

Difficulty in securing the required personnel made it more difficult for the Intendant General's Branch even than for other branches to adopt its designed organization. In outline, it was intended to organize the branch in three sections, Naval, Air and Land. The Land section included all supplies and stores common to all sections, also all buildings and works.

Considerable progress was made in the filling of appointments in the Land section, although many vacancies still existed at the time of dispersal. The Naval and Air sections had not come into being and the establishment of an Air Officer-in-charge of Administration within the staff of ABDAIR made the situation of the proposed Air section of the Intendant General's staff a doubtful one.

(g) *Intelligence Branch*.—The Intelligence Branch at the operational headquarters of ABDACOM served as an Inter-Service Intelligence Bureau. Its personnel were drawn almost entirely from the Far East Central Intelligence Bureau, Singapore, and comprised officers of all three Services. It continued to function as the source of military intelligence for ABDACOM operational headquarters after the establishment of the Combined Operations Intelligence Centre at Air Staff headquarters.

The combined operations Intelligence Centre began to function in the former Military Academy at Bandoeng from 0900 hours (Java Time) on 1st February. Captain F. B. Stump, U. S. Navy, was Director and he had assistants from all three Services of the British, Australians, Dutch and Americans.

It was directed that all information available, including specifically the following, should be forwarded promptly to the C. O. I. C.:—

- (i) All enemy reports, stating source when possible and details available, of aircraft activities and location; land forces; vessels; attacks; and mine laying.

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- (ii) Reconnaissance of harbours, areas, etc., with all reports of any special reconnaissance with negative reports included.
- (iii) Attacks on enemy airfields, vessels, troops, etc.
- (iv) D. F. and special intelligence reports.
- (v) Reports of dispositions, strength and availability of our forces, including number of available aircraft by type and location; prospective aircraft reinforcements; location of all our naval vessels (especially submarines) and prospective future movements; location and movement of our merchant shipping (especially convoys).

The Director was to be informed of prospective movements and operations of our forces.

(h) *Joint Planning*.—When problems demanding joint planning arose, the Chief of Staff nominated staff officers from the three Services to form an *ad hoc* committee for consideration of the problem in question.

13. *Method of dealing with day to day work*.—The expeditious despatch of work and co-ordination was secured by a series of daily conferences on various levels.

At first one Commanders' conference was held daily and later, from 11th February, they were held twice daily at 0900 hours and 1800 hours. These conferences were attended by the Supreme Commander, his Deputy, the Chief of Staff, the Chiefs of Staffs, who combined with that duty the command of forces of the various services, the D. D. M. I., and other officers whose presence was desired, such as the Commander of the 1st Australian Corps while he was present in Java.

Following the Commanders' Conference, Staff Conferences were held, presided over by the Chief of Staff and attended by Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The function of these conferences was to implement and co-ordinate work in connection with decisions taken at the Commanders' conferences. Normally they were held twice daily.

In addition to the above, Deputy Chiefs of Staff held meetings of their own staff officers as required.

It was found that regular conferences on the above lines reduced to a minimum the necessity for noting and other paper work and expedited the despatch of business.

14. *Office Organization*.—A Central Registry system was taken into use at ABDACOM headquarters for the registration of correspondence and the custody and maintenance of files. This system did not work satisfactorily, even after an almost complete clerical establishment had arrived, because the urgency with which messages received had to be dealt with precluded completion of the normal processes of registry and filing before action was taken. It is probable that the maintenance of files would have been transferred to a section basis as soon as the number of staff officers available increased. In the General Staff some officers were, in fact, maintaining their private files on especially important subjects even with the staff on more or less a skeleton basis.

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Separation of, first, the Intendant General's staff and, later ABDAIR from the main operational headquarters entailed those branches' dropping out of the main central registry system. Duplication of file numbers was avoided by the allotment of blocks of numbers to each branch.

#### SECTION IV.—FAR EAST WAR SITUATION AT THE TIME WHEN ABDACOM TOOK OVER COMMAND IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC.

(a) *Object of the Summary.*—In order to provide a background against which to view the activities of ABDACOM it is necessary very briefly to review the course of events from the outbreak of war with Japan up to the 15th January 1942.

(b) *Outbreak of Hostilities.*—On the 7th December 1941 Japan, under the cloak provided by negotiations in Washington between their special peace envoy Mr. Kurusu, and Admiral Nomura, with the United States authorities, opened hostilities over a wide area in the Pacific. This was followed by a Japanese declaration of war against the United States and Britain, which led to declarations of war against Japan by the United States, Britain and the Dominions and many of the Central and South American Republics. On the 8th December the Netherlands East Indies declared war against Japan. On the 11th December Germany and Italy declared war on the United States who replied with a declaration of a state of war with those countries; the Netherlands East Indies declared war on Italy, being already at war with Germany. China declared war on Germany and Italy on the 9th December; Germany rejected the declaration on the grounds that they recognised only one Government, namely the Nanking Government, in China. An agreement was signed at Washington on the 1st January 1942, by the United States, Britain, Russia, China and twenty-two other Anti-Axis States in which they undertook to prosecute the war with all vigour and not to make a separate peace. On the same day Dr. J. van Mook relinquished his ministerial appointment in the Netherlands Government in order to take up the duties of Lieutenant-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies.

(c) *Events in the Pacific Islands.*—Hostilities opened on the 7th December 1941 with heavy attacks by aircraft from several Japanese aircraft carriers, bombardment by submarines and attacks by midget submarines against Pearl Harbour, Oahu and other Hawaiian Islands Objectives. The attacks resulted in the loss of one U. S. battleship by internal explosions following hits by bombs, the capsizing of another battleship, the loss of other smaller naval units and many aircraft and heavy casualties to naval and army personnel. Since then there have been spasmodic attacks on various points in the Hawaiian Islands chiefly by bombardment by submarines, with negligible results.

Between 7th December 1941 and 15th January 1942, when ABDACOM took over command, Japanese action against Pacific Islands was widespread. The three link islands on the U. S. air and cable route between Hawaii and the Philippines were attacked, Guam being occupied in 11th December and Wake Island on 22nd December after a gallantly prolonged resistance by the greatly outnumbered garrison, resulting in the loss of

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or damage to seven enemy ships. At various dates in this period landings took place on Makin and Abiak in the Gilbert Islands; air raids were made on Nauru and Ocean Islands and Johnston, Baker, Palmyra and Ocean Islands were subjected to naval bombardment. Rabaul was subjected to an air raid on 4th January, a prelude to an enemy expedition to occupy New Britain en route to New Guinea and, possibly, Australia.

(d) *Events in China.*—The Japanese occupied the International Settlement at Shanghai on the 8th December. Air raids were made on Hong Kong and Kowloon on this day.

On the 9th they attacked the British leased territory on the mainland opposite Hong Kong. During the night 11/12th December the British garrison withdrew from the mainland into Hong Kong Island. By order of their Generalissimo three Chinese Armies carried out diversionary attacks on the Canton-Kowloon railway and on the Leased Territory, but did not succeed in halting the Japanese attack on Hong Kong. The Japanese effected a landing on the island on the night of 18th December and after severe fighting the garrison was forced to surrender at 1905 hours on 25th December 1941.

On the 22nd December General Wavell, in his capacity as C.-in-C. India and Burma, arrived at Chungking for discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and Major-General G. H. Brett, U. S. Army Air Corps, regarding co-ordination of effort.

(e) *Events in the Philippine Islands.*—Hostilities against the Philippines opened with air raids against Davao, Palawan and Baguio on 8th December, followed by raids on Cebu on the 12th and 25th. Other enemy air raids were made on Cebu, Manila and Cavite naval base, causing serious casualties in Manila and severe military damage at Cavite. Japanese landings were effected at Vigan and Aparri in the north of Luzon island on 9th December and at Legaspi in the south-east on the 12th. Small Filipino forces resisted, but could not repel, these landings. A pause in the land operations followed, while the Japanese built up air bases at the sites of their landings.

Large scale landings were effected by the Japanese at Lingayen Gulf, North of Manila, on the 22nd December, followed by further major landings at Antimonan, south of Manila, on the 23rd. Both landings were followed up by substantial reinforcements. It then became a difficult problem to unite the U. S. forces from the north and the south in defensible positions N. W. of Manila, but the junction was effected before the communications bottleneck north of Manila was rendered unusable by land and air attacks. The U. S. northern force was withdrawn on 29th December and the concentration was effected on the 31st, Manila and Cavite falling into Japanese hands on 1st January 1942. The Japanese met with a reverse in an attack on the new position on 5th January. On the 10th of January the U. S. forces were withdrawn to a position across the base of the Bataan Peninsula which forms the western arm of Manila Bay, and the island of Corregidor at the entrance to the Bay. Incautious Japanese advances against the Bataan position were repulsed with very severe loss by U. S. artillery on 13th January, as were two further Japanese attacks on the 14th.

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Japanese landings in the Philippines elsewhere than in Luzon were limited. A landing was effected at Davao in the south of Mindanao on 20th December, and another landing at Jolo. Enemy air bases were established at both of these places, and concentrations of enemy shipping appeared at Davao. Air attacks against this shipping up to 6th January caused the Japanese very substantial losses in warships, transports and store ships.

(f) *Events in Malaya.*—The first Japanese landing in Malaya was effected near Kota Bharu at 0130 hours on 8th December 1941. Simultaneously further landings were made at Patani and Singora near the Malayan frontier in southern Thailand. On the 8th heavy air raids were made on aerodromes occupied by the British air forces in northern Malaya, resulting in crippling losses in aircraft on the ground. Singapore, also, was raided, apparently more as a demonstration than as a serious attack.

A severe blow was struck at Allied morale, besides the serious material loss inflicted, by the sinking by Japanese air attack of Prince of Wales and Repulse off the east coast of Malaya on 10th December, while they were seeking an opportunity to attack the Japanese shipping used in connection with the enemy landings. On the 12th December four Japanese transports, one tanker and one supply ship were sunk off Singora by Netherlands Navy submarines. Reinforcements of naval and air units had arrived in Singapore from the N. E. I. on 10th December.

By 10th December the British force in Kelantan was forced by a Japanese advance in strength from the direction of Singora to withdraw south of Kota Bharu. Thereafter troops in N. E. Malaya were not seriously threatened by a direct enemy advance, but they were forced to conform to the withdrawal in western Malaya. By 22nd December they were in position near Kuala Lipis.

In Kedah an advance was made into Thai territory, along the road Kroh-Yala, after the Japanese had landed. On meeting unexpectedly strong opposition this force was compelled to withdraw to Kroh. A Japanese offensive from southern Thailand into Kedah drove the 11th Indian Division out of an incompletely organized defensive position at Jitra and compelled the Division to retreat in some confusion and with heavy losses. By 17th December fighting was in progress along the Muda River 80 miles south of the Thai frontier. By the 18th our troops were reorganizing south of the Krian River, which forms the boundary between Kedah and Province Wellesley and Perak, and Penang was evacuated. By the 22nd our positions were in the vicinity of Kuala Kangsar, 45 miles S. E. of the Krian River. By the 28th our troops were in contact with the enemy at Chemor, 10 miles north of Ipoh, and at Blanja on the Perak River S. W. of Ipoh; on the 29th our troops had been withdrawn to the south of Ipoh.

At this stage successive withdrawals were caused by Japanese landings behind the British left flank. For this purpose small ships and barges, which must have been left undestroyed at Penang, were used. Movement was made either by night or under air cover, the enemy taking advantage of his air superiority, by day. This air superiority, due at least in part to early losses of grounded aircraft on airfields in northern Malaya, enabled the enemy to carry out frequent bombing and machine gunning attacks on the British troops and transport without the possibility of retaliation on the enemy.

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Patrol encounters between Kuala Trengganu and Kuantan had, for some time, indicated an enemy advance down the east coast. On 31st December contact was made with the enemy in the vicinity of Kuantan, on 1st January the Japanese were in the outskirts of the town and on 4th January they attacked the aerodrome. The British garrison defending the aerodrome offered strong resistance, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, but on the 5th the aerodrome was in Japanese hands and the remains of the Kuantan garrison were withdrawn to the area south of Kuala Lipis, leaving no British troops on the east coast north of Endau.

On the west coast further enemy infiltration by sea caused fresh British withdrawals. Positions south of the River Perak in Lower Perak were reached on the 4th January, Bidor, 70 miles north of Kuala Lumpur on the 5th and positions on the Slim River, on the Selangor border 50 miles north of Kuala Lumpur, on the 6th. On the 7th an enemy tank attack penetrated the Slim River position, resulting in the cutting up of two Brigades of the 11th Indian Division.

General Wavell visited the Headquarters of the 3rd Indian Corps, 11th Indian Division and 12th and 28th Indian Infantry Brigades (the two cut up on the previous day) on 8th January. It was apparent to him from this visit that the 11th Indian Division was in no condition to withstand further serious attacks. He therefore issued instructions for a withdrawal to the northern boundary of Johore, where the 8th Australian Division (22nd and 27th Brigades A. I. F.) and the 9th Indian Division, strengthened by additions, were to conduct an active defence, with 53rd Infantry Brigade (of 18th British Division) and 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, newly arrived in Malaya, in support. On 10th January further withdrawals on the Selangor front were made. Positions north of Seremban were reached on the 12th and the withdrawal continued on the 13th. By 14th January the withdrawal of 3rd Indian Corps was completed and West Force comprising 27 Bde. A. I. F., 45 Indian Inf. Bde. and, later, 9 Indian Div, had taken over the defence. A patrol of 22 Bde. A. I. F. sighted a Japanese fighting patrol near the Rompin River on the east coast north of Endau. In the west the Japanese claimed to have reached the area Seremban—Tampin—Sepang.

General Wavell, when in Singapore on 7th January, had issued orders for the reconnaissance and preparation of defences on the landward side of Singapore Island to be accelerated.

(g) *Events in Thailand and Burma.*—At 0200 hours on 8th December 1941 the Japanese began to enter Thailand. By 0730 hours the same day Thai resistance to the Japanese invasion ceased and later in the day the Thai Government concluded an agreement permitting the passage of Japanese forces through Thai territory. Subsequently Thai troops actively co-operated with Japanese troops in some engagements with British forces.

Japanese action against Burma began with bombing attacks on objectives in the Tenasserim Division on 10th December. On 14th December the Japanese advanced to Victoria Point whence the small British garrison was withdrawn. British small-scale raids on the Thai isthmian railway were made ineffective by the resistance of superior Thai forces.

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On 17th December a detachment of Dutch and Australian troops occupied Dilly in Portuguese Timor in order to counter potential hostile activity by the Japanese in that place. This action gave rise to subsequent diplomatic negotiation in which ABDACOM became involved.

(j) *Preludes to formation of ABDACOM.*—On 20th December a conference was in progress in Washington and the British press suggested that measures to secure co-ordinated strategy were likely to proceed from it. Mr. Churchill arrived in Washington on 22nd December accompanied by senior representatives of the Services. On 2nd January Mr. Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, disclosed to the press that General Wavell was likely to be appointed Supreme Commander in the South-West Pacific and this was followed by an official announcement of the appointment by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill on 3rd January. The appointment of Major-General Brett as Deputy Supreme Commander and of Admiral Hart as Commander of the Allied Naval Forces was also officially announced, together with the appointment as Chief of Staff of General Pownall who on 27th December had assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief Far East Command. Simultaneously it was announced that Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek would command all Allied forces in China, Indo-China and Thailand. It was announced on 6th January that General Wavell's headquarters would be located somewhere in the Netherlands East Indies.

(k) *Summary of the Situation on 15th January —*

Hong Kong had fallen.

The U. S. garrison in the Philippine Islands was besieged on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island.

Minahasa in the Celebes was in enemy hands as was North Borneo and Tarakan and there were indications of hostile advances south-ward from these places.

In Malaya 3rd Indian Corps after constant fighting and retreating for five weeks could be counted on for little further effort. The enemy had approached close to Johore and the possibility of getting in reinforcements through Singapore was already open to some doubt.

Burma had not yet seriously been attacked by land forces.

In many parts of the outer N. E. I. islands, air raids indicated further imminent enemy advances.

#### SECTION V.—REINFORCEMENTS FOR ABDA AREA.

16. *Necessity for Reinforcements.*—(a) The Japanese were known to dispose of a minimum of 72 divisions, not including Depot Divisions in Japan, and some 26 of these were operating in the S. W. Pacific area. Allied land forces in that area approximated to the equivalent of 8 divisions, 3 in Malaya, say the equivalent of 3 in the Philippines and 2 in Java. Elsewhere in the Netherlands East Indies the Dutch forces consisted of only small parties of Territorial troops intended more for internal security duties than for active operations.

(b) As regards Naval Forces, the Japanese usually had approximately 3 battleships, 28 cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 71 destroyers, 4 seaplane carriers and 34 submarines operating in the S. W. Pacific and adjacent areas. Allied Naval units under the control of ABDAFLOAT comprised

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In Burma—6 Light Bomber Squadrons.  
6 Fighter Squadrons.

This programme was modified to some extent as provision progressed, as indicated in paragraph 20 below. The importance of equipping, maintaining and expanding the Dutch air forces in the N. E. I. was urged on the United States Government, but circumstances did not permit this, *vide* para. 20 (d) below.

18. *Allotment of Reinforcements—Naval Forces.*—In view of the Allied strength of submarines already in the South China Sea, H. M. G. decided (19) that no more submarines were to be diverted from the United Kingdom or Mediterranean to ABDA area beyond two British and two Dutch submarines and one Dutch submarine depot ship which had already been ordered eastward. Actually the two British submarines arrived, but neither of the two Dutch submarines ordered nor the depot ship arrived before the dispersal of ABDACOM headquarters. (21).

Reinforcements of surface craft promised for ABDA area were:—

U. S.—One cruiser. Due to arrive approx. 24th February (21).

British.—One cruiser (minelayer). Did not arrive (21).

Two light cruisers, R. A. N. (22). One present, one due to arrive approx. 26 Feb.

Two destroyers, R. A. N. Did not arrive (21).

Three sloops, R. A. N. Did not arrive (21).

One 8" gun cruiser from Eastern Fleet. Employed in area pending arrival of a cruiser with Rear Admiral for China Force due end of March.

Dutch.—One A. A. cruiser. } Did not arrive (21).  
One destroyer. }

The total Naval units mentioned in para. 16 (b) above, plus actual arrivals included among the reinforcements detailed in this paragraph, were contributed as follows:—

	Cruisers.	Destroyers.	Submarines.	Sloops.
U. S. . . . .	4	11	26	..
British . . . . .	6	5 (plus 4 old small destroyers at Singapore).	2	2
Dutch . . . . .	3	8	8 (plus 3 local defence submarines).	..

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(iii) The following reinforcements actually arrived in the theatre:—  
*Formations:—*

53 Inf. Bde. of 18 Div. } at Singapore early in January before for-  
 45 Ind. Inf. Bde. } mation of ABDACOM.

44 Ind. Inf. Bde.—at Singapore 25th January, M. T. of 18 Div. in the same convoy had to be back-loaded to Batavia because of the difficulty of unloading at Singapore under air attack.

18 Div. (less 53 Inf. Bde.)—at Singapore 29th January; convoy was attacked when approaching Singapore; one large ship, Empress of Asia, was hit by bombs and later burnt out, but casualties were slight.

A skeleton Corps H. Q. of 1 Aust Corps arrived in Java by air and one ship only of the convoys transporting the Corps arrived at Batavia where some A. I. F. personnel were disembarked to assist in the defence of Java. Later Corps H. Q. and all the remainder of the Corps were diverted to destinations outside the ABDA area. Commander and one staff officer 7 Armd. Bde. arrived in Java, but left when the Bde. was diverted to Burma.

*Units and Details:—*

One Aust M. G. Bn. and }  
 reinforcements for 8 Aust Div. } at Singapore 23rd January.

Drafts for 3rd Indian Corps }  
 No. 100 Indian Lt. Tank Sqn. } at Singapore 29th Jan.

'B' Sqn. 3rd Hussars—at Oosthaven 13th February; disembarked, but re-embarked for Batavia because southern Sumatra was being evacuated.

(b) *Burma.*—(i) In Burma the following formations were available when war broke out with Japan:—

*H. Q. 1st Burma Division.—*

1st Burma Infantry Brigade.

2nd Burma Infantry Brigade.

13th Indian Infantry Brigade.

16th Indian Infantry Brigade—just arriving in the country.

(ii) Land forces promised or sent included:—

*Formations:—*

H. Q. 17th Indian Division.

46th Indian Infantry Brigade.

48th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Two East African Brigade Groups.

H. Q. 14th Indian Division.

63rd Indian Infantry Brigade.

47th Indian Infantry Brigade.

49th Indian Infantry Brigade.

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*Units:—*

Duke of Wellington's Regiment.

West Yorkshire Regiment.

Cameronians.

Inniskilling Fusiliers.

Many Engineer, Ordnance, Transportation, Pioneer, Labour, etc., units.

The formations included in this and the preceding sub-paragraph would on arrival, have aggregated the four divisions which were accepted as the target for Burma.

(iii) Reinforcements which actually arrived in Burma during the period 15th January to 22nd February, when ABDACOM was in operational control, included:—

46 Ind. Inf. Bde., arrived 25th January.

48 Ind. Inf. Bde., arrived 31st January.

Duke of Wellington's Regiment, arrived 12th Feb.

West Yorkshire Regiment, arrived 28th January.

Cameronians, arrived 19th February.

Several of the Engineer, transportation, etc., units also arrived.

It was later decided that the East African Bde. Gps. should not be sent to Burma. None of the other formations mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii) arrived in Burma during the period of ABDACOM's control.

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Reinforcements.*—Early heavy losses of grounded aircraft had served to emphasise, if emphasis were needed, the necessity for A. A. reinforcements for the defence of aerodromes, as well as of other targets. A. A. reinforcements intended for other theatres were accordingly diverted to the Far East by the War Office. The following units arrived in Java:—

H. Q. 16 A. A. Bde.

77 Hy. A. A. Regt.

6 Hy. A. A. Regt.

35 Lt. A. A. Regt.

21 Lt. A. A. Regt.

48 Lt. A. A. Regt.

} from Malaya and less guns lost at sea  
or in Southern Sumatra.

These A. A. units remained, when the headquarters of ABDACOM was dispersed, for the defence of important aerodromes in Java and they formed the bulk of the British troops in the island when it was attacked by the Japanese.

(d) *United States Army Troops.*—U. S. Army troops in the ABDA area, outside the Philippines, comprised the following units, located as shown:—

148th Fd. Arty. Regt. (less one Bn.) 41 officers and 620 men, DARWIN.

147th Fd. Arty. Regt. . . . . 69 officers and 1138 men, DARWIN.

H. Q. & H. Q. Bty. 26 Fd. Arty. 10 officers and 87 men, MALANG (JAVA) Bde.

131st Fd. Arty. Bn. . . . . 27 officers and 518 men, MALANG (JAVA)

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No scheme for the transportation of U. S. Army reinforcements into the ABDA area was ever received.

20. *Allotment of Reinforcements—Air Forces.*—Air reinforcements despatched in pursuance of the policy outlined in paragraph 17, above, included:—

(a) *Burma.—Coastal Defence.*—In December, India, lacking more modern aircraft, sent 4 Wapitis and 2 Audax to Burma, to form a Coast Defence Flight.

*Fighters.*—Before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, No. 67 Squadron R. A. F., equipped with Brewster Buffaloes, was in Burma.

Three more fighter squadrons, Nos. 17, 135 and 136, were diverted to Burma, without aircraft, from a convoy *en route* to India. Thirty-six Hurricanes for these squadrons were flown from the Middle East and were due to arrive in Burma between 7th and 14th January; casualties *en route* were numerous, in some batches as many as 50 per cent of the aircraft being written off before arriving in Burma. Batches of 5, 8 and 30 Hurricanes were sent in ships sailing on 20th December and 25th January from the United Kingdom and on 30th December from Takoradi, respectively.

Arrangements for provision of the balance of two squadrons required to bring the total number of fighter squadrons in Burma, apart from the American Volunteer Group, to six were not decided before ABDACOM relinquished operational control.

The successful air defence of Rangoon, during the period, was due largely to the efforts of the American Volunteer Group. The two squadrons of the Group, one of which was available in Burma alternately until the beginning of February, were equipped with P-40's which, through constant hard use, became worn out.

*Bombers.*—No. 60 Bomber Squadron R. A. F. had been in Burma, but at the outbreak of hostilities all but two of its aircraft were in Singapore for armament training and never came back to Burma.

No. 116 (Blenheim IV) Squadron R. A. F. was despatched from the Middle East by air and it was intended to follow it up with another Blenheim IV squadron.

A decision as regards the despatch of further bomber squadrons to raise the total to the target figure of six squadrons was deferred. (24).

It was decided, later, to operate one-half squadron of American heavy bombers from Burma.

*Order of Battle.*—Owing to non-receipt of arrival reports, the actual number of aircraft received in Burma during the period of ABDACOM's control, and their dates of arrival, cannot be stated. On 6th February the Order of Battle of the air forces in Burma was:—

*Fighters—*

No. 17 Squadron.	Rangoon.	10 Hurricanes.
135 "	"	11 "
67 "	"	4 Buffaloes.
136 "	"	Nil.
A. V. G.	"	20 P-40's.

Two additional squadrons were due by the end of February.

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*Bombers—*

No. 113 Squadron.	Rangoon.	16 Blenheims.
60 "	"	Nil.
45 "	} had not arrived.	
Three squadrons ex-Mideast		

*(b) Malaya—*

At the outbreak of hostilities the air forces available in Malaya comprised:—

*Bombers—*

No. 1 Sqn. R. A. A. F.	} General Reconnaissance.
No. 8 Sqn. R. A. A. F.	
No. 34 Sqn. R. A. F.	
No. 62 Sqn. R. A. F.	

*Torpedo Bombers—*

No. 36 Sqn. R. A. F.	} Equipped with Vildebeestes and Albacores.
No. 100 Sqn. R. A. F.	

*Fighters—*

No. 21 Sqn. R. A. A. F.  
 No. 27 Sqn. R. A. F.  
 No. 243 Sqn. R. A. F.  
 No. 453 Sqn. R. A. F.  
 No. 488 Sqn. R. A. F.

*Bomber Reinforcements.*—Considerable deliveries were made towards completion of the reinforcements required to raise the number of bomber squadrons to eight, but details are not available.

Fifty-two Hudson aircraft were sent from the United Kingdom, the first 23 of which were despatched on 5th January, and one Blenheim squadron was sent from the Middle East.

It was intended to use 16 of the Hudsons to form a new squadron and the remainder to re-equip existing squadrons or as a reserve. On this basis there would be six squadrons, 4 originally in Malaya plus one new Hudson squadron and one Blenheim squadron, leaving a deficiency of two squadrons below the target figure of eight, apart from operational losses not replaced.

*Fighter Reinforcements.*—No. 232 Squadron, with 51 Hurricanes and 24 pilots, was diverted from a convoy *en route* to India and arrived at Singapore in mid-January.

Nos. 258, 242, and 605 Squadrons, without aircraft, were diverted to Singapore from another convoy, arriving there at the end of January.

A British aircraft carrier transported 48 Hurricanes to a rendezvous south of Sumatra, whence the aircraft were flown off *via* Batavia and Palembang, arriving in Singapore on 26th January. These Hurricanes

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were used to equip Nos. 488 and 243 Squadrons, thus providing, with No. 232 Squadron, three Hurricane squadrons at Singapore. All the remaining Buffaloes were then concentrated in No. 453 Squadron.

No. 21 Squadron R. A. A. F. was returned to Australia towards the end of January for re-equipment, because no aircraft for it were available in Malaya.

On 31st January thirty-nine more Hurricanes arrived based in Batavia. These were erected there by personnel of No. 605 Squadron which had arrived without aircraft.

Casualties to Hurricanes were unusually high, through crashes and crash landings as well as in combat, owing to the inexperience of the pilots sent to the South-West Pacific area. (25).

Four additional Hurricane squadrons were due to arrive at the end of February in the aircraft carrier which brought the 48 Hurricanes on 26th January, but they were diverted elsewhere.

*Flying Boats.*—One flying boat squadron, No. 205 equipped with Catalinas (P. B. Ys.), was allotted to ABDA area after the outbreak of hostilities.

(c) *Cengroup*—(Western Java and South Sumatra.)—This Group was operated by the Dutch. Towards the end of January, Dr. Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of N. E. I., applied (26) to the U. S. Government for the allocation of 100 pursuit planes per month for six months for the purpose of equipping the N. E. I. air force. ABDACOM in reply (27) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington on this subject stated that the priorities for American fighter reinforcements were (A) to equip and maintain to full operational efficiency all American units assigned to the ABDA area, (B) to assure a flow of replacement aircraft to keep the units up to full-operational strength, and (C) to furnish to the Australian Government such equipment as could be spared to assist in protection of vital lines of communication leading into the ABDA area. It was not, therefore, possible to allot any in sight to the N. E. I. air force. Time did not permit of an allotment to re-equip N. E. I. air force before the Japanese attack on Java.

The Dutch fighter aircraft sent to reinforce Malaya moved back from Singapore to Java on 20th January.

(d) *EASGROUP*—(Eastern Java.)—Elements of the U. S. Air Forces were established in Java on evacuation from the Philippines when the free operation of air forces in Luzon was rendered impossible by the Japanese advances. Heavy bombers, also, had reached Java, *via* India, either *en route* to Australia or destined for the N. E. I., before the formation of ABDACOM. Later, the headquarters of the American Far Eastern Air Force (F. E. A. F.) was established alongside ABDAIR in the Military Academy at Bandoeng.

American heavy bombers based on aerodromes in Central and Eastern Java were available throughout the existence of ABDACOM and rendered extremely valuable service, in bombing enemy objectives and occasionally in carrying Commanders over long distances. The number available fluctuated on account of casualties, suffered mainly among grounded aircraft and by crashes due to weather conditions. Losses were balanced to

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a greater or lesser degree by the arrival of a variable flow of reinforcements. The numbers normally available for operations averaged 6 to 9 daily. These bombers, particularly the B-17-E., were well able to protect themselves against, and to destroy, enemy fighters in the air. Originally 80 heavy bombers were to be sent (27) and on 9th February the despatch of 22 more during the next two months was arranged. (28).

American Air Forces in EASGROUP which can be traced included:—

7th Group	Heavy Bombers (LB-30)	Jogjakarta.
19th Group	Heavy Bombers (B-17).	Malang.
24th Group	Pursuit (P-40-E)	Djombang.
Combat Wing 10	Catalinas (P. B. Ya.)	Soerabaja, Saumliki, Darwin and Wangapor.

Three other Pursuit Groups. (26).

Fighter (pursuit) aircraft reinforcements *en route* to or in the N. E. I. on 29th January (26) totalled 320. A further 320 were due to be delivered to U. S. forces in the ABDA area by 15th April. Actual deliveries during the period of Abdacom's control however barely sufficed to replace wastage. The numbers which actually reached Java did not exceed some 25—30 aircraft out of 40 routed from Darwin to the N. E. I.

(e) *AUSGROUP*—(*Darwin area*).—This area shared in the flow of reinforcing U. S. aircraft as decided in consultation between the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Australian Government and ABDACOM.

#### SECTION VI.—CHIEF EVENTS IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC DURING THE EXISTENCE OF ABDACOM.

21. *Arrangement of this Section*.—It is considered best to treat events by areas and to follow the operations of sea, air and land forces in each area to their conclusion, rather than attempt to describe sea, air and land operations separately over the whole period and throughout the ABDA area. Operations are, therefore, described in succeeding paragraphs by areas in the following order:—

- (a) the Philippine Islands,
- (b) Malaya and Singapore, in the later stages of which the operation of supporting air forces from South Sumatra and Java has to be included,
- (c) Burma,
- (d) N. E. I.—
  - (i) Borneo and Celebes,
  - (ii) The Moluccas and New Guinea.
  - (iii) Timor,
  - (iv) Sumatra, Java and the Eastern Chain.

The inter-relation between events in the different parts of the area is indicated by extracts from appreciations, directives and information telegrams which were prepared and submitted from time to time.

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22. *The Philippine Islands.*—When General Wavell assumed command of the S. W. Pacific area on 15th January, little was known of the position in the Philippines and means of communication with General Macarthur, and with General Sharpe who was commanding the troops in Mindanao, were scanty. (30) A staff officer from General Sharpe reported at ABDA headquarters on 17th January (31), and one from General Macarthur arrived on 8th February (32). From the arrival of the latter until his departure on 19th February, it was possible to communicate through him direct with General Macarthur, but thereafter until dispersal communications had to be passed through Washington.

In an early cable to General Wavell, General Macarthur advocated the ejection of Japanese forces from Davao, in the south of Mindanao, by aggressive Allied naval action, the establishment of fighter, followed later by bomber, aircraft on the aerodrome still in American hands on Mindanao, and the initial establishment of one American Corps in that island in order to secure a line of communication to his force there (33). The situation in the Philippines as outlined by General Sharpe's staff officer was that the Japanese, estimated 17,000 strong, were holding only a small area in Mindanao round Davao bay. The remainder of the island was held by troops under American control, totalling some 30,000, who had, however, only five field guns, no anti-aircraft guns, eight fighter aircraft and one bomber and only about 50 rounds of small arms ammunition per rifle. Two Visayan divisions had been ordered to Mindanao on 30th December. By 9th January the bulk of them had arrived, bringing the total to the 30,000 referred to above and the Commander established his headquarters at Del Monte. Jolo in the Sulu Islands S. W. of Mindanao, had been occupied by the Japanese, understood to be about 4,000 strong who were erecting aircraft there. In Luzon the garrison had withdrawn into the Bataan peninsula. The central islands of the Philippine group, the Visayas, were still held by Philippine troops and communication by small steamers between those islands and Mindanao was still open (31). After consultation with the Deputy Supreme Commander and the Commander Asiatic Fleet (34), it was decided that any attempt to send aircraft as suggested by General Macarthur would have so little chance of success that it should not be made. It was explained to General Macarthur that the situation in other parts of the ABDA area made it impossible to do more than to organize the supply to him of ammunition and food (36). It was arranged that small arms ammunition should be sent to Mindanao by submarine and if possible by air; also that Jolo should be bombed. The possibility of sending further supplies of ammunition by warship or merchant ship, or of running in a convoy with AA guns and reinforcements, was also considered, but the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, found it to be impracticable from a naval point of view (35).

In Luzon a shortage of food began to make itself felt and in early January General Macarthur estimated that supplies would last only from 2 to 3 months with the troops on half rations, as they were from 11th Jan. Strenuous efforts were therefore made to run in ships with food. Several ships (37) were loaded in Australia with rations and ammunition and were sent by various devious routes to Mariveles, at the southern end of the Bataan Peninsula, sometimes with transshipment to smaller ships at certain islands *en route*. The authorities in China were asked to assist in

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this matter, but found on investigation that no suitable ships or junks were available. (38). When the headquarters of Abdacon dispersed, no reports of the safe arrival of any of these ships had been received.

Reported events in the Philippines during the period under review were as follows.

*15th January.*—Japanese forces in Luzon were estimated at five divisions and there were no indications of any reduction being effected. Much dive bombing of artillery and infantry positions continued, but air activity otherwise had been much reduced from 6th January and it was assumed that the main bomber force previously employed against Luzon had been transferred to other theatres, (39).

Air trips from Corregidor to Del Monte and back were not encountering effective hostile interference, (40). No enemy operations were in progress in the Visayas, and north Mindanao had not been occupied. U. S. forces based on Del Monte were maintaining contact with the Japanese at a point 35 miles north of Davao.

*18th January.*—Enemy air raid on Cebu causing severe damage to shipping (41).

*19th January.*—Three U. S. aircraft attacked a Japanese cruiser and a large tanker 100 miles off Jolo, sinking the cruiser and leaving the tanker burning (42). U. S. bombers from Malang, Java, could not locate targets at Jolo owing to cloud, but sank one enemy tanker at sea, refuelled at Del Monte and returned to Malang on 20th January with 23 U. S. air crew personnel.

*21st January.*—Enemy pressure in Luzon was rapidly increasing, fresh Japanese forces being landed in the Lingayen Gulf and Subic Bay areas and the whole of their 14th Army being committed in the theatre. (41) General Brereton signalled from Brisbane the shipping arrangements made to send food and ammunition to Luzon (43).

*22nd January.*—The Japanese were repulsed all along the Bataan front in an engagement lasting all day. They had evidently decided on a policy of attrition because their control of the sea enabled them to land reinforcements at will. Up to date the U. S. forces had suffered an average loss of 35 per cent, and some divisions as much as 60 per cent, of their effectives. These losses necessitated a shortening of the front and General Macarthur proposed to make a last stand on a strong position personally selected by him. In Mindanao Japanese activities were confined to patrols, but they were organizing and arming 10,000 Japanese former residents of Davao (44). General Macarthur advised General Wavell that it was highly inadvisable for the latter to attempt his proposed visit to Luzon (45).

*23rd January.*—Fresh Japanese landings in Subic Bay and along the coast on the west of the Bataan position were counter-attacked but U. S. troops were feeling the fatigue of continuous fighting. The Bataan position was seriously threatened (46). On the same day a U. S. counter-attack on the East flank of the Bataan position was completely successful, the enemy being disorganized by concentrated fire from 155 mm. guns. On the West flank, where Japanese communications were secured by their navy, U. S. troops were forced back, but the situation was stabilized, (47).

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*24th January.*—A ground observer at Jolo reported that 100 aircraft were using the aerodrome, proceeding on daily flights to the South and returning each time with some aircraft missing. (48).

*26th January.*—General Magruder, U. S. Army, reported from Chungking that after a thorough investigation of the possibilities it had been established that no vessels remained in Chinese hands capable of running the blockade into Bataan with cargoes of food from China, (49). Further arrangements for shipping food and ammunition to Bataan from Australia were notified, (50).

*27th January.*—As foreshadowed on 22nd January, the U. S. forces in Bataan broke contact with the enemy during the night 26th/27th January and withdrew to the main battle position with no casualties and no loss of material.

The Japanese were increasing their air forces at Davao and Jolo (51).

Two U. S. bombers from Java delivered quarter of a million rounds of small arms ammunition at Del Monte, Mindanao, and returned with 43 key personnel (52).

*28th January.*—Abdacon explained to General Macarthur that the serious situation in the N. E. I. precluded the possibility of operating aircraft from the Philippines, as had been suggested by him. (53).

*29th January.*—As anticipated by General Macarthur, the Japanese misjudged the reason for the U. S. withdrawal on 26/27th January and attacked without artillery or air support. As a result, the U. S. artillery inflicted severe loss on the enemy's attacking forces (54).

*1st February.*—A heavy artillery concentration successfully immobilised a Japanese force of small boats and launches which had been assembled in the vicinity of Ternate, Cavite Province, 10 miles S. E. of Corregidor. (55).

*6th February.*—Nos. 16, 18, 28 and 65 Japanese Divisions were identified on the Bataan front. (56). The Japanese were landing additional troops at Lingayen Gulf (57).

*7th February.*—The Japanese began an attempt to reduce the fortifications of Mills, Hughes and Drum, all of which are island forts in Manila Bay, by means of artillery concentrations from batteries in Cavite on the southern shore of the bay. Damage was caused to the fortifications of Drum. The results of counter-battery fire could not be observed on account of lack of air observation (58).

*9th February.*—During the past 48 hours, Japanese pressure in Bataan had increased considerably, with many dive bombing attacks. Numerous attempts at infiltration had been repelled. The artillery duel between U. S. batteries and Japanese batteries in Cavite temporarily subsided. (59).

His Majesty the King sent a congratulatory message to General Macarthur and his troops on their magnificent defence (60).

*10th February.*—Sporadic fierce fighting continued in Bataan.

*11th February.*—The Japanese occupied another of the small Philippine Islands. (61).

*13th February.*—General Macarthur reported that the bulk of the enemy's bomber formations which had been operating from Davao and Jolo had moved further south. (62).

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*14th February.*—After a four days lull the artillery duels between U. S. batteries and those of the Japanese in Cavite were resumed. (63). U. S. anti-aircraft fire in Bataan had had to be curtailed on account of low stocks of A. A. ammunition; on this date approximately 8,000 rounds of 3-inch A. A. ammunition was *en route* to the Philippines from N. E. I. (64). Four other ships were also *en route* to the same destination from Australia, loaded with food and ammunition. (65).

*18th February.*—Japanese reinforcements were arriving including new air units and a large convoy in Subic Bay where the enemy had started to use Olongapo as a base. Enemy bombing and artillery activity was increasing. (66).

*22nd February.*—Enemy artillery fire against U. S. fortifications had ceased and he was apparently awaiting the arrival of further reinforcements. (67).

*25th February.*—General Macarthur was informed of the decision to disperse ABDA headquarters. (68).

To summarise the foregoing diary of events, it may be said that although it had been found impossible to give active assistance to General Macarthur in his defence in Luzon, all practicable measures were taken to provide him with the material with which that very gallant defence might be continued.

*23. Events in Malaya—General Survey—Fighting on the Malayan Mainland.*—(a) Plan to hold enemy on Northern Frontier of Johore.

As already briefly narrated, it was apparent when the Supreme Commander visited the headquarters of the 3rd Indian Corps at Kuala Lumpur, and divisional and brigade headquarters north of that place, on 8th January, that drastic measures were essential to maintain the Corps in being as a fighting formation. It had begun the campaign with five infantry brigades:—

6th Indian Infantry Brigade,			
8th	"	"	"
15th	"	"	"
22nd	"	"	"
28th	"	"	"

and to these had been added the Command Reserve, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. Before 7th January it had been found necessary to combine 6th and 15th Brigades into a single, composite Brigade of three battalions, named 15th Brigade, on account of the heavy casualties suffered by both Brigades in earlier fighting. Battalions of the 8th Brigade had suffered heavy casualties in the initial operations in and around Kota Bharu and two of the three battalions of the 22nd Brigade were reduced more nearly to the strength of single companies as a result of the fierce fighting for Kuantan aerodrome. The Japanese tank break through at the Slim River position on 7th January reduced the 12th and 28th Brigades to a few hundred men each. Thus all Brigades were very greatly below their full establishment and vehicle casualties had been almost as great as those in personnel; because units had in many cases been surrounded and they rejoined the main body by jungle tracks, where their transport could not

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follow. The final, and probably the most important, factor was that as the result of a month's continuous fighting and retreating the men had reached a state of overwhelming fatigue and there can be no doubt that their morale was, in consequence, lowered.

A plan was accordingly made for 3rd Corps to hold a position covering Kuala Lumpur for as long as possible without awaiting a full scale enemy attack and meanwhile to delay the enemy to the greatest extent possible by demolitions. Thereafter the Corps was to be withdrawn by rail and road into Johore leaving only sufficient mobile rearguards to cover the demolition scheme. 8th Australian Division less one brigade group was to move forthwith to prepare to fight a decisive battle on the general line Segamat-Mount Ophir-Muar. 9th Indian Division, made up from the freshest troops in 3rd Indian Corps, and the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade at that time in Malacca, were to be placed under the Commander 8th Australian Division for employment in the Southern portion of the position indicated above. After withdrawal, 3rd Indian Corps was to be responsible for defence of the east and west coasts of the southern portion of Johore and while fulfilling this responsibility was to reorganize and organize a general reserve from reinforcements as they arrived. It was hoped to gain sufficient time to build up a force with which to initiate a counter-offensive, which could not, however, be before the middle of February at the earliest. The Navy was to assist with small craft on the Johore coasts, to prevent landings.

The disadvantage of allowing the enemy to advance through south Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Malacca with little opposition and of relieving the Australians on the east coast of Johore by troops with less knowledge of the ground was recognised. The well developed road systems in Selangor and Malacca made delaying tactics difficult, however, and with the 3rd Indian Corps in the condition in which it was, it was not possible to fight for those provinces. (69).

(b) Plan for the employment of the Australian Corps on arrival.

It was intended to send to Singapore the whole of 1st Australian Corps, from Middle East, and on their arrival to send back some or all of the Indian formations to the N. E. I. where, while perfecting defensive dispositions, they might have breathing space in which to reorganise and refit. In view of the fact that developments at Singapore or on the sea approaches might make this plan impracticable, preparations were begun to divert part or all of the Australian Corps to the N. E. I. should circumstances demand such a diversion. (70). The despatch of personnel of the Corps headquarters, especially administrative staff officers, by air ahead of the Corps was requested in order that they might assist in these preparations.

(c) Preparation of landward defences at Singapore.

On 9th January, the Supreme Commander ordered acceleration of reconnaissances of the northern (landward) side of Singapore Island, and the construction of defences where required. (71).

(d) Further losses of 3rd Corps and rapid enemy advance.

The Supreme Commander again visited Singapore, by air from Batavia, on 13th January and motored to Segamat to see Generals Heath and Gordon-Bennett, commanders of the 3rd Indian Corps and 8th Australian

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Division, respectively. The plan as outlined above was being carried out, but 9th and 11th Indian Divisions were found to have been further weakened in both numbers and morale by fighting north of Kuala Lumpur and the enemy's advance had been more rapid than had been hoped. The Supreme Commander reported to the Chiefs of Staff, London, that the battle for Singapore would be a close run thing and that some luck would be required to get in the reinforcing convoys safely and up to time. (72).

(e) *Air situation.*—An appreciation by the Air Officer Commanding, R. A. F., Far East, dated 18th January, gives an indication of the air situation in Malaya at this period. He assessed the enemy's air strength at 150 fighters and 250 bombers at aerodromes within range in Malaya and French Indo-China. Taking rapidly available reinforcements into account, the enemy might bring 700 or more aircraft to bear against Singapore. R. A. F. resources locally available were 45 fighters and 17 bombers with 48 reinforcing Hurricanes and 60 bombers *en route*. He assessed his immediate needs, additional to the resources just quoted, as four long range bomber squadrons and four long range fighter squadrons, each squadron with 12 aircraft, initial equipment. It was necessary, in his opinion, to increase resources, when circumstances permitted, to a total of 32 squadrons with 388 aircraft together with reserves of aircraft and crews. (73).

Enemy fighters operating from Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan were at this time very troublesome. American heavy bombers were, therefore, brought up from East Java in order to attack the aerodromes at those places. Such attacks were made with effect on several occasions, but adverse weather conditions prevented them from being decisive. (74).

(f) *Preparation in case of a forced withdrawal into Singapore Island.*—On the 20th January the Chiefs of Staff, London, brought to notice points of importance which would require attention in case the garrison in Malaya should be forced to withdraw into Singapore Island. These points included:—

- (i) use of fortress guns against landward attack.
- (ii) obstructing land approaches to the Straits and landing places,
- (iii) diversion of some of the beach defences and machine guns from the South to the North of the island,
- (iv) control of boats and small craft.
- (v) creation of self-contained defensive localities and switch lines,
- (vi) measures against surprise night landings,
- (vii) defence of aerodromes against airborne troops,
- (viii) dispersal and control of the civil population and suppression of Fifth Column activity,
- (ix) use of personnel in fixed defences for tasks in local defence schemes, and
- (x) development of a good signals communications system within the fortress and to aerodromes in use in South Sumatra.

(75).

Most of these measures were already in hand, and the completion of arrangements to defend Singapore Island had been vigorously urged on G. O. C. Malaya by the Supreme Commander, since his visit on January 9.

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(g) Losses suffered in Australian Division and 53rd British and 45th Indian Infantry Brigades.

After a further visit by air to Singapore on 20th January the Supreme Commander reported to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington that the situation had greatly deteriorated. The whole of the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade and two Australian battalions were cut off about Bakri, near the west coast, east of Muar, and had failed to make good their withdrawal. (About half eventually got back, minus their transport.) The 53rd Infantry Brigade of 18th (British) Division, also was being heavily attacked about twenty miles east of Bakri. It was apparent that this situation in the south would necessitate the withdrawal of the troops in the Segamat-Labis area, and might necessitate a general withdrawal towards Johore Bahru and eventually to Singapore Island. Measures for the defence of the island were being taken, but the success of the defence would depend on the numbers and state of the troops withdrawn from Johore, the arrival of reinforcements and the possibility of maintaining fighter aircraft on the island. If all went well it was hoped that prolonged defence of the island would be possible.

The intensification of air attacks on Singapore was indicated by the fact that two attacks, by about fifty aircraft each time, were made there that morning. (76).

The organization of formations, and arrangements for commanders and staff in Singapore in the event of a withdrawal into the island was examined by ABDACOM staff on 21st January. (77).

(h) *Naval action against Japanese infiltration by sea.*—Continued Japanese landings behind our troops on the west coast of Malaya had been causing concern and on 21st January the Chiefs of Staff, London, raised the question. The situation was that a flotilla of small craft mounting light guns was improvised and operated on the west coast. Owing to enemy control of the air, whenever any of these craft operated by day they were sunk. In consequence they were operated by night, but thereby lost much of their effectiveness because enemy movement was usually by day with air cover. The flotilla was augmented as much as possible, the services of a destroyer and a submarine were added and such air support as was practicable was given, but all this was insufficient seriously to interfere with the enemy's freedom of action.

(j) *Further precautions in case of a withdrawal into Singapore Island.*—Other questions raised were the water supply situation if the Johore supply ceased to be available, and the reduction in the number of useless mouths. As regards water, the situation was that by the loss of Johore the supply would be reduced from 27 to 17 million gallons daily, which could be met by a measure of rationing. Women and children evacuated up to 22nd January numbered 5,200, using every available berth in all ships sailing from Malaya; 4,800 remained, of whom 4,200 had applied for passage and the remaining 600 were employed in war work. (78).

(k) *Employment of Armoured Brigade, on arrival.*—On 23rd January General Percival, G. O. C. Malaya, reported that by early March, when it was due to arrive, it was unlikely that there would be much scope for the Armoured Brigade which was included in the reinforcements intended to be sent to Malaya. (79). This Armoured Brigade was thereafter allotted

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for employment in N. E. I., but, on the appearance of an opportunity to employ it in Burma and owing to the serious situation there, it was diverted to that country.

(l) *Responsibility for decision whether a withdrawal into the Island should be made.*—On the 27th January General Percival was reminded by the Supreme Commander that the primary objects were to gain time and to cause maximum loss to the enemy. Bearing this in mind General Percival was to judge when withdrawal to the island was necessary in order to avoid disorganisation and unnecessary losses of men and material which might prejudice the defence of the island, which he was to be prepared to hold for many months. (80).

The plan for withdrawal into Singapore Island, should that course become unavoidable, had to regulate the retirement of three columns down three roads, Mersing-Johore Bahru, Ayer Hitam—Johore Bahru, and Batu Pahat-Johore Bahru. A bridgehead covering Johore Bahru was to be established through which the final withdrawal into the island would take place. On 28th January General Percival reported that after consulting Generals Heath and Gordon-Bennett he had decided to order withdrawal into the island during the night 30th/31st January. He fully realised the wide repercussions of the proposed step, but in his opinion the risk which even then existed of the right and centre columns being cut off by swift enemy action down the west coast road made any further delay unjustifiable. He had not committed the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had recently arrived as a reinforcement from India, because he considered that better value would be obtained from it ultimately by training it in bush warfare than by turning it straight into the battle in strange country. (81). General Percival's action was approved by the Supreme Commander who directed, however, that every foot of the island must be fought for (82).

(m) *Final action on the mainland.*—Touch had been lost with 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade which had been operating on the railway in Johore and Major General Barstow, Commander 9th Indian Division became "missing" in a personal attempt to establish contact. After all further attempts to find the Brigade had failed, the troops were withdrawn into Singapore Island during the night 30th/31st January and the bridge on the causeway connecting the Island with Johore Bahru was thoroughly demolished. Events thereafter and until the garrison surrendered are described in the next paragraph.

#### EVENTS IN MALAYA—GENERAL SURVEY—DEFENCE OF SINGAPORE ISLAND.

24. *Preparatory Defensive Measures in the Island.*—(a) Initiation of defence scheme against landward attack.

It has already been recorded that on 9th January the Supreme Commander immediately after his arrival from India had directed that plans for the defence of the island against attack from the mainland and the construction of defences should be undertaken as a matter of urgency. Prior to this plans had been based on repelling sea borne attacks on the island and holding land attacks in Johore, or further north. Little or nothing had been done to construct defences on the north side of the island to prevent a crossing of the Johore Strait, although arrangements had been made to blow up the drawbridge on the causeway.

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## (b) Scope of fixed defence guns.

Fortress cannon of the heaviest calibre in the fixed defences had all round traverse and many of the other fixed defence guns had greater or lesser arcs of fire over the mainland. The 15 inch guns, however, had no landward firing ammunition, the 9.2 inch had only 25 rounds per gun, though high explosive ammunition for the 6 inch guns was adequate. (83). The flat trajectory of all these guns made them unsuitable for counter battery work.

## (c) Resources of food, etc.

Mention has already been made of the steps taken to evacuate "useless mouths" and to review the water supply available within the island, as well as to control small craft which might be used by the enemy for crossing the Strait. A review of supplies of food, ammunition and Ordnance stores was also made. The estimated strength of the garrison was based on the arrival in the island of the following reinforcements, who did in fact get in, in addition to the troops from Johore whose numbers have been indicated elsewhere:—

## Reinforcements—

44th Indian Infantry Brigade Gp.

18th British Division (less one Infantry Brigade Group which had already arrived).

100th Indian Light Tank Squadron.

Machine Gun Battalion, Australian Imperial Forces.

Approximately 3000 reinforcements for 3rd Indian Corps.

For the above garrison, food supplies amounted to three months' meat, four months' flour and tinned vegetables and five to six months' of other items. Stocks of food for the civil population were sufficient for four months, with six months' flour and nine months' meat which could have been used to supplement army stocks. Ammunition stocks calculated at F. F. C. scales were:—

Pistol and Thompson sub-machine gun—12 days.

.55 Anti-tank rifle ammunition—23 days.

.303 inch S. A. A., grenades, and mortar ammunition—1½ months.

Artillery ammunition—3 months or more.

Clothing was sufficient for two months, general stores and mechanical transport for two months except spares for carriers, signals stores were deficient in certain items, particularly wireless, but otherwise were adequate for island communications for two or three months, and it was calculated that there would be no reserve stocks of weapons and no spares when units had drawn arms to replace losses (84).

## (d) Progress made with general defensive measures.

On the 22nd January progress as regards other preparations for the defence of the island was reported to be as follows:—

- (i) requirements of high explosive ammunition for guns of the fixed defences had been notified; the War Office had promised to examine the possibility of provision on receipt of this information,

- (ii) obstruction of land approach in the island, with what was in hand, but was supervisory personnel
- (iii) field guns from the beach being moved to the rear
- (iv) boats and small craft would not be available to the
- (v) the preparation of all lines, was in hand, but and civil labour for compulsory labour only were limited,
- (vi) measures to guard against
- (vii) measures to defend against the provision of to defences at each area taking part in the defence
- (viii) plans for dispersal and the suppression of fire Japan began hostilities
- (ix) the arming of personnel defence scheme had a
- (x) signal communications in use in Sumatra were

## (e) The "denial" policy.

The General Officer Commanding War Office to continue the "denial" of valuable stocks, naval, military, in case of necessity. He informed plans for the destruction of the port worked out and in many cases, however, that, in the opinion of and himself, any conspicuous measures for destruction, taken at that time, would never be stored. Our intention to defend Singapore formulated plans for the destruction and make such preparations as attention. Destruction would take place if the island existed after seaborne or entail delegation of responsibility. Approval of this policy and again the fourth policy in back areas in a clear. Asiatic population for all essential. London, signalled their approval. ABDACOM informed the G. O. clear. Singapore was to be defended. Preparations must be made to destroy

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more in the fixed defences had all fixed defence guns had greater or less. The 15 inch guns, however, had 25 inch had only 25 rounds per gun, and the 6 inch guns was adequate. The guns made them unsuitable for

the steps taken to evacuate "useless" supplies available within the island, as might be used by the enemy for cross-feeding, ammunition and Ordnance strength of the garrison was based on following reinforcements, who did in the Johore whose numbers have been

Infantry Brigade Group which had

Imperial Forces.

for 3rd Indian Corps.

amounted to three months' meat, and five to six months' of other supplies were sufficient for four months' meat which could have been. Ammunition stocks calculated at

gun—12 days.

23 days.

and mortar ammunition—1½ months.

or more.

general stores and mechanical stores for carriers, signals stores were wireless, but otherwise were adequate for three months, and it was the stocks of weapons and no spares losses (84).

defensive measures.

regards other preparations for the war as follows:—

ammunition for guns of the fixed type, the War Office had promised provision on receipt of this

- (ii) obstruction of land approaches to the Straits and landing places in the island, with wire, mines, booby traps or other means was in hand, but was handicapped by a shortage of technical supervisory personnel and labour,
- (iii) field guns from the beach defences in the southern sectors were being moved to the north and west sectors of the island,
- (iv) boats and small craft were being collected where they would not be available to the enemy,
- (v) the preparation of all round defensive localities, with switch lines, was in hand, but was limited by a shortage of military and civil labour for which there were unlimited calls; a compulsory labour ordinance was being passed, but resources were limited,
- (vi) measures to guard against surprise night landings were in hand,
- (vii) measures to defend aerodromes against air borne attack included the provision of troops, armoured cars and anti-aircraft defences at each aerodrome and R. A. F. personnel were taking part in the defence, but many of them were not armed,
- (viii) plans for dispersal and control of the civil population, and for the suppression of Fifth Column activities were made before Japan began hostilities and dispersal camps were in existence,
- (ix) the arming of personnel of fixed defences to take part in the defence scheme had already been arranged,
- (x) signal communications throughout the island and to aerodromes in use in Sumatra were being arranged (85).

(e) The "denial" policy.

The General Officer Commanding Malaya had been instructed by the War Office to continue the "denial" policy in order to include the very valuable stocks, naval, military, air force and civil, in Singapore Island, in case of necessity. He informed the War Office on 22nd January that plans for the destruction of the property of the fighting services were being worked out and in many cases were well advanced. He represented, however, that, in the opinion of the Governor, the Rear Admiral Malaya and himself, any conspicuous measures of destruction, or even preparations for destruction, taken at that date would cause a landslide in public morale which could never be stopped. Already there were doubts about our intention to defend Singapore. In consequence he proposed to formulate plans for the destruction of both civil and military installations and make such preparations as were possible without attracting public attention. Destruction would take place only if a danger of losing the Island existed after seaborne or airborne enemy landings, and this would entail delegation of responsibility to local commanders. He requested approval of this policy and again stressed the danger of enforcing a scorched earth policy in back areas in a country where they were dependent on the Asiatic population for all essential services (86). The Chiefs of Staff, London, signalled their approval of this suggested policy (87). Meanwhile ABDACOM informed the G. O. C., Malaya that the policy was already clear. Singapore was to be defended to the last. At the same time preparations must be made to destroy material rather than let it fall into

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enemy hands, though these preparations should of course be made as unobtrusively as possible. The best way to convince the population of our intentions was to make them take part in the defence, especially by supplying the labour required which must be done at once. The denial policy must continue; the enemy would have no consideration for the Asiatic population and would take what he wished from them, if we left it. This was no time for sentiment. The Chinese population of Singapore knew that they need expect no consideration from the Japanese (88).

The order of priority for destruction of material was notified by the War Office (89).

Proposals for the transfer of valuable machine tools and constructional equipment to Australia and elsewhere were initiated, but time did not permit the evacuation of more than part of the equipment. (90).

The G. O. C. later represented that his orders to hold Singapore to the last and to ensure that in the last resort a complete denial policy should be carried out were incompatible. He had done everything which could be done without causing public alarm, but represented that some of the stores required hours or even days for complete demolition, some were in the front line, and as the holding of Singapore was the primary object some demolitions might have to go by default (91). The Chiefs of Staff, London, replied that demolition of the Naval Base should be given first priority and Fortress guns second priority. Other valuable stores, equipment and installations should be destroyed on a priority basis, but their destruction should not be allowed to weaken the defence (92).

25. *Outline of Development of Operations.*—(a) Removal of Fighter aircraft to Sumatra.

The withdrawal into Singapore Island brought the three northern aerodromes on the island, Tengah, Sembawang and Seletar, within range of observed artillery fire from the mainland. Only the aerodrome at Kallang, near Singapore city and harbour, remained free from artillery, though of course not from air bombardment. In these circumstances the Supreme Commander decided during a further visit to Singapore by air on 30th January that all fighter units except a force of one Flight of 8 Hurricanes and one Flight of 8 Buffaloes must be moved to Sumatra. Bombers had already been moved out of the island. The Air Officer Commanding WESGROUPE was ordered to establish his headquarters in Sumatra, leaving a Rear Headquarters under a Group Captain or Wing Commander at Singapore (93). To have left the fighters on exposed aerodromes at Singapore would have been to invite their destruction within a few days, and it was also essential to provide fighter protection for the aerodromes in Southern Sumatra from which the bombers were operating. Fighter defence of Singapore was to be maintained so far as possible by use of the two Flights left at Kallang and by using the other aerodromes as opportunity offered for refuelling fighters operating from their base aerodromes in Sumatra.

(b) Reorganization of Indian formations.

Indian formations were reorganized so that a small Corps Headquarters was retained to control 11th Indian Division and 12th and 44th Indian Infantry Brigades; remnants of 9th Indian Division were absorbed into

other formations. 3rd Indian Northern Area, with 11th Indian Division, while it looked for Brigades. (94).

(c) Organization for Defence of The Singapore defences were organized under the command of the Northern Area.—Under command of

Troops—

18th Division.

11th Indian Division, 1st Brigade and some

Area—exclusive CHANGI AREA—exclusive PAYA LEBAR VILLAGE—exclusive Point 135 (in girdle of Western Area.—Under command of

Troops—

Australian Imperial Force

44th Indian Infantry Brigade

Area—exclusive WOODLAND AREA—exclusive TIMAH VILLAGE—exclusive SUNGEI JURONG to include

Southern Area.—Under command of Fortress.

Troops—

1st Malaya Infantry Brigade

2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade

Straits Settlement Volunteer

Fixed Defence units.

Area—exclusive CHANGI AREA—exclusive PAYA LEBAR VILLAGE—exclusive BOTANICAL GARDENS—exclusive BUKIT TIMAH VILLAGE. Area. Pengerang, Tekong also included in the Southern

Reserve.—12th Indian Infantry

(d) Period of enemy preparation

From the date of withdrawal on 8th February there was no enemy activity consisted of artillery activity heavy air raids on points in the leaving and approaching Singapore on defensive positions and on Batu Pahat landing grounds including them air bases very close to aerodromes in Singapore Island. February. Medium artillery

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should of course be made as early as possible to convince the population of its part in the defence, especially by the fact that it had been done at once. The denial could have no consideration for what he wished from them, if we went out. The Chinese population of Singapore had no consideration from the

of material was notified by the

valuable machine tools and considerable quantities of material were initiated, but time was not to be lost in part of the equipment. (90).

At his orders to hold Singapore to the last resort a complete denial was not possible. He had done everything possible to give the public alarm, but represented that even days for complete demolition, the holding of Singapore was the only way to go by default (91). The demolition of the Naval Base should be a second priority. Other valuable buildings should be destroyed on a priority basis and not allowed to weaken the defence

ations.—(a) Removal of Fighter

I brought the three northern aerodromes—Seletar, within range of the island. Only the aerodrome at Seletar, remained free from artillery, and was in a good position. In these circumstances a further visit to Singapore by the enemy except a force of one Flight of fighters must be moved to Sumatra, the island. The Air Officer Commanding his headquarters in Sumatra, as a Captain or Wing Commander at the aerodromes at Singapore was not within a few days, and it was not possible for the aerodromes in Southern Sumatra to be operating. Fighter defence of the aerodromes by use of the two Flights of fighters as opportunity offered at the aerodromes in Sumatra.

that a small Corps Headquarters was formed and 12th and 44th Indian Divisions were absorbed into

other formations. 3rd Indian Corps was to be in operational control of the Northern Area, with 11th Indian Division and 18th (British) Division under its command, while it looked after the domestic affairs of the 12th and 44th Brigades. (94).

(c) Organization for Defence

The Singapore defences were organized as follows:—

*Northern Area.*—Under command of 3rd Indian Corps.

Troops—

18th Division.

11th Indian Division, to which had been added 8th Indian Infantry Brigade and some Divisional Troops of 9th Indian Division.

*Area*—exclusive CHANGI VILLAGE—exclusive YAN KIT VILLAGE—exclusive PAYA LEBAR VILLAGE—exclusive PIERCE RESERVOIR—exclusive Point 135 (in grid square 7519)—exclusive WOODLANDS.

*Western Area.*—Under command of 8th Australian Division.

Troops—

Australian Imperial Forces.

44th Indian Infantry Brigade.

*Area*—inclusive WOODLANDS—inclusive Point 135—inclusive BUKIT TIMAH VILLAGE—inclusive KAMPONG SUNGEI JURONG—exclusive SUNGEI JURONG to inclusive TANJONG BALAI.

*Southern Area.*—Under command of late Commander Singapore Fortress.

Troops—

1st Malaya Infantry Brigade.

2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade.

Straits Settlement Volunteer Force.

Fixed Defence units.

*Area*—inclusive CHANGI—inclusive YAN KIT VILLAGE—exclusive PAYA LEBAR VILLAGE—exclusive road junction at 898143—exclusive BOTANICAL GARDENS—exclusive WAI SOON GARDENS—exclusive BUKIT TIMAH VILLAGE, thence along south boundary of the Western Area. PENDERANG, TEKONG and BLAKANG MATI islands were also included in the Southern Area.

*Reserve.*—12th Indian Infantry Brigade. (95).

(d) Period of enemy preparations for assault.

From the date of withdrawal into the Island, 30th/31st January until 8th February there was no large movement of land forces and enemy activity consisted of artillery fire, some slight movement in small craft and heavy air raids on points in the island, the Naval Base, the Docks, shipping leaving and approaching Singapore and low level attacks and dive bombing on defensive positions and aerodromes. From 1st February Kluang and Batu Pahat landing grounds were taken into use by the enemy, thus giving them air bases very close to Singapore. The three northern aerodromes in Singapore Island were shelled intermittently on and after 4th February. Medium artillery was used by the enemy for the first time

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on 7th February. Considerable shipping losses were suffered from enemy air attacks in the Banka and Birhala Straits and in the approaches to and roads at Singapore. As a result after the arrival of a frequently attacked convoy on 5th February any further shipment of reinforcements and stores to Singapore had to be treated as a special operation with special protective arrangements. During the early shelling and air bombing, civilian labour disappeared. By 7th February, however, the morale of the Asiatic population had become steadier, although labour still disappeared from bombed areas. An Army Labour Corps, recruited from Asiatics under their own officers, was increasing in strength and doing well. Throughout this period small parties of men from units and formations cut off during the fighting in Johore continued to trickle in on to the island. On 2nd February an air reconnaissance discovered a convoy of enemy merchant ships with warship escort at anchor at the Anambas Islands and it was thought that this might presage an attack on Singapore from seaward.

(e) First enemy landings.

In the early morning of 8th February a small party of Japanese landed on Pulau Ubin. During the night 8th/9th February the enemy main landing was made on a 5000 yards front on the N. W. side of the island in the Australians' sector, supported by heavy artillery fire. Considerable infiltration was effected before dawn on the 9th and by midday strong enemy parties had reached the neighbourhood of TENGAH AERODROME—BULIM. The British forces withdrew under pressure to the general line SUNGEI KRANJI—BULIM—HONG KAH—SUNGEI JURONG. The enemy's advance was supported by dive bombing and low flying attacks. Tengah aerodrome was evacuated by our air forces.

(f) Second main landing.

Further enemy landings took place at SUNGEI MANDAI and to the West during the night 9th/10th February. Counter attacks met with local success, but strong enemy pressure along the whole of the Western front caused a general withdrawal to a line running West of the main road to Johore causeway as far south as Bukit Timah village, and in the south-west to Sungei Pandan. In the south the enemy was held some 4,000 yards east of the Sungei Jurong, but infiltration towards Buona Vista was reported. The Japanese used about 40 medium and light tanks during the night attack. During the night 10th/11th a large landing craft attempting to effect a landing at Labrador was sunk by Siloso Battery.

(g) Orders for defence to the last.

The Supreme Commander arrived by flying boat from Batavia for a visit to Singapore on the morning of 10th February, returning on the morning of 11th February. He found the battle for Singapore not going well, with the Japanese making more rapid progress than they should have done on the west of the island. He saw the Governor and all Divisional Commanders, as well as the G. O. C. Malaya and left with the last named a message to the effect that there must be no question or thought of surrender. Every unit must fight it out to the end in close contact with the enemy. The Supreme Commander ordered the G. O. C. to stage a counter attack with all troops possible on the west front.

While proceeding to embark for the Supreme Commander slipped small bones in his back.

(h) Enemy commander's demand.

On 11th February the G. O. C. Commander of the Japanese army. The G. O. C. reported that he would of course be negative (96).

(j) Development of operations.

A counter attack on the evening of the 11th (south), but during the night the 1st Infantry Brigade retook the position which it had lost. The 27th Australian Infantry Brigade in the counter attack and the Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion restored the position. The 27th Australian Infantry Brigade attacked the rear of the enemy's main position but this was unsuccessful. At the same time the 1st Naval Base—Nee Soon Village—Holland Road—Road Junction 751.

On the 12th further enemy landings were reported. Denial schemes in evacuation had so far been executed according to the plan suggested that the G. O. C. might be able to cipher staff, typists and nurses, in the event of the fall of Hong Kong (97). During the night the 3rd Indian Corps was withdrawn.

On the 13th enemy pressure continued to the MacRitchie Reservoir area. The Paya Lebar area and in the west, now within range of the enemy's main force, must fight it out, as he was doing that, after everything humanly possible, determined personnel might be evacuated to Sumatra.

(k) Intimation of the exhaustion.

G. O. C., Malaya reported on the 13th that the whole town being within field artillery range was in danger of being driven off their positions. The Divisional Commanders considered that the exhausted either to withstand a further day or two. His subordinate held the opinion that the gain in time for the extensive damage in Singapore town. The G. O. C. was of the opinion that when in the interests of the troops, which could serve no useful purpose, carrying out the strict injunctions but in view of the circumstances.

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losses were suffered from enemy attacks and in the approaches to and the arrival of a frequently attacked element of reinforcements and as a special operation with special early shelling and air bombing. Early, however, the morale of the although labour still disappeared Corps, recruited from Asiatics in strength and doing well. men from units and formations to trickle in on to the island. discovered a convoy of enemy vessels at the Anambas Islands and an attack on Singapore from sea-

a small party of Japanese landed on 9th February the enemy main on the N. W. side of the island in heavy artillery fire. Considerable the 9th and by midday strong hood of TENGAH AERODROME under pressure to the general line AH—SUNGEI JURONG. The bombing and low flying attacks. air forces.

SUNGEI MANDAI and to the Counter attacks met with along the whole of the Western running West of the main road French village, and in the south the enemy was held some 4,000 towards Buona Vista was medium and light tanks during 11th a large landing craft was sunk by Siloso Battery.

lying boat from Batavia for a 14 February, returning on the battle for Singapore not going progress than they should have the Governor and all Divisional and left with the last named the no question or thought of the end in close contact with the G. O. C. to stage a the west front.

While proceeding to embark in the flying boat for the return journey, the Supreme Commander slipped from a jetty in the dark and broke two small bones in his back.

(h) Enemy commander's demand for surrender.

On 11th February the G. O. C., Malaya received a letter from the Commander of the Japanese army demanding the surrender of the fortress. The G. O. C. reported that he had no means of dropping a reply, which would of course be negative (96).

(j) Development of operations in the Island.

A counter attack on the evening of 11th February was successful on the left (south), but during the night an enemy attack down the Bukit Timah road retook the position which had been gained by the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade in the counter attack. Counter attacks by two battalions and the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment of the 18th Division failed to restore the position. The 27th Australian Infantry Brigade was ordered to attack the rear of the enemy's main body from Bukit Panjang Village, but this was unsuccessful. At the end of these operations the general line was Naval Base—Nee Soon Village—Pierce Reservoir—Race Course—Holland Road—Road Junction 7513—Pasir Panjang Village.

On the 12th further enemy landings at Layang, west of Changi, were reported. Denial schemes in evacuated or immediately threatened areas had so far been executed according to plan. On this date ABDACOM suggested that the G. O. C. might wish to send away the remaining female cipher staff, typists and nurses, in view of the Japanese atrocities reported from Hong Kong (97). During the night 12/13th February the Headquarters of 3rd Indian Corps was withdrawn from Changi.

On the 13th enemy pressure from the north compelled a withdrawal to the MacRitchie Reservoir area. Further attacks developed in the Paya Lebar area and in the west. The whole of Singapore town was by now within range of the enemy's field artillery. Whilst reiterating that he must fight it out, as he was doing, it was suggested to G. O. C., Malaya that, after everything humanly possible had been done, some bold and determined personnel might be given the opportunity to escape by small craft to Sumatra.

(k) Intimation of the exhaustion of the defenders.

G. O. C., Malaya reported on 13th February that in addition to the whole town being within field artillery range of the enemy, the troops were in danger of being driven off their water and food supplies. His subordinate Commanders considered that the troops already committed were too exhausted either to withstand a strong attack or to launch a counter attack. In these conditions it was unlikely that resistance could last more than a day or two. His subordinate Commanders were unanimously of the opinion that the gain in time from prolonging resistance would not compensate for the extensive damage and heavy casualties which would occur in Singapore town. The G. O. C. represented that a stage must come when in the interests of the troops and the civil population further bloodshed, which could serve no useful purpose, should be averted. He was carrying out the strict injunctions issued on the 10th to fight to the last, but in view of the circumstances now represented he requested that giving

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him wider discretionary powers should be considered. In reply, the G. O. C. was ordered to continue to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy for as long as possible, by house to house fighting if necessary.

(l) Further developments in the operations.

On the 14th February an enemy attack developed at the East end of Macritchie Reservoir, but the situation was restored by a counter attack by 28th Indian Infantry Brigade. In the evening strong enemy pressure forced our forward troops back to the line Mount Pleasant—Hill 130—S. W. of Bukit Brown—crossroads at Bukit Timah—Adam Road, on which the situation was stabilized. Some Japanese in this and previous engagements were reported to be wearing British and Australian uniforms. Various areas in Singapore Town were bombed and shelled throughout the day, starting some large fires and considerably damaging the water supply which the Royal Engineers were making every effort to repair.

(m) Denial of important property to the enemy.

The following destruction of oil installations, fixed defences and ammunition dumps was reported as completed up to 14th February.

#### *Oil installations.*

Army—4,620,000\* out of a total of 4,670,000 gallons of petrol destroyed

Navy—Oil tanks at Kranji, Woodlands, Senoko, Pulau Bukom, Pulau Sebarok, destroyed; at Normanton 8 tanks destroyed, but remainder not destroyed, owing to their proximity to crowded military hospitals which could not be vacated.

R. A. F.—All stocks destroyed except one dump which for operational reasons could not be destroyed.

Civil—All first line transport stocks destroyed.

#### *Fixed Defences.*

The following were destroyed:—

15 inch—All guns and engine rooms.

9.2 inch—Connaught guns and engine rooms.

6 inch—

Pasir Laba guns, magazines, engine rooms and instruments.

Changi guns, magazines and instruments.

Beting Kusa guns, instruments and all ammunition at the gun sites.

Labrador guns and instruments.

Siloso guns, magazines and instruments.

Serapong guns and instruments.

Batu Berlayer and Siloso guns.

6 pdr.—

Kranji, Rehala, Repling guns.

Changi Outer guns, instruments and ammunition.

#### *Coast Artillery Searchlights.*

Pt. 8001.

Pasir Laba.

Tanjong Gul.

Powder.

Radius of Changi Battery

Changi Outer.

Labrador.

Siloso.

Serapong.

Berhala.

Rehing.

Batu Berlayer.

Instruments at fire command  
commander's post Faber.

#### *Fortress Observation Posts.*

Hill 270.

Powder.

Faber.

Changi Hill.

#### *Battery Observation Posts.*

Hill 270 (Buona Vista).

Instruments in Fortress Plot

At the time of the above report  
Island had not been received.

*Ammunition Dumps.*—Changi  
Heavy Batteries, Royal Artillery

R. A. F. dumps at Batak  
components which were removed

(a) Australian Commander's

On 14th February Major  
Australian Division reported to  
the Australian Imperial Forces  
the Tanglin area, two miles from  
fighting units including his own  
rely on his troops to hold to the  
He reported that the Supreme  
to the last, but if the enemy  
take suitable action to avoid

(c) Developments leading to

Later on the 14th the G. O.  
damage to the mains the water  
or possibly only 24 hours.  
which he was then attacking.

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ould be considered. In reply, the  
inflict the maximum damage on the  
se to house fighting if necessary.  
erations.

attack developed at the East end of  
n was restored by a counter attack  
the evening strong enemy pressure  
the Mount Pleasant—Hill 130—S. W.  
Tunah—Adam Road, on which the  
nese in this and previous engage-  
British and Australian uniforms.  
bombed and shelled throughout the  
siderably damaging the water supply  
ng every effort to repair.

the enemy.

allations, fixed defences and ammu-  
d up to 14th February.

of 4,670,000 gallons of petrol des-

adlands, Senoko, Pulau Bukom,  
at Normanton 8 tanks destroyed,  
yed, owing to their proximity to  
which could not be vacated.

except one dump which for opera-  
destroyed.

cks destroyed.

ns.

ngine rooms.

ngine rooms and instruments.

struments.

and all ammunition at the gun

2.

truments.

and ammunition.

#### *Coast Artillery Searchlights.*

Pt. 8001.

Pasir Laba.

Tanjong Gul.

Powder.

Radius of Changi Battery.

Changi Outer.

Labrador.

Siloso.

Serapong.

Berhala.

Rehing.

Batu Berlayer.

Instruments at fire commander's post Changi and instruments at fire  
commander's post Faber.

#### *Fortress Observation Posts.*

Hill 270.

Powder.

Faber.

Changi Hill.

#### *Battery Observation Posts.*

Hill 270 (Buona Vista).

Instruments in Fortress Plotting Room at Faber.

At the time of the above report full details of denials on Blatang Mati  
Island had not been received.

*Ammunition Dumps.*—Changi magazines and certain field dumps of  
Heavy Batteries, Royal Artillery, had been destroyed.

R. A. F. dumps at Batak Quarry were destroyed, less certain bomb  
components which were removed. (98).

(n) Australian Commander's intended action.

On 14th February Major General Gordon-Bennet, Commander 8th  
Australian Division reported to his Government, through ABDACOM, that  
the Australian Imperial Forces in Singapore Island were concentrated in  
the Tanglin area, two miles from the city proper. He stated that non-  
fighting units including his own headquarters were in position. He could  
rely on his troops to hold to the last, as usual; all other fronts were weak.  
He reported that the Supreme Commander had ordered all troops to fight  
to the last, but if the enemy entered the city behind the A. I. F. he would  
take suitable action to avoid unnecessary sacrifice (99).

(o) Developments leading to surrender.

Later on the 14th the G. O. C. Malaya reported that owing to extensive  
damage to the mains the water supply was limited to a maximum of 48.  
or possibly only 24 hours. If the enemy captured the pumping station,  
which he was then attacking, the period would be further reduced. That

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troops was made on Palembang 1 on the morning of 14th February, on the 15th. During the last 24 hours, the supporting air forces were on their own bases.

EXIST

26. *Control of Burma*.—It is the initiation of proposals to establish General Wavell recommended that under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, India, the situation was stabilised and order was decided, however, that Burma remained under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, India, from 15th January until 22nd February, when it was transferred to the operational as well as administrative control of the Commander-in-Chief, India.

When operational control was generally understood that during December, on the transfer of I Ch Far East Command, was vested change. A definition of the situation resulting from the change of operations of Staff, London, in consultation. This raised some doubt concerning from Burma should be submitted were resolved, India remaining as in Burma and ABDACOM'S resorted to early intimation to India because unusual administrative de-

27. *Air Operations*.—(a) Cont

When India assumed control Commanding No. 221, Group B, all air forces in Burma and No. 10, Group A, of the Air Officer-Commanding-in-Chief, India, the responsibility of the defence of Burma was suggested that this arrangement would give India direct operational control of Burma. The Committee concluded that the suggested arrangement would avoid difficulties and it was decided that the command only the air forces in Burma should be transferred to direct Indian control. (110).

(b) *Early air operations.*—From fighter aircraft was available in (Brewster Buffaloes) and the V or P-40's). In the air raids on the latter of which the scale of craft were destroyed. Thereafter formations of fighters only, by day by night, causing only slight damage. Allied air forces began to attack found on the ground, destroying

On 13th February General Percival communicated his views regarding the reasons for the Japanese success in Malaya. It was due, he considered, primarily to training, previous war experience, discipline and morale. In order to take on the Japanese army successfully, forces must be trained up to a high standard of toughness, fighting efficiency, adaptability, discipline and morale. (107).

On February 16th the Supreme Commander, in a message to the Commodore Commanding China Force, expressed his appreciation of all the efforts of the China Force to reinforce and succour Singapore. He asked the Commodore also to pass this message to as many as possible of the officers and men of the Merchant Navy whose ships had been concerned in the work. The Supreme Commander said that they had displayed gallantry and devotion to duty of the highest order. (108).

The air forces operating in support of the garrison of Singapore were, in the later stages, based mainly on aerodromes at Palembang I and Palembang II in Southern Sumatra. An attack by enemy parachute

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because the prospect of coping with produced an entirely new situation. Elements and fighting on, but he made a decision. (100). In reply to the G. O. C. that in all places the troops they must go on fighting. Settlements informed the Colonial G. O. C. the danger of pestilence a million people concentrated within G. O. C. made a further representation in reply was told that his gallant must be continued to the limit of

was informed that time gained and vital importance in the existing crisis in a position to inflict such losses and fully capable of doing so, he must find that this was no longer possible, hence. (105).

Following message was received from

tion, water, petrol, food and ammunition. Unable therefore continue the operations have done their best and grateful

Singapore.

More Island progressed, Service wire- of action. The channel of communication and Wireless Limited, and the last message station was sent at 2210 hours,

Malaya.

communicated his views regarding operations in Malaya. It was due, he considered, to his war experience, discipline and the successful forces must be maintained, fighting efficiency, adaptability

and the Merchant Navy.

Commander, in a message to the Commander expressed his appreciation of all the force and succour Singapore. He expressed his message to as many as possible of the ships whose ships had been concerned and said that they had displayed the highest order. (108).

of the garrison of Singapore were, aerodromes at Palembang I and An. An attack by enemy parachute

troops was made on Palembang I, and the town and oil refineries there, on the morning of 14th February, followed by a sea borne attack at dawn on the 15th. During the last two days of the defence of Singapore, therefore, the supporting air forces were fully occupied in the defence of their own bases.

#### EVENTS IN BURMA.

26. *Control of Burma.*—It has been explained elsewhere that on the initiation of proposals to establish a South West Pacific Command General Wavell recommended that Burma should continue completely under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India, at least until the situation was stabilised and offensive operations were in prospect. It was decided, however, that Burma should be included in the ABDA area and it remained under the operational control of the Supreme Commander from 15th January until 22nd February when, by agreement, it reverted to the operational as well as administrative control of India.

When operational control was transferred to ABDACOM it was generally understood that administrative control, which since 15th December, on the transfer of Burma from the control of Headquarters, Far East Command, was vested in India, would not be affected by the change. A definition of the situation as regards administrative control resulting from the change of operational control was made by the Chiefs of Staff, London, in consultation with their delegation in Washington. This raised some doubt concerning the channels through which demands from Burma should be submitted, but after correspondence these doubts were resolved, India remaining administratively responsible for the forces in Burma and ABDACOM'S responsibility in this connection being confined to early intimation to India of any operational projects likely to cause unusual administrative demands. (109).

#### 27. *Air Operations.*—(a) Control of air operations.

When India assumed control of the forces in Burma the Air Officer Commanding No. 221, Group R. A. F., Burma, was given control of all air forces in Burma and North East India, subject to the directions of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in India. Owing to the indivisibility of the defence of Burma and that of N. E. India it was at first suggested that this arrangement might continue after ABDACOM assumed operational control of Burma. After discussion, however, it was concluded that the suggested arrangement might give rise to practical difficulties and it was decided that the A. O. C. No. 221, Group should command only the air forces in Burma, those in N. E. India reverting to direct Indian control. (110).

(b) *Early air operations.*—From 1st to 15th January an average of 21 fighter aircraft was available in Burma from No. 67, Squadron R. A. F. (Brewster Buffaloes) and the American Volunteer Group (Tomahawks or P-40's). In the air raids on Rangoon on 23rd and 25th December, in the latter of which the scale of attack was 110 aircraft, 39 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Thereafter the enemy usually raided with large formations of fighters only, by day, and with small numbers of bombers by night, causing only slight damage. On reduction of enemy effort the Allied air forces began to attack enemy aircraft wherever they could be found on the ground, destroying or severely damaging, up to 17th

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enemy troop concentrations of our troops, in addition to enemy raids, and attacks on our troops inflicted on the enemy during the period 1 July 1967, 37 certain, 9 probable and 26 doubtful.

(d) *Co-operation of the American* the situation of the land forces, the British Command in Burma. Chennault, Commander of the, withdraw to China that part of. The reason for this was that the. Chino Chiang Kai Shek for serv. 2-40's with which they were o. through continuous action in d. which the Group was to be re-e. America via Africa before the e. Chiefs of Staff had represented. gent from Burma might prejudi. tion of which port the flow of. the Generalissimo consented to. contingent in Burma. After H. Burma in February, eight of th. to tide them over until their o. illustration of the air situation. had been withdrawn from Burm. and four Buffaloes would have. services rendered by the Americ. following extract from a messag. A. O. C. No. 221, Group, on 27

"The A. V. G. have borne, battle and their fighting skill, confident". (112).

(e) *Demands for reinforcing land forces in their advance in A. O. C. NORGROUP to request aircraft for his Group should be possible to ensure this with the N. E. I. (113).*

(f) *Co-operation in land operations*—crossed the Salween River on the 15th in the Martaban salient our troops crossed the River. By the 17th February our lodgements on the west bank of the River but our forces were compelled to cross the River on the 22nd, completing our lodgements on the 23rd. In this action our forces were completely destroyed. The Lower Burma.

Throughout this period our  
both direct and indirect; to the  
concentrations, transport columns.

- The loss of the Tenasserim aerodromes immediately after the issue of this directive made the performance of task (ii) difficult, except by attacks on the enemy's main aerodromes at Bangkok and on docks and railway installations in that area.

Following the minor enemy penetration into Southern Tenasserim, the enemy began an advance on Moulmein on 20th January with larger forces and after fairly severe fighting occupied Moulmein on 31st January, our forces withdrawing to the west bank of the Salween River. During this period the Allied air forces were very actively engaged in attacks on

two torpedo bombers, for the loss of which were also made, by fighters re-occupied Malaya railway: reconnaissances from Victoria Point on small craft which landed on the West coast of the peninsula.

but on 7th January thirteen Blenheims arrived in Burma, without maintenance from the Middle East. In view of the situation on our part, it was decided that they were overhauled. Accordingly they were sent to the enemy base dock area at Rangoon for successful results. Thereafter these Blenheims were to avoid being caught on the ground and to be repaired after their flight from a raid. They became operationally

Hurricane) Squadrons, R. A. F., their aircraft, which were being flown in the course of the next seven

*enemy land advance.*—Late on the evening of a Burma Rifles battalion estimated to be 100 strong about 10 miles from Tavoy to the Thailand frontier, by enemy land forces against the

garrison from Mergui was ordered to withdraw from Tavoy. Consequently the only air bases for attacks at Singora, the main port used by our forces in Malaya, could no longer be used and a part of the air warning service was lost.

(111) No. 221, Group R. A. F. in "NORGROUP"), were given two

reinforcements and protect the port of Rangoon from attack on Malaya.

operations immediately after the issue of task (ii) difficult, except by operations at Bangkok and on docks and

operation into Southern Tenasserim, Moulmein on 20th January with larger forces occupied Moulmein on 31st January, south of the Salween River. During the night they were very actively engaged in attacks on

enemy troop concentrations and transport and in direct support of our troops, in addition to continuing the defence of Rangoon from enemy raids, and attacks on enemy occupied aerodromes. Aircraft losses inflicted on the enemy during the period 19th to 30th January totalled 57 certain, 9 probable and 26 damaged for a loss of 11 of our own.

(d) *Co-operation of the American Volunteer Group.*—At a time when the situation of the land forces was deteriorating, anxiety was caused to the British Command in Burma by a warning received from Colonel Chennault, Commander of the American Volunteer Group, that he must withdraw to China that part of his Group which was operating in Burma. The reason for this was that the A. V. G. had been allotted to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek for service in, or in defence of, China and the P-40's with which they were equipped were rapidly becoming worn out through continuous action in defence of Rangoon. Kittyhawks with which the Group was to be re-equipped were not expected to arrive from America via Africa before the end of March. Finally, after the combined Chiefs of Staff had represented that withdrawal of the A. V. G. contingent from Burma might prejudice the defence of Rangoon, on the retention of which port the flow of Lend Lease material to China depended, the Generalissimo consented to the retention of one squadron of the contingent in Burma. After Hurricane reinforcements began to arrive in Burma in February, eight of these aircraft were loaned to the A. V. G. to tide them over until their own reinforcing aircraft arrived. As an illustration of the air situation then obtaining, if the A. V. G. contingent had been withdrawn from Burma on 31st January, only six Hurricanes and four Buffaloes would have remained in Burma. The value of the services rendered by the American Volunteer Group is shown by the following extract from a message sent by Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, A. O. C. No. 221, Group, on 27th January:—

"The A. V. G. have borne, and are still bearing, the brunt of the battle and their fighting skill, courage, devotion and discipline are magnificent". (112).

(e) *Demands for reinforcing aircraft.*—The progress made by enemy land forces in their advance in the direction of Rangoon caused the A. O. C. NORGROUP to request that the arrival of both bomber and fighter aircraft for his Group should be hastened. ABDACOM did all that was possible to ensure this without prejudicing the air defence of Malaya and the N. E. I. (113).

(f) *Co-operation in land operations, 1st to 22nd February.*—The enemy crossed the Salween River on the 11th February and after heavy fighting in the Martaban salient our troops withdrew to positions behind the Bilin River. By the 17th February the Japanese had succeeded in effecting lodgements on the west bank of the Bilin River. Severe fighting ensued, but our forces were compelled to begin to withdraw across the Sittang River on the 22nd, completing the movement and destroying the only bridge on the 23rd. In this withdrawal, two brigades were cut off and almost completely destroyed. This disaster was fatal to the defence of Lower Burma.

Throughout this period our available air forces gave constant support, both direct and indirect, to the troops. Enemy positions, troop concentrations, transport columns, communications centres, dumps and

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river and sea craft were bombed and machine gunned. Fighter sweeps succeeded in keeping enemy air activity against our troops to small proportions. Opportunities to strike at the enemy air forces were fewer than in the last ten days of January, because of the preoccupation of our air forces with other targets. Enemy raiding aircraft, however, still occasionally came within range and 19 were certainly, 17 probably, destroyed and one damaged during the period 3rd—21st February, for the loss of 2 destroyed and 4 damaged, all while on the ground.

(g) *Construction of new landing grounds, and limitations of air warning system.*—In order to be able to receive reinforcing aircraft and to disperse available resources, Burma pressed on with the construction of several new landing grounds. By 6th February airfields with prepared runways were available in south Burma at Mingaladon, Zayatkwun and Bassein (being completed) in addition to five natural airfields suitable for the heaviest types of aircraft until the rains, and three additional aerodromes with all weather runways were in preparation at Hmawbi and Pegu. (114). These unfortunately were situated in the part of Burma now (March 1942) overrun by the Japanese.

Facilities for dispersion of aircraft were the more necessary because of successive curtailments of the air observer system. The loss of the telephone line, first down the Tenasserim Division and then East of the Sittang River, much curtailed the extent of the warning which could be given, and the course taken by the land operations tended to have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the observer personnel. Dependence had to be placed more and more on mechanical warning devices, efforts to expedite the delivery of which were made, although few had become available when ABDACOM ceased to be responsible for Burma on 22nd February. When the withdrawal of our much reduced land forces to the west bank of the Sittang placed the air bases in use in the Rangoon area under a direct threat, the Air Officer Commanding decided that his air forces must be withdrawn in order to avert the risk of their being destroyed on the ground. It was therefore proposed to establish base landing grounds for No. 221 Group in India, with operational landing grounds at Akyab and Magwe and advanced landing grounds in the Rangoon area, to provide whatever fighter and bomber support could be given. (115). On 23rd February the following measures were put in force:—

- (i) Bombers were evacuated from Zayatkwun and Bassein to operate from Magwe, refuelling and rearming at Mingaladon.
- (ii) General Reconnaissance aircraft were to operate from Mingaladon.
- (iii) "Haig" (one of the new airfields) was to remain an emergency landing ground.
- (iv) 4 Hurricanes with long range tanks and 2 P-40's were to move to Magwe for local defence and support of the land forces. (116).

NORGROUP Headquarters moved from Rangoon to Magwe on 22nd February, leaving a forward control in Rangoon.

On 16th February, the last day of the air forces order of battle in NOB:

17 Squadron	} 15 Hurricanes
135 Squadron	
67 Squadron	5 Buffaloes
A. V. G.	18 P-40's.
113 Squadron	9 Blenheims
	3 Blenheims
1 Squadron	} 11 Lyschamps
28 Squadron	

28. *Operations in Southern Thailand.*—Developed with rather surprising rapidity. Preliminary information was received from the Far East Command until 15th February. Military intelligence on the Far East Command. Japanese operations in Thailand from many of its sources of information. The difficulty of rapid communication. The military intelligence staff in India began to create a military intelligence unit capable of bringing in time-tracts of jungle and broken communication.

On 11th January unconfirmed reports of about 5,000 Japanese in the area. Road leading from central Thailand could provide no confirmation of 60 barges at Raheng which, it was said, was of an advanced base. On the 12th, since of Mesohd—Raheng were attacked Prachuab Girikan aerodrome site Tavoy and Mergui, respectively, movement in that area. On the 13th, Raheng—Myawadi (near Mesohd) reconnaissance were again negative.

The first report of contact with enemy, other than patrol encountered on 17th January at Myitta, east of Tavoy. On 17th January it was reported that about 250 and that 1,000 more were on the River route. On the 18th, reported to be advancing on Tavoy. The presence of any enemy in the area was confirmed and no contact was made. 2,000 enemy were reported at this place had been made.

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On 16th February, the last date for which figures are available, the air forces order of battle in NORGROUPE was:—

17 Squadron	} 15 Hurricanes.
135 Squadron	
67 Squadron	5 Buffaloes.
A. V. G.	18 P-40's.
113 Squadron	9 Blenheim IV.
	3 Blenheim I.
1 Squadron	} 11 Lysanders.
28 Squadron	

28. *Operations in Southern Tenasserim.*—Land operations in Burma developed with rather surprising suddenness. One reason for the lack of preliminary information was that Burma, being under the control of Far East Command until 15th December 1941, had been dependent for military intelligence on the Far East Combined Intelligence Bureau in Singapore. Japanese operations in northern Malaya cut that Bureau off from many of its sources of information and at the same time increased the difficulty of rapid communication between the Bureau and Burma. The military intelligence staff in Burma consisted of one third grade staff officer and two intelligence officers. Immediately on taking over control, India began to create a military intelligence organization, but as is always apparent in such circumstances, time is essential to establish an organization capable of bringing in timely, important and accurate news. Large tracts of jungle and broken country impeded air observation.

On 11th January unconfirmed reports were received of the presence of about 5,000 Japanese in the area Mesohd—Raheng, that is to say on the road leading from central Thailand to Moulmein. Air reconnaissances could provide no confirmation of these reports, except the observation of 60 barges at Raheng which, it was thought, might indicate the stocking of an advanced base. On the 13th the results of a visual air reconnaissance of Mesohd—Raheng were negative. The same day two Buffaloes attacked Prachuab Girikan aerodrome and Rajburi railway station, opposite Tavoy and Mergui, respectively, and did not report any unusual troop movement in that area. On the 15th troop movements in the area Raheng—Myawadi (near Mesohd) were reported but the results of air reconnaissance were again negative.

The first report of contact between our forces and those of the enemy, other than patrol encounters, was on the night 15th/16th January at Myitta, east of Tavoy, and no details were available. By 17th January it was reported that the enemy's strength at Myitta was about 250 and that 1,000 more were advancing on Tavoy by the Tenasserim River route. On the 18th, enemy forces estimated at 1,200 were reported to be advancing on Tavoy and 500 to 1,000 on Mergui, although the presence of any enemy in the Mergui area at this time was never confirmed and no contact was made with our troops at that place. About 5,000 enemy were reported at Mesohd, but no move into Burma from this place had been made.

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At this time the field formations in Burma were disposed as follows:—  
1st Burma Division.

Southern Shan States—Toungoo.

H. Q. 17th Indian Division—Moulmein.

16th Indian Infantry Brigade—Kawkareik, on the road to Mesohd.

2nd Burma Infantry Brigade—Moulmein.

One battalion—Tavoy.

Smaller detachment—Mergui.

46th Indian Infantry Brigade—Rangoon, where it had disembarked on 16th January.

Orders for the withdrawal of the Mergui detachment by sea were issued on 18th January. It was at first intended that they should go to Tavoy, but Tavoy was evacuated on the 19th and they went to Rangoon instead. 46th Indian Infantry Brigade were ordered to Moulmein to reinforce 17th Indian Division, arriving on the 21st and 22nd. By the 26th the evacuation of Mergui had been completed and the aerodrome had been demolished; no contact had been made by our troops with the enemy who eight days earlier had been reported to be advancing on the town. At Tavoy demolition of the aerodrome must have been neglected, because enemy fighters were reported to be operating from it on the 19th.

The enemy thus cheaply and quickly obtained possession of the Tenasserim Division south of Moulmein. On the 20th January the enemy attacked our troops east of Moulmein, events in which area are described in a later paragraph.

29. *Naval Defence of Burma.*—Events on the Tenasserim coast coupled with the Japanese occupation of Penang where three submarines were reported on 9th February, gave rise to apprehension that the enemy might attempt to repeat his infiltration tactics by sea, as successfully practised on the west coast of Malaya. To meet this threat the Naval Officer in Charge at Rangoon requested the allotment of 2 small destroyers, 4 sloops, 6 corvettes or the like, and a number of fast motor launches (117). The Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet in commenting on the N. O. I. C's demands said that he realised the danger, but had no resources from which to provide against it and suggested that air attack on such infiltration was the solution (118). As neither C.-in-C. E. F. nor C.-in-C. East Indies could assist, the latter suggested that the Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy's offer of assistance in the local naval defence of Burma might be accepted, if Government of India approval could be obtained. (119). ABDACOM referred the matter to the Commander-in-Chief in India (120). Considerable correspondence followed, the position being complicated by doubts concerning the authority under whose orders NOIC Rangoon should work. Eventually the C.-in-C. E. I. was requested by the Admiralty to coordinate the activities of all local defence craft available from India and Burma for defence of the coast including Burma. Commodore C. Graham, C.B., R. N. was appointed Commodore Commanding Burma Coast for the local naval defence of which he was made responsible, under the direction of C.-in-C. E. I. (121).

30. *Operations in the area River.*—During the late afternoon the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade attacked the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade some 50 miles east of Moulmein. The enemy were reported to have withdrawn on the 22nd not progressing. On the 23rd the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade was advancing. During the withdrawal the Brigade of ferries which had to be crossed was continued on the 24th, with the Japanese strength in the area estimated at 2,500, but this estimate was revised on the 26th when it was reported that the Japanese strength was:—

2nd Burma Infantry Brigade

16th Indian Infantry Brigade

46th Indian Infantry Brigade

In consequence of alarming reports that Rangoon was in danger the 25th January. As the distance was necessary to use an Ammunition train took some eleven hours each way made touch along the Salween pressure on Moulmein thereafter. On 1st February the 2nd Burma Infantry Brigade between, the bulk of its equipment. The Japanese force employed infantry regiments.

For the next eight days an infiltration of enemy patrols. On 1st February such parties had entered and Thabon and general enemy.

During this period further. The Supreme Commander paid a visit to Burma in February, in the course of which by the suitability of the country for armoured formations before the Commander ordered the diversion of troops from the Middle East to the Burma Coast to prepare plans to strike the enemy a heavy blow.

On the 11th the enemy advanced from Martaban where they landed N. W. of the town. The 16th Indian Infantry Brigade was strong. Considerable casualties were suffered in operations, in which the 3rd Baluch Regiment at Pa-an was under pressure continued, however, our general line ran from Thabon. On 14th/15th our troops were withdrawn.

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Burma were disposed as follows:—

me in.

Kawkareik, on the road to Mesohd.  
Moulmein.

Rangoon, where it had disembarked

Mergui detachment by sea were  
intended that they should go to  
the 19th and they went to Rangoon  
were ordered to Moulmein to re-  
on the 21st and 22nd. By the  
completed and the aerodrome had  
made by our troops with the enemy  
rted to be advancing on the town.  
must have been neglected, because  
erating from it on the 19th.

ly obtained possession of the  
On the 20th January the enemy  
vents in which area are described

ents on the Tennaserim coast  
of Penang where three submarines  
ise to apprehension that the enemy  
tactics by sea, as successfully  
To meet this threat the Naval  
the allotment of 2 small destroy-  
ed a number of fast motor launches  
rn Fleet in commenting on the  
ed the danger, but had no resources  
suggested that air attack on such  
neither C.-in-C. E. F. nor C.-in-C.  
suggested that the Flag Officer  
of assistance in the local naval  
if Government of India approval  
M referred the matter to the

Considerable correspondence  
d by doubts concerning the autho-  
n should work. Eventually the  
Ministry to coordinate the activi-  
from India and Burma for defence  
Commander C. Graham, C.B.,  
stranding Burma Coast for the  
ade responsible, under the direc-

30. *Operations in the area Thailand Frontier—Salween River—Sittang River.*—During the late afternoon of 20th January Japanese troops attacked the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade in position near Kawkareik, some 50 miles east of Moulmein. After some fighting in which the enemy were reported to have suffered heavy casualties, 16th Brigade withdrew on the 22nd not pressed by the enemy who, however, were advancing. On the 23rd the withdrawal continued slowly westward. During the withdrawal the Brigade lost its transport owing to the sinking of ferries which had to be crossed. The withdrawal to the Moulmein area was continued on the 24th, with the troops tired and somewhat scattered; the Japanese strength in their attack at Kawkareik was estimated at 2,500, but this estimate was not confirmed. No contact with the enemy was reported on the 26th when the disposition of our troops in the area was:—

2nd Burma Infantry Bde.—Moulmein.

16th Indian Infantry Bde.—Martaban and northward.

46th Indian Infantry Bde.—Bilin and northward.

In consequence of alarming reports from Burma to the effect that Rangoon was in danger the Supreme Commander visited Burma on 25th January. As the distance to be covered was some 2,000 miles, it was necessary to use an American heavy bomber for the journey, which took some eleven hours each way. During the next few days the Japanese made touch along the Salween River and south of Moulmein. Enemy pressure on Moulmein thereafter increased and on the night 31st January, 1st February the 2nd Burma Infantry Brigade withdrew across the Salween, the bulk of its equipment, except for 4 Bofors guns, being saved. The Japanese force employed in this engagement was estimated at two infantry regiments.

For the next eight days activity was confined to bombardment and the infiltration of enemy patrols and parties across the river. By the 10th February such parties had established a road block between Martaban and Thaton and general enemy attacks appeared to be imminent.

During this period further fluctuating reports were received and the Supreme Commander paid another visit to Burma on the 5th and 6th February, in the course of which he visited the Salween front. Impressed by the suitability of the country in lower Burma for the operation of armoured formations before the start of the rains, the Supreme Commander ordered the diversion of 7th Armoured Brigade, then en route from the Middle East to the N. E. I., to Burma. He directed the G. O. C. Burma to prepare plans to use the Brigade at the earliest opportunity to strike the enemy a heavy blow.

On the 11th the enemy attacked across the Salween at Pa-an and advanced from Martaban where his forces had been reinforced by troops landed N. W. of the town from a steamer, and were estimated at 2,000 strong. Considerable casualties were inflicted on the enemy in these operations, in which the 3/7th Gurkha Rifles at Martaban and the 7/10th Baluch Regiment at Pa-an especially distinguished themselves. Enemy pressure continued, however, especially from the east, and by the 14th our general line ran from Thaton to Duvinceik. During the night of the 14th/15th our troops were withdrawn behind the Bilin River.

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17th Indian Division was disposed as follows on the 16th February:—  
46th and 16th Indian Infantry Bdes., west of the road and railway and north of the Bilin River.

48th Indian Infantry Bde., in divisional reserve and patrolling the road Bilin—Kyaikto.

Two battalions, plus one company, Burma Rifles on the Saiween, east and N. E. of Bilin.

On this date reports of enemy crossings of the Salween north of Pa-an and of the collection of elephant transport in that area were received. In their advance on Moulmein the Japanese had used bullock cart transport.

Enemy patrols succeeded in crossing the Bilin River on 17th February and by the 18th a general action had developed necessitating the employment of the divisional reserve. The Japanese kept trying to envelop the eastern flank, simultaneously increasing pressure on the western (seaward) flank, but by means of counter attacks our troops succeeded in maintaining their main positions intact. Fighting continued in approximately the same area up to the night 21st/22nd February, many of our units sustaining heavy casualties. During the night 21st/22nd all unwanted ordnance was withdrawn behind the Sittang River and at dawn on the 22nd the withdrawal of 17th Indian Division to the west bank began.

G. O. C. Burma had been warned by the Supreme Commander on 17th February that continued withdrawal, as experience in Malaya had shown, was most damaging to the morale of our troops. It was pointed out that time could often be gained as effectively, and less expensively, by a bold counter-offensive. Following this advice the G. O. C. had endeavoured to check the withdrawal, but without success. This made the dispatch of reinforcements a matter of vital urgency and India sent all possible units as quickly as possible, as has been shown in the Section concerning reinforcements. The docks situation at Rangoon was such, however, that the G. O. C. did not feel justified in accepting the complete convoy of 17 ships due in Rangoon on 21st February, considering that a heavy loss of personnel and stores might be involved. He therefore got the Navy to return to India all ships except those bringing the 7th Armoured Brigade, a British battalion and an Auxiliary Pioneer Battalion (122). On 21st February the G. O. C. was directed to stop all further withdrawal and counter-attack whenever possible, also to attack the enemy with all air forces available (123).

By 23rd February 17th Indian Division had retired behind the Sittang River and had blown the bridge. The enemy on this front had been reinforced bringing his total strength up to some two divisions. One of these made an outflanking movement followed by an attack from the rear which severed contact between the troops holding the bridgehead and the two forward brigades, with the result that the greater part of the latter was left east of the river. 17th Indian Division was re-organized into two weak brigades west of the Sittang. 7th Armoured Brigade began to disembark at Rangoon on 21st February and on the 22nd one squadron moved to Pegu in support of 17th Indian Division.

Practically the whole of the civil population of Rangoon had left the city by 25th February.

From 22nd February the control by India.

31. *Chinese Assistance in Burma*  
(a) Burma was rendered by the local Volunteer Group to assist in the air and land forces were allotted by the Generalissimo, in pursuit of his object of joint war effort. The forces were the 1st and 93rd Divisions, and the 5th Army Divisions. The 5th Army was well equipped with armoured vehicles and other modern equipment but was not so well supplied. In strength approximately with a British "Division".

During a visit to Chungking on 19th January, the Generalissimo accepted the Generalissimo's offer of service in Burma. For various reasons, including the collection of rice for their rations, they did not leave until 19th January. By early February they were in the Mekong River east of the road.

Eventually headquarters of the 6th Army and its divisions took over the South Burma Division for service on the Salween. It was made to move the 5th Army into Burma to make use of the Chinese troops, certainly the efficiency of the Chinese troops, certainly the lack of mosquito nets and proof sheets and mosquito nets and hutments were sanctioned from Burma (124).

The Chinese troops had several encounters with Japanese parties on the Thai border but they became engaged in no major operations during the period of control.

At the wish of the Generalissimo, formed at Chungking. ABDACOM, the British Military Attache at Chungking, and the British Military Mission to India retained control of the situation. The deliberations of the Council with which the Generalissimo was in agreement.

32. *British Military Mission to India*  
COM, India retained control of the situation. It was agreed that forces provided for operational control of the Generalissimo's forces in Burma. That of the G. O. C. Army in Burma might be received from the Supreme Commander, India remained administrative control of the situation in Burma (126).

33. *Communications, India—Burma*  
for China.—Congestion of the situation through the delivery there of quantities of goods which were beyond the capacity of the British forces in Burma were deficient but a categorical assurance had been given by the British troops to the Generalissimo. G. O. C. Burma's military situation demanded a new policy.

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follows on the 16th February:—  
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Burma Rifles on the Saiween,

of the Salween north of Pa-an and  
that area were received. In their  
used bullock cart transport.

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developed necessitating the em-  
Japanese kept trying to envelop  
pressure on the western (sea-  
attacks our troops succeeded in

Fighting continued in approxi-  
1st/22nd February, many of our  
the night 21st/22nd all un-  
the Sittang River and at dawn  
Division to the west bank

the Supreme Commander on 17th  
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Division was re-organized into  
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and on the 22nd one squadron  
Division.

lation of Rangoon had left the

From 22nd February the control of operations in Burma was assumed  
by India.

31. *Chinese Assistance in Burma.*—As already related, vital assistance  
to Burma was rendered by the loan of one squadron of the American  
Volunteer Group to assist in the air defence of Rangoon. Apart from this,  
land forces were allotted by the Generalissimo to assist in the defence of  
Burma, in pursuit of his object of rendering all possible assistance in the  
joint war effort. The forces were the 6th Army consisting of the 49th, 55th  
and 93rd Divisions, and the 5th Army comprising the 22nd, 96th and 200th  
Divisions. The 5th Army was well equipped with a high proportion of  
armoured vehicles and other modern equipment, with which the 6th Army  
was not so well supplied. In strength a Chinese "Army" corresponded  
approximately with a British "Division".

During a visit to Chungking on 23rd December 1941 General Wavell  
accepted the Generalissimo's offer of the 49th and 93rd Divisions for ser-  
vice in Burma. For various reasons, including the necessity for the col-  
lection of rice for their rations, they did not begin to arrive in Burma until  
19th January. By early February the 93rd Division was in position along  
the Mekong River east of the road Kengtung—Chiengrai.

Eventually headquarters of the 6th Army were established at Kengtung  
and its divisions took over the Southern Shan States front, releasing 1st  
Burma Division for service on the southern front. Arrangements were also  
made to move the 5th Army into Burma. In order to increase the effi-  
ciency of the Chinese troops, certain issues of clothing, bedding, water-  
proof sheets and mosquito nets and the provision of medical assistance  
and hutments were sanctioned from British sources for those serving in  
Burma (124).

The Chinese troops had several successful patrol encounters with Thai  
and Japanese parties on the Thailand and French Indo-China frontiers,  
but they became engaged in no major operations during ABDACOM's  
period of control.

At the wish of the Generalissimo an Allied Joint Military Council was  
formed at Chungking. ABDACOM was not directly represented, but the  
British Military Attache at Chungking kept ABDACOM informed of  
deliberations of the Council with which that headquarters was concerned.

32. *British Military Mission to China.*—On the formation of ABDA-  
COM, India retained control of the British Military Mission to China (125).  
It was agreed that forces provided by the Mission would be under the  
operational control of the Generalissimo while operating in China and under  
that of the G. O. C. Army in Burma, subject to any directions which  
might be received from the Supreme Commander, while operating in  
Burma (126). India remained administratively responsible for the Mission.

33. *Communications, India—Burma—China and Lease—Lend Mate-  
rial for China.*—Congestion of the port area at Rangoon had occurred  
through the delivery there of quantities of American lease/lend stores for  
China which were beyond the capacity of the Burma Road to remove.  
British forces in Burma were deficient of many of the items lying there,  
but a categorical assurance had been given that nothing would be im-  
pounded for use by British troops without the express sanction of the  
Generalissimo. G. O. C. Burma stated that he considered that the mili-  
tary situation demanded a new policy in order to give Burma a larger

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share and to avoid congestion of the port. These views were recommended by the Deputy Supreme Commander (General Brett) to the consideration of his Government at Washington (127).

When as Commander-in-Chief in India, he assumed control of operations in Burma, General Wavell directed the building with all possible speed of a road link between India and Burma, Imphal—Tamu—Kalewa, in case the port of Rangoon should become unusable. This road had already been under consideration. Various questions concerning the order of priority which should be allotted to this and other routes were referred to ABDACOM. While supporting the construction of these routes with all energy, ABDACOM had to point out that it was not, and could not be organized to deal with detailed administrative problems in this connection, which must be left to Burma, India and M. A. China (128).

24. *Andaman and Nicobar Islands.*—Before the creation of ABDACOM, India was responsible for the defence of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as well as for their Civil administration. When India assumed responsibility for the defence of Burma, this responsibility was delegated to G. O. C. Burma. On re-transfer of the operational control of Burma, to ABDACOM, G. O. C. Burma still remained responsible.

Early in January India made an addition of one Gurkha battalion and four field guns to the garrison of Port Blair, which had been one company of British infantry and some military police. As operations developed, G. O. C. Burma expressed concern regarding the defence of the islands, requirements for which should, be thought, be made the subject of special reconnaissance. India was in favour of withdrawing the garrison which could, at the best, deny only Port Blair harbour to the enemy. As control of Burma was about to pass back to India, ABDACOM left a decision in this matter to the latter. The garrison was eventually withdrawn before the Japanese occupied the Andamans on 23rd March.

#### EVENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

35. *General Survey.*—In MALAYA and BURMA the problem confronting ABDACOM, as has been seen, was to attempt to bring up reinforcements before the troops available on the spot were compelled by superior enemy forces to retire to an extent which rendered reinforcement impossible. Sufficient forces were not available or in sight to reinforce the widely scattered detachments in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. The problem in the N. E. I. outer islands, therefore, was to delay the enemy's advance towards the main islands, JAVA and SUMATRA, sufficiently to permit the introduction of reinforcements into them. This was done to the utmost extent possible with the sea and air forces available. In spite of this the enemy continued to advance, temporarily checked from time to time by the counter action taken; and the "pattern" of his advance became apparent. His method was to secure an undefended airfield, put in anti-aircraft defences, develop the airfield and stock it with fuel and ammunition, then bring in aircraft; working from this new air base, to attack the air forces at the next objective; when those air forces were rendered more or less harmless, to send on a convoy, with strong anti-submarine protection, and bearing what was, in relation to the known strength of the defenders of the objective, an overwhelming force. And so on. Operations to this pattern were repeated so frequently that the

Intelligence Directorate was able to predict with some objective preferred by the enemy objective and the date and time.

The standard make-up of a to be:—

- (a) an escorting force, generally two or three
- (b) 15 to 20 transports, each carrying two large troops, thirds of the infantry heavy equipment usually stood off at had been consolidated

The most profitable target for the larger transports.

36. *Events in BORNEO and* Japanese effected landings since NEO and at MENADO in MIN 11th January. At the same time HASA was occupied. KUCHING December 24th/25th and Japanese were in contact with Dutch and of the Sarawak border on 13th and BRITISH NORTH BORNEO

At Tarakan the enemy attacked night, a form of operation which by them. The Dutch garrison's denial scheme had been carried

Working to his usual plan, the aerodrome at BALIKPAPAN, he dromes in the area from which 17th January KENDARI II aerogunned by enemy fighters, present also. Allied aircraft attacked the destroying 8 enemy fighters in enemy aircraft were over of 13 naval vessels and 20 coast of N. E. BORNEO on 20 could arrive off SAMBODJA, of the 21st. Both TARAKAN and fining centres and enemy objectives Demolition of all oil installations ordered and was begun at 0000 h

BANDJERMASIN, the head was attacked by 9 Japanese aircraft was reported that no enemy ship move southwards in the CELL sighted previously at KEMA.

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port. These views were recommended (General Brett) to the consideration (127).

Ataba, he assumed control of operations at the building with all possible roads to Burma, Imphal—Tamu—Kalewa, became unusable. This road had all sorts of questions concerning the order of this and other routes were referred to construction of these routes with all that it was not, and could not be administrative problems in this connection, and M. A. China (128).

—Before the creation of ABDACOM, of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, on. When India assumed responsibility was delegated to G. operational control of Burma, to remain responsible.

addition of one Gurkha battalion and Blair, which had been one company police. As operations developed, G. being the defence of the islands, right, be made the subject of special of withdrawing the garrison which air harbour to the enemy. As commander India, ABDACOM left a decision was eventually withdrawn because on 23rd March.

#### LANDS EAST INDIES.

and BURMA the problem confronted to attempt to bring up reinforcements were compelled by superior which rendered reinforcement impossible or in sight to reinforce the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. and, therefore, was to delay the islands, JAVA and SUMATRA, sufficient reinforcements into them. This was the sea and air forces available. advance, temporarily checked from then; and the "pattern" of his advance was to secure an undefended airfield the airfield and stock it with aircraft; working from this new airfield objective; when those air forces to send on a convoy, with strong that was, in relation to the known, an overwhelming force. And so repeated so frequently that the

Intelligence Directorate was able not only to tell, by the number and type of ships in the convoy, the strength of the enemy land force conveyed, but also to predict with some certainty, by examination of the type of objective preferred by the enemy, and his course and speed, the next objective and the date and time at which it would be attacked.

The standard make-up of a convoy conveying one Division was found to be:—

- (a) an escorting force, strength according to requirements, but generally two or three cruisers and one destroyer Division.
- (b) 15 to 20 transports, according to size; these invariably included two large troop-carrying transports which carried about two thirds of the infantry portion of the division; stores and heavy equipment were loaded in the smaller ships which usually stood off at some distance until the initial landing had been consolidated.

The most profitable target for attack in any such convoy was obviously the larger transports.

36. *Events in BORNEO and CELEBES.*—As already recorded, the Japanese effected landings simultaneously at TARAKAN in N. E. BORNEO and at MENADO in MINAHASA, the N. E. leg of CELEBES, on 11th January. At the same time KEMA on the S. E. coast of MINAHASA was occupied. KUCHING in SARAWAK had been occupied on December 24th/25th and Japanese troops sent forward from that place were in contact with Dutch and British Indian troops a few miles south of the Sarawak border on 13th January. Various points in BRUNEI and BRITISH NORTH BORNEO had also been occupied by the enemy.

At Tarakan the enemy attacked the Dutch garrison with the bayonet by night, a form of operation which before that date had not been employed by them. The Dutch garrison surrendered on 12th January after the oil denial scheme had been carried out.

Working to his usual plan, the enemy then proceeded to attack the aerodrome at BALIKPAPAN, his obvious next objective, and other aerodromes in the area from which his convoys might be attacked. On the 17th January KENDARI II aerodrome in S. E. CELEBES was machine gunned by enemy fighters, presaging an enemy advance in the CELEBES also. Allied aircraft attacked the enemy-occupied aerodrome at MENADO destroying 8 enemy fighters in the course of the raid. On the 18th, 15 enemy aircraft were over BALIKPAPAN. An enemy force of 13 naval vessels and 30 transports was sighted off the coast of N. E. BORNEO on 20th January and it was predicted that it could arrive off SAMBODJA, north of BALIKPAPAN, on the morning of the 21st. Both TARAKAN and BALIKPAPAN were important oil refining centres and enemy objectives at this time were oil and aerodromes. Demolition of all oil installations and the oilfields at BALIKPAPAN was ordered and was begun at 0900 hours on the 20th.

BANDJERMASIN, the headquarters of the Governor of Dutch Borneo, was attacked by 9 Japanese aircraft on 19th January. The same day it was reported that no enemy shipping was sighted at KEMA, indicating a move southwards in the CELEBES, because much shipping had been sighted previously at KEMA.

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The destruction carried out at BALIKPAPAN was very thorough and the Japanese convoy from TARAkan appeared to hesitate in view of the demolition of its objective. Advantage was at once taken of the appearance of this enemy convoy within range of sea and air attack. Dutch medium bombers operating from SAMARINDA II, American heavy bombers operating from JAVA and American and Dutch submarines were sent to attack it, while a striking force consisting of one American cruiser and six destroyers was assembled to put in a night attack. From the 23rd to the 30th January these attacks resulted in the following minimum enemy losses:—

*Sunk.—*

9 merchant ships, one of which may have been a tanker; 3 by aircraft and 4 by surface vessels.

*Probably Sunk.—*

2 heavy cruisers by submarines.  
2 transports by destroyers.  
2 medium sized merchant ships by aircraft.

*Damaged.—*

8 hits on warships, cruisers or destroyers.  
8 merchant ships.  
2 smaller vessels.

Only one battalion was left by the enemy in occupation of TARAkan and he replaced losses in his convoy, suffering further losses while lying at BALIKPAPAN in the meantime. It was therefore apparent that he intended to continue his southward advance, and MAKASSAR in S. W. CELEBES and BANDJERMASIN appeared to be probable objectives. On 21st January, KENDARI II and on 22nd January GORONTALO in the CELEBES were subjected to enemy air attack. On 23rd January enemy warships entered KENDARI BAY, and a landing was effected there on the morning of the 24th.

In N. W. BORNEO it was observed on the 24th that the enemy were collecting many small craft at KUCHING and it was inferred that they contemplated an attack on PAMANGKAT from which, and neighbouring points, they would be able to gain access to the SINKAWANG aerodromes. In consequence the SAMBAS River was blocked at PAMANGKAT and prepared demolitions were carried out. The expected landing took place at PAMANGKAT on 27th January and in the next few days the Japanese occupied other towns in that area and got possession of SINKAWANG II aerodrome after it had been cratered. The Dutch and British Indian forces operating north of SINKAWANG II were forced by this landing, combined with renewed enemy pressure from SARAWAK, to withdraw to SINTANG in the interior.

At BALIKPAPAN the Japanese landed on 23rd/24th January and the Dutch garrison withdrew slowly westwards in the direction of SAMARINDA II aerodrome, which they maintained in use for as long as possible because of the opportunity which it gave of attacking enemy shipping in the MAKASSAR STRAITS. From BALIKPAPAN the Japanese began a deliberate overland advance to the south-west which eventually put

them in possession of BANDJER. Their advance on SAMARINDA II was checked and they eventually rendered the aerodrome unusable for air attacks.

Renewed attention was given to the aerodrome at MANDAI, was subject to attack.

The rapid wastage to which it was subjected compelled it to operate from landing grounds where little or no warning system is existing. On the landing ground at OELIN, six navy O type fighters and six army O type fighters were based. The ground had been reconnoitred by Glenn Martins on the ground were. This instance was typical of many instances of reinforcing aircraft insufficient to build up a formidable force.

By 30th January it was deduced that the enemy which was rapidly being brought to a halt. The extent of the losses which it had suffered. Its time of start appeared to be delayed. Its port for it at KENDARI, where it was delaying this action. Orders were given to the landing ground at PARE PARE on the MAKASSAR STRAIT. On the morning of the 31st January a convoy of vessels for a second time was frustrated by enemy aircraft. The vessels Marblehead and Houston, severely damaged, proceeded, however, in returning to the port.

On 6th February indications were that the STRAITS convoy would be joined by the SEA for the attack on MAKASSAR. It was reported that MAKASSAR would be attacked on the 9th and this was what in fact occurred, but the convoy did not take part.

During this period the enemy were strengthening their submarine base, and many other indications of his air effort southward. It was probable that the enemy were likely to make a move in the near future, in which the training in French Indo-China might be reported of a considerable air concentration that some part of the Indo-China air force it is possible that air forces from the East could take part in the SUMATRA operation. If it could be collected, there was a possibility of simultaneous Japanese operations. It was reported that Task forces adequate to assemble only by periodical switches from one end of the front to the other.

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BALIKPAPAN was very thorough and appeared to hesitate in view of the damage was at once taken of the in range of sea and air attack. SAMARINDA II, American heavy cruiser and Dutch submarines were consisting of one American cruiser in a night attack. From the resulted in the following minimum

may have been a tanker; 5 by aircraft.

by aircraft.

destroyers.

enemy in occupation of TARA-KAN suffering further losses while lying. It was therefore apparent that he lance, and MAKASSAR in S. W. appeared to be probable objectives. On 22nd January GORONTALO in by air attack. On 23rd January AY, and a landing was effected

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ended on 23rd/24th January and towards in the direction of SAMA- tained in use for as long as possi- gave of attacking enemy shipping BALIKPAPAN the Japanese be- south-west which eventually put

them in possession of BANDJERMASIN on 10th February. Their advance on SAMARINDA II was not pressed to any great distance, but they eventually rendered the aerodrome there unusable through constant air attacks.

Renewed attention was given to MAKASSAR which, together with its aerodrome at MANDAI, was subjected to air attacks on 26th January.

The rapid wastage to which an air force is subject if circumstances compel it to operate from landing grounds lacking A. A. defences and with little or no warning system is exemplified by the results of an enemy attack on the landing ground at OELIN near BANDJERMASIN on 27th January. Six navy O type fighters attacked from 1315 to 1400 hours, after the ground had been reconnoitred by one fighter at 1100 hours. Seven Glenn Martins on the ground were destroyed and two more were damaged. This instance was typical of many which in the aggregate made arrivals of reinforcing aircraft insufficient to replace wastage, instead of their being available to build up a formidable force.

By 30th January it was deduced that the BALIKPAPAN convoy, which was rapidly being brought up to its original strength by replacement of the losses which it had suffered, would move next on MAKASSAR. Its time of start appeared to be dependent on the building up of air support for it at KENDARI, where Dutch resistance at KENDARI II was delaying this action. Orders were issued for the destruction of the landing ground at PARE PARE on the west coast of CELEBES north of MAKASSAR. On the morning of 4th February an attempt to attack the MAKASSAR STRAIT convoy, assembled at BALIKPAPAN, by surface vessels for a second time was frustrated by the discovery of the assembling vessels by enemy aircraft which attacked the U. S. Navy cruisers Marblehead and Houston, severely damaging both of them. They succeeded, however, in returning to port by the 7th.

On 6th February indications were obtained that the MAKASSAR STRAITS convoy would be joined by another force from the MOLUCCA SEA for the attack on MAKASSAR. On 8th February it was predicted that MAKASSAR would be attacked by the joint convoys at dawn on the 9th and this was what in fact occurred, except that the BALIKPAPAN, convoy did not take part.

During this period the enemy developed KENDARI as a large air and submarine base, and many other indications were available of a displacement of his air effort southward. On 4th February it became apparent that the enemy were likely to make an attempt on southern SUMATRA in the near future, in which the parachute troops which had been under training in French Indo-China might be employed. A week later the report of a considerable air concentration at KUCHING appeared to indicate that some part of the Indo-China force had been brought there and it is possible that air forces from further east were switched westward to take part in the SUMATRA operation. Although no positive evidence could be collected, there was a definite impression that the extended, simultaneous Japanese operations were putting such a strain on their air forces that Task forces adequate for the purpose in view could be assembled only by periodical switches of a part of the enemy air forces from one end of the front to the other.

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Another enemy transport was sunk by submarine S-37 off MAKASSAR on 8th February. At most of the places which have been mentioned, when the Dutch garrisons were forced by enemy landings to withdraw into the interior they tried to carry out guerilla action against enemy communications, in accordance with pre-arranged plans. In many cases the results were disappointing, the locally enlisted Indonesian troops showing a tendency to discard their uniforms and withdraw to their villages and their families. In other cases, however, useful damage was caused to the enemy. In one such action, on 15th February, a party of about twenty men of the N. E. I. Army having noted from reconnaissances that the Japanese were in the habit of paying daily visits to a bridge which had been demolished near MAKASSAR, laid an ambush and killed 2 Japanese officers and 30 to 40 other ranks, without loss to themselves.

In Borneo, RANDJERMASIN was occupied by the enemy, who had advanced across country and by bicycle along the roads from BALIK-PAPAN, on 10th February. The Governor of Dutch Borneo withdrew to MOEARATEWE in the interior. In the north-west, Japanese were observed moving in boats up the KAPOEAS RIVER towards SINTANG, to which place the Dutch and British troops from SINKAWANG had withdrawn, by a Dutch Lodestar taking supplies to the troops at SINTANG. The Lodestar fired on the enemy, causing casualties, and warned the Sintang garrison.

On the dispersal of ABDACOM headquarters, therefore, the situation in BORNEO and the CELEBES was that the enemy had occupied various places round the coasts where he desired to establish air and sea bases, and where he hoped to start to extract oil from damaged oil-fields, but, except for SINTANG in N. W. BORNEO and the province of MINAHASA in N. E. CELEBES, he had made no attempt to dominate the interior and occupy the country as a whole. The British Indian battalion referred to, which was the 2/15th Punjab Regiment, was expected to be concentrated at KOEMAI in S. W. BORNEO by 10th March. On 22nd February a ship from JAVA with six months requirements of all natures for the unit was due to arrive at KOEMAI. There is therefore hope that the battalion will be able to continue guerilla operations in co-operation with the Dutch troops for at least some time.

37. *Events in the MOLUCCAS and NEW GUINEA.*—The chief islands in the MOLUCCAS are HALMAHERA, which did not appear to figure in Japanese plans to any great extent, CERAM and BURU (BOEROE) with AMBON (AMBOINA) to the south of them, and BANDA ISLAND which gives its name to the BANDA SEA. Dutch New Guinea, although subject to many air attacks, was not included in the places which the enemy had marked down as potential main bases. His chief interest here lay in NEW IRELAND and NEW BRITAIN, both to the N. E. of NEW GUINEA, as stepping stones towards AUSTRALIA, and they were outside the ABDA area. ABDACOM's main interest, therefore, in the area now under consideration lay in AMBON, where a small garrison of Australian and Dutch troops had been established for the protection of airfields and flying boat stations in the vicinity, which were in use by Allied aircraft. Aircraft operating from these bases provided most valuable reconnaissance reports, in the early stages, of enemy movement into and through the CELEBES and MOLUCCA SEAS, besides providing a link between Australia and American occupied bases in the PHILIPPINES.

Apart from the ABDA area importance was that on RABUL. RABUL was subjected to air attacks, becoming the object of seaborne attacks. MUSSAU ISLAND and UPI after RABUL was occupied by target for allied air attacks.

On 23rd January enemy air attacks in HALMAHERA and SORONG GUINEA. This followed the attack at KEMA in N. E. CELEBES. Air raids, mainly by single aircraft, in the AMBON area. In view of these attacks given on 29th January for the Dutch New Guinea. Air raids were made on ISLAND, from where allied aircraft made these air raids considerable number on the ground.

On 28th January a sighting of a ship. It was in the MOLUCCA SEA, escorted by 1 heavy cruiser, and it seemed certain that its destruction was the effort in this region on 30th January from which all possible Australian troops were the imminent threat. The aerial attacks, enemy landings having been reported from the sea, on the 30th AMBON was severed, but on 31st effect that the Australians were in company of Dutch troops remained at ISLAND. The enemy was reported to have been in this attack, two cruisers and two mines and one cruiser and one mine on shore; in addition an unconfirmed report received that the aircraft carrier KAGA was by an American aircraft. After the attack which they were understood to have been in, the Japanese were forced to surrender on 31st.

From this date until the discovery of other points in HALMAHERA and GUINEA, notably FAKPAK and other enemy air attacks, but no further enemy's energies were devoted to the sea and air base.

38. *Events in TIMOR.*—For with Japan the British Government taken by the Japanese in Portugal with the Portuguese Government and Australian troops from Dutch Timor of Portuguese Timor, on 1st of a Japanese attack. On the 1st

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a submarine S-37 off MAKASSAR which have been mentioned, enemy landings to withdraw into guerrilla action against enemy committed plans. In many cases the enlisted Indonesian troops showed and withdraw to their villages. However, useful damage was caused. On 15th February, a party of about 100 men noted from reconnaissances that the enemy was making daily visits to a bridge which they had laid an ambush and killed 2 men, without loss to themselves. The bridge was occupied by the enemy, who had been moving along the roads from BALIKPAPAN. The Governor of Dutch Borneo withdrew to the north-west, Japanese were observed on the AS RIVER towards SINTANG, troops from SINKAWANG had withdrawn, supplies to the troops at SINTANG were cut off, and casualties, and warned the Singapore.

At the headquarters, therefore, the situation was that the enemy had occupied various islands and established air and sea bases, and had taken oil from damaged oil-fields, but, in the province of MINAHASA, the Japanese attempt to dominate the interior was resisted. The British Indian battalion referred to, was expected to be concentrated by 10th March. On 22nd February, the requirements of all natures for the island were met. There is therefore hope that the island operations in co-operation with the British Indian battalion.

**NEW GUINEA.**—The chief islands which did not appear to figure in the Japanese plan were RAM and BURU (BOEROE) with their harbours, and BANDA ISLAND which is in Dutch New Guinea, although situated in the places which the enemy had occupied. His chief interest here lay in the islands, both to the N. E. of NEW GUINEA, and they were of great strategic interest, therefore, in the area where a small garrison of Australian troops was stationed for the protection of airfields which were in use by Allied aircraft. These islands provided most valuable reconnaissance of enemy movement into and out of the MOLOCCA SEAS, besides providing a base for the occupied bases in the PHILIP-

Apart from the ABDA area proper the enemy movement of chief importance was that on RABOUL in NEW BRITAIN. On 20th January RABOUL was subjected to air attack and it was deduced that it would become the object of seaborne attack. On 22nd January the enemy occupied MUSSAU ISLAND and UPONAPSU in NEW IRELAND. Thereafter RABOUL was occupied by the enemy and subsequently became the target for allied air attacks.

On 23rd January enemy air attacks were carried out against TERNATE in HALMAHERA and SORONG at the extreme N. W. tip of NEW GUINEA. This followed the establishment of an enemy naval air base at KEMA in N. E. CELEBES. Again on the 24th there was a series of air raids, mainly by single aircraft, in the HALMAHERA—SORONG—AMBON area. In view of these varied enemy activities, orders were given on 29th January for the demolition of the aerodrome at BABO in Dutch New Guinea. Air raids were also made on NAMLEA in BOEROE ISLAND, from where allied aircraft were operating. In the course of these air raids considerable numbers of Allied aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

On 28th January a sighting report of an enemy convoy was received. It was in the MOLOCCA SEA, steering south, and consisted of 13 merchant ships escorted by 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers and 5 destroyers, and it seemed certain that its destination must be AMBON. Enemy air effort in this region on 30th January was mainly directed against AMBON, from which all possible Australian aircraft had been removed in view of the imminent threat. The aerodromes there were demolished on 31st January, enemy landings having started, after air attacks and bombardment from the sea, on the 30th. On the 31st communication with AMBON was severed, but on 3rd February a report got through to the effect that the Australians were still fighting on, although only one company of Dutch troops remained still available for action against the enemy. The enemy was reported to have suffered considerable losses in shipping in this attack, two cruisers and one submarine probably being sunk by mines and one cruiser and one destroyer by the Australian artillery on shore; in addition an unconfirmed but apparently reliable report was received that the aircraft carrier Kaga, 26,900 tons, was bombed and sunk by an American aircraft. After putting up a very stiff resistance, in which they were understood to have suffered heavy casualties, the Australians were forced to surrender on the 4th.

From this date until the dissolution of ABDA headquarters TERNATE and other points in HALMAHERA, and various places in Dutch New Guinea, notably FAKFAK and SORONG, were subjected to frequent enemy air attacks, but no further hostile landings were effected. The enemy's energies were devoted to the development of AMBON as a sea and air base.

**38. Events in TIMOR.**—For some time prior to the outbreak of war with Japan the British Government had been concerned by the interest taken by the Japanese in Portuguese TIMOR. Negotiations were in train with the Portuguese Government for arrangements whereby Netherlands and Australian troops from Dutch Timor would be sent to assist the garrison of Portuguese Timor, on invitation from the Governor, in the event of a Japanese attack. On the 15th December, however, the Netherlands

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East Indies authorities decided that in view of the submarine threat it was imperative to strengthen the Portuguese garrison at once. Accordingly a mixed Dutch and Australian detachment, under a Dutch commander, was landed at DILLI, the capital of Portuguese Timor, on 17th December. The Governor protested and this was followed by a protest from the Portuguese Government. When the Allied force landed the Portuguese Government was informed that it would be withdrawn when the threat which it was intended to meet was past and the British Government felt itself bound by subsequent conversations to withdraw its troops when adequate Portuguese forces became available for the defence of the territory. The Portuguese Government decided to send a reinforcing detachment, originally stated to number 800 men, from LOURENCO MARQUES. They requested that the Allied troops should be withdrawn when the Portuguese detachment arrived. While recognising that the arrival of the detachment from LOURENCO MARQUES would not secure Portuguese Timor against Japanese attack, the British Government were naturally desirous of avoiding a break with European Portugal. It was therefore proposed to announce that the Allied troops would be withdrawn on arrival of the Portuguese reinforcement, but to initiate staff talks designed to ensure the prompt calling in of Allied troops in the event of Japanese attack. Road communications between DILLI and the boundary with Dutch Timor were bad and it was proposed that their improvement to facilitate rapid reinforcement should be included in the subject matter of the staff conversations.

Fighter aircraft reinforcements could not be flown from AUSTRALIA to the N. E. I. without landing in TIMOR, the aerodrome at KOEPANG in the Dutch part of the island being in regular use for this purpose. ARDACOM therefore represented their concern at the proposal to withdraw the Allied detachment, but undertook to do the best that could be done to avert the feared consequences of the proposed action. As the Japanese consul at DILLI was known to be actively engaged in intrigue against the Allies, and he was under restraint so long as the Allied detachment remained at DILLI, it was proposed for consideration that all consuls should be expelled by the Portuguese Government from their part of the island.

The Portuguese Government deputed an officer to visit ABDA headquarters to discuss the manner in which Allied help would be forthcoming in the event of a Japanese attack and how the change over in responsibility for defence should be effected. The Governor was also directed to improve the road from DILLI to the frontier although he did not in fact do so. The Portuguese representative arrived at ABDA headquarters on 14th February when the staff conversations began. They were made somewhat difficult by the fact that the only language which the envoy possessed in common with the Allied representatives was limited and rather indifferent French. He had never been to TIMOR and knew nothing of conditions there and he had no instructions from his Government. Before the discussions could reach finality the Japanese attacked TIMOR, the questions at issue thereby became purely academic and the Portuguese delegate, apparently much relieved at the turn which events had taken, departed. In view of the reported Japanese landings, Australian Combined Headquarters, DARWIN, were authorised to remove by any means possible the Australian and Dutch troops in Portuguese Timor. The

Australian strength was two ri  
that of the Dutch 1½ infantry c  
(129).

In Dutch Timor, on account of the lack of a direct link on the route AUSTRALIA had been reinforced by No. 240 mortar, anti tank, coast artillery units totalling 1,366 all ranks. The Australians also were strengthened by approximately 240 men.

Concurrently with growing  
wards which resulted in the att  
air forces began to pay attent  
in its vicinity. On 26th Janu  
ATAMBOEA in Dutch Timor  
Dutch aircraft was shot down  
and two passengers being kill  
February by an attack by 8 4  
SEMAOE STRAIT off KOEPA  
aerodrome. On the 3rd the  
attacked by 9 fighters and one  
down at the mouth of the MIN  
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slight damage. On the 4th fo  
roads and the aerodrome. At  
be confirmed, that an enemy  
the Eastern Archipelago. Two  
the roads without effect on the

On seeing the enemy threat, the commander asked Australian Army if it could spare one battalion from forming them that General Brereton's States field artillery battalion, the first Australian Army Headquarters, and the defence forces at Darwin. On necessity, (132) however, they agreed, on the proviso that every possible step be taken to frustrate any Japanese

It was realised that in view of shipping in the roads at Koepang, A. A. Artillery there before they could give cover for their disembarkation. Light A. A. Battery (eight guns) at Batavia should be sent to help. Shipping difficulties at Batavia were delayed and it was not possible until 15th February. This meant departure from Darwin early on 16th February. At Koepang at dark on the 19th. The battery was successfully landed by one of the U. S. Navy cruisers Hornet on 15th February. That day

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view of the submarine threat it was decided to keep a garrison at once. Accordingly, under a Dutch command of Portuguese Timor, on 17th this was followed by a protest in the Allied force landed the at it would be withdrawn when it was past and the British Government conversations to withdraw its became available for the defence ment decided to send a reinforcement 800 men, from LOURENCO Allied troops should be withdrawn 1. While recognising that the CO MARQUES would not secure the British Government were with European Portugal. It was Allied troops would be withdrawal, but to initiate staff ling in of Allied troops in the communications between DILLI and and it was proposed that their ment should be included in the

not be flown from AUSTRALIA OR, the aerodrome at KOEPANG a regular use for this purpose. concern at the proposal to withdrawal to do the best that could be of the proposed action. As the to be actively engaged in intrigue ment so long as the Allied detachment for consideration that all cons Government from their part of

and an officer to visit ABDA headquarters. Allied help would be forthcoming how the change over in responsibility. The Governor was also directed to frontier although he did not in fact arrived at ABDA headquarters on tions began. They were made only language which the envoy representatives was limited and rather to TIMOR and knew nothing of from his Government. Before Japanese attacked TIMOR, the academic and the Portuguese turn which events had taken. these findings, Australian Com forced to remove by any means in Portuguese Timor. The

Australian strength was two rifle companies, totalling 320 all ranks, and that of the Dutch 1½ infantry companies amounting to some 475 all ranks (129).

In Dutch Timor, on account of the importance of the aerodrome as a link on the route AUSTRALIA—N. E. I., the R. N. E. I. Army garrison had been reinforced by No. 2/40 Infantry Battalion A. I. F. and Australian mortar, anti tank, coast artillery, engineer, medical and supply detachments totalling 1,366 all ranks. The Dutch garrison at KOEPANG, where the Australians also were stationed, was twelve "brigades" totalling approximately 240 men.

Concurrently with growing indications of a new enemy thrust southwards which resulted in the attack on AMBON on 30th January, Japanese air forces began to pay attention to KOEPANG and the landing grounds in its vicinity. On 26th January the aerodromes at PENFOEI and ATAMPOEA in Dutch Timor were machine gunned by four fighters; one Dutch aircraft was shot down 9 kilometres from KOEPANG the crew and two passengers being killed. These attacks were followed on the 1st February by an attack by 8 bombers escorted by 2 fighters on a ship in SEMAOE STRAIT off KOEPANG and the machine gunning of PENFOEI aerodrome. On the 3rd the aerodromes and roads at Koepang were attacked by 9 fighters and one bomber and a Qantas flying boat was shot down at the mouth of the MINA RIVER in S. E. TIMOR, 15 people being killed. Two Dutch ships in the roads were attacked but suffered only slight damage. On the 4th four enemy fighters were sighted over the roads and the aerodrome. At this time it was thought, but it could not be confirmed, that an enemy aircraft carrier must be operating South of the Eastern Archipelago. Two formations of 9 bombers each attacked the roads without effect on the 7th.

On seeing the enemy threat approaching Timor, the Supreme Commander asked Australian Army Headquarters in Melbourne whether they could spare one battalion from Darwin as reinforcement for Koepang, informing them that General Brett had agreed to the move of a United States field artillery battalion from Darwin for that purpose (130). At first Australian Army Headquarters demurred on account of the already thin defence forces at Darwin (131). After further explanation of the necessity, (132) however, their agreement was obtained, subject to the proviso that every possible step should be taken adequately to reinforce Darwin to frustrate any Japanese attack (133).

It was realised that in view of the almost daily enemy air attacks on shipping in the roads at Koepang it would be necessary to place some A. A. Artillery there before the arrival of the reinforcements, in order to give cover for their disembarkation. It was accordingly arranged that one Light A. A. Battery (eight Bofors), which had just been disembarked at Batavia should be sent to Koepang with all possible speed. Owing to shipping difficulties at Batavia, however, re-embarkation of the battery was delayed and it was not possible to get it to Koepang before the evening of 15th February. This necessitated sailing the convoy with reinforcements from Darwin early on the 16th which was calculated to get it to Koepang at dark on the 18th, by when the battery should be in action. The battery was successfully landed and the convoy sailed under escort of the U. S. Navy cruiser Houston, two destroyers and two escort vessels, on 15th February. That day the convoy was reconnoitred by an enemy

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flying boat. On the 16th, in the light of information received of an imminent enemy attack on Timor, ABDACOM ordered the convoy back to Darwin. The same day the convoy was attacked by 37 bombers and 9 four-engined flying boats, the bulk of the attack being concentrated on Houston. Luckily, however, only slight damage was done to one of the merchant ships of the convoy in which there were two or three casualties.

The weather at this period over the Eastern Archipelago was very unreliable for flying. On 8th February 8 American P-40's *en route* from Australia to Java forced landed in the north of Timor island, one pilot being killed and all the aircraft being rendered unserviceable. On the 14th an Australian Hudson, just after taking off from Penfoer aerodrome, Koepang, was struck by lightning four persons being killed.

Dilly was reconnoitred by Japanese aircraft on 15th February. On the 16th, 27 enemy bombers were sighted over S. W. Timor. These bombers, which were possibly a part of those which attacked the convoy, were almost certainly based on Kendari, while the flying boats were probably operating from Ambon. On the 17th, 20 Japanese aircraft were observed over Timor flying south towards the Timor Sea, while another 25 attacked Koepang and surroundings, dropping 60 bombs and causing little damage and wounding only three persons.

On the 19th February Dilli was shelled, probably by an enemy submarine, and Japanese landings west of Dilli were reported. On the 20th the enemy landed at various points around Koepang. Parachutists were used in the attack on the aerodrome at Oesaoe. Fighting continued throughout the 20th. Full details were not available at the time of the dispersion of ABDA headquarters.

39. *Events in SUMATRA, JAVA and the EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO.*—Java was the obvious ultimate goal of the Japanese advance in the Netherlands East Indies. Apart from its very considerable agricultural and mineral resources, it was the seat of Government, it contained the only naval base in that area, valuable air bases, considerable military stores and some munitions factories. It formed the main area in which naval, air and land reinforcements could be assembled prior to a counter-offensive. The acquisition of air bases in South Sumatra would clearly make the defence of Java almost impossible, hence action to obtain the use of these bases was a natural preliminary move on the part of the Japanese. Similarly action to obtain air bases on any convenient island in the Eastern Archipelago as a preliminary to an attack on Eastern Java was to be expected. As the enemy southward advance through the outer islands progressed, it became apparent that he was going to carry these preliminaries into effect and, when they were completed, attack Java.

The area under consideration is extensive and enemy activities were many, so it is more convenient to review events in various parts of the area in turn, as is done in succeeding paragraphs. The Eastern Archipelago is considered first. Events in Timor have been described separately because enemy moves there were designed more to cut the air route and to obtain a base for action against Australia than as a preliminary to an attack on Java. Next comes the attack on South Sumatra, which was a sequel to the enemy's success in Malaya. Finally the preliminaries to the attack on Java are recorded.

40. *Eastern Archip.*—The islands considered are, from west to east, Flores, Solor, Alor and the air raids, because apart from the enemy attempted no landings, which was not, however, as it is a part of Java. Across and Waingapoe in Soembawa short range reinforcing air force to complete their re-

On 26th January three B-29 Superfortresses were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft fighters at Bina, Samar, and others. The oil installation at Bina was destroyed. On the 27th an enemy aircraft was shot down in the Flores Sea area. Bina was again destroyed on 28 February and on the same day the oil installation at Waingapoe on Soemba island was destroyed. On the 5th of February a B-29 was shot down 10 kilometres south of Denpasar. On 10 February 30 bombers and 12 fighters were shot down near Denpasar at the time. Nineteen B-29s were shot down near Denpasar; the four B-29s were shot down; the four B-29s were shot down; the four B-29s were shot down. On the 10th a B-29 aircraft type was reported by the Japanese.

On 7th February two P-40's were at Korleko on the east coast of enemy aircraft were sighted over attack was made. On the 4th, 5th enemy air reconnaissance was carried resulted. On the 11th Bali was in flight of after events it would appear to discover Allied disposition for a seaborne attack. On Waingapoe, Soemba, which had been re-established, but this was a wireless station, not to enemy gun and machine gunned by 8 aircraft killed and 9 wounded, while on the 14th 9 aircraft had bombed K

Positive indications of a decision were received on 18th February when the enemy was sighted at the southern end of the island. It was inferred from the small number of troops while the enemy intended to provide a beachhead, he did not expect an opposed landing in a limited area. These deductions, as plotted from sightings, led to the conclusion that the attack would be against Bali, which he had been ordered to do. The demolition of Denpasar aerodrome and the operations on Lombok were not carried out as the enemy's objective.

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The Eastern Archipelago was very 8 American P-40's en route from north of Timor island, one pilot being ed unserviceable. On the 14th an from Penfoer aerodrome, Koepang, being killed.

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ative and enemy activities were events in various parts of the ents. The Eastern Archipe- e been described separately ore to cut the air route and then as a preliminary to an South Sumatra, which was a lly the preliminaries to the

40. Eastern Archipelago.—The main islands in the chain now being considered are, from west to east, Bali, Lombok, Soembawa, Soemba, Flores, Solor, Alor and Wetar. The story here is chiefly one of hostile air raids, because apart from Timor, as already described, and Bali, the enemy attempted no landings in the area, except possibly on Soemba which was not, however, confirmed. The island of Madoera (or Madura) is a part of Java. Aerodromes at Denpasar in Bali, Bima in Soembawa and Waingapoe in Soemba provided useful emergency landing places for short range reinforcing aircraft unable through stress of weather or other cause to complete their intended journey.

On 26th January three Japanese fighters machine gunned the quay and customs shed at Bima, Soembawa, killing one civilian and wounding five others. The oil installation on Kambing island was set on fire by a bomb. On the 27th an enemy aircraft carrier was reported to be operating in the Flores Sea area. Bima was reconnoitred by 15 enemy aircraft on 1st February and on the same day 9 fighters and 9 bombers attacked Waingapoe on Soemba island, killing 12 civilians and wounding about 15 others. On the 5th of February Denpasar aerodrome in Bali, and Benoa 10 kilometres south of Denpasar, were bombed and machine gunned by 30 bombers and 12 fighters. By bad luck 13 American P-40's, which had been unable to complete the full journey to Java, were refuelling at Denpasar at the time. Nine P-40's managed to take off, of which four reached Java; the four left on the ground were destroyed; one enemy fighter was shot down. On this day a Japanese aircraft carrier of the 50 aircraft type was reported by a reconnoitring plane south of Lombok.

On 7th February two P-40's were destroyed in making a forced landing at Korleko on the east coast of Lombok. A considerable number of enemy aircraft were sighted over Flores during the day, although no attack was made. On the 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th February intensive enemy air reconnaissance was carried out over Soembawa, but no attack resulted. On the 11th Bali was reconnoitred by three aircraft. In the light of after events it would appear that these reconnaissances were intended to discover Allied dispositions in Bali and the vicinity in preparation for a seaborne attack. On 15th February communication with Waingapoe, Soemba, which had been interrupted for some time, had not been re-established, but this was understood to be due to damage to the wireless station, not to enemy occupation. Ende in Flores was bombed and machine gunned by 8 aircraft on 15th February, 7 natives being killed and 9 wounded, while considerable damage was done to houses. On the 14th 9 aircraft had bombed Kalabahi in Alor, causing casualties.

Positive indications of a decisive enemy move in this area were first received on 18th February when 4 cruisers and two transports were sighted at the southern end of the Makassar Straits sailing south-west. It was inferred from the small troop-carrying capacity of the convoy that while the enemy intended to provide protection against naval interference he did not expect an opposed landing and that he intended to occupy only a limited area. These deductions, together with the course of the convoy as plotted from sightings, led to the conclusion that the enemy attempt would be against Bali, which he could reach by 2030 hours on the 18th. The demolition of Denpasar aerodrome on Bali was ordered, but demolitions on Lombok were not carried out because that island did not appear to be the enemy's objective.

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The enemy landings on Bali began at about 2100 hours on the 18th at two points, 10 miles N. E. of Denpasar and at the southern end of the island east of Boealoe aerodrome. As sighted at Bali the enemy force consisted of 2 cruisers, 4 to 5 destroyers and 4 merchant vessels. By the 19th, 3,000 Japanese had occupied Denpasar. An Allied striking force of naval surface vessels was despatched to engage the enemy ships, which were also attacked by our aircraft. The enemy's probable losses in these attacks as compiled from reports received amounted to 1 cruiser destroyed, 1 cruiser or destroyer damaged by torpedo and 1 cruiser or destroyer damaged by gunfire, in addition to 1 large transport sunk. Losses in the Allied naval force were two destroyers sunk and one Dutch cruiser damaged. The enemy moved up aircraft to Bali, including one squadron of heavy bombers formerly at Balikpapan, and thus established an air base at close range in preparation for his attack on eastern Java.

Five enemy heavy bombers at Denpasar were burnt out by attack by American aircraft from Java on the 22nd. The enemy quickly removed his ships from the vicinity of the island, presumably on account of the losses which he was suffering from air and sea attack. These losses probably imposed some slight delay on the enemy attack on Java.

41. *Sumatra*.—Until just before the fall of Singapore, hostile air action against Sumatra consisted first of intermittent attacks on aerodromes, then attacks on ports on the West coast and shipping off that coast, and finally heavy attacks on the British and Dutch air forces which, when landing grounds in Malaya could no longer be used, were based on the aerodromes in South Sumatra.

As early as 8th January arrangements were made with the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army for the use of aerodromes in Sumatra for the support of our operations in Malaya and for the transit of reinforcing aircraft, and for their protection by anti-aircraft artillery to be provided by the British. Palembang was essential for fighters covering vital convoys and the oil installation. Pakanbaroe was intended to be used for the operation of bombers, although it never actually was. One of the northern group, Sabang, Lhongka and Medan, was required on the reinforcement route (134). Provision of A. A. guns was made for Palembang I and II and the oil refineries at Palembang, guns being got into action at these places, and for Pakanbaroe where the guns did not, however, actually arrive. The development of events did not permit provision for Medan or any other of the northern group.

The urgent necessity for reinforcing Malaya precluded the allotment of British or Indian infantry for the defence of the Southern Sumatra aerodrome area at that time, but from the first it was intended to provide troops for this purpose as soon as any could be found.

The early air attacks on Sumatra are exemplified by the following:—

17th January, Pakanbaroe bombed, 40 casualties.

19th January, Sibolga, in the north-west of the island was bombed, for the first time. Attack directed mainly against the harbour area. Leaflets dropped on Pakanbaroe.

20th January, bombs dropped near a Dutch auxiliary vessel in Aroe Bay and near Pangkalansoesoe, causing no damage. 3 enemy aircraft over Medan and Belawan, bombed and machine

gunned the lightship, noon 9 bombs dropped, wounding 7.

21st January, two attacks on harbour: "Larut" set on fire in the second, with 16 bombs, but no damage to Belawan. Enemy aircraft over Palembang I. and against targets in Aroe Bay arrive at dusk.

22nd January, Belawan I. raided dropped many bombs, wounded 16 persons, destroyed tanks and godowns, small ship with fuel oil, "Raub" and badly damaged. Indrapoera one Japanese was shot while trying to escape, captured.

25th January, and preceded by machine gunned by enemy of Padang; little damage. "van Imhoff" was damaged, several of whom were killed on the 23rd, one British, one American soldier.

25th January, some bombs dropped on vessel which was also damaged.

26th January, 4 bombers, set on fire, ment steamer "We" damaged, raids at Pangkalansoesoe.

26th January, heavy bombs dropped (Padang); two steamers set on fire; no casualties.

28th January, a further raid on one steamer, minor damage to Islands.

29th January, Sabang with damage: Padang heavily damaged.

31st January, two steamers set on fire and plant at Sitem, Rhineland machinery and the parts of the remaining put of the tin plant, the surplus machinery.

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at about 2100 hours on the 18th at the southern end of the island and at the southern end of the island sighted at Bali the enemy force of 10 and 4 merchant vessels. By the 19th. An Allied striking force of 10 to engage the enemy ships, which the enemy's probable losses in these attacks amounted to 1 cruiser destroyed, 1 torpedo and 1 cruiser or destroyer sunk, large transport sunk. Losses in the 19th were 10 and one Dutch cruiser sunk at Bali, including one squadron of 10, and thus established an air base on eastern Java.

19th. The enemy quickly removed the base, presumably on account of the 19th and sea attack. These losses probably were the result of an enemy attack on Java.

20th. The fall of Singapore. hostile air attacks of intermittent attacks on the West coast and shipping off that coast. British and Dutch air forces which, no longer be used, were based on

21st. Operations were made with the Commander in Chief for the use of aerodromes in operations in Malaya and for their protection by anti-British. Palembang was essential for the oil installation. Pakanbaroe was the base of bombers, although it never was used. Sabang, Lhongka and Medan. (134). Provision of A. A. guns for the oil refineries at Palembang, and for Pakanbaroe where the development of events did not show the northern group.

22nd. Malaya precluded the allotment of the Southern Sumatra. The first it was intended to provide could be found.

23rd. Exemplified by the following:— 1. 40 casualties.

24th. The west of the island was bombed. directed mainly against the base on Pakanbaroe.

25th. A Dutch auxiliary vessel in Aroe, causing no damage. 3 enemy ships at Belawan, bombed and machine

gunned the lightship at Belawan without effect. In the afternoon 9 bombs dropped at Belawan killing 3 coolies and wounding 7.

21st January, two attacks on British auxiliary ships in Sabang harbour: "Larut" slightly damaged in first raid and set on fire in the second. Another British auxiliary vessel attacked with 16 bombs, but not damaged, in Laboehan Bay, near Belawan. Enemy reconnaissance aircraft sighted over Palembang I. and American heavy bombers due to operate against targets in Malaya from there on the 22nd advised to arrive at dusk.

22nd January, Belawan Deli twice attacked; 6 bombers in the first raid dropped many of their 60 lbs. bombs in the water, but wounded 16 persons and caused some damage to palm oil tanks and godowns; in the second raid 3 bombers sank a small ship with full cargo, capsized the auxiliary ship "Raub" and badly damaged the godowns. Near Siak Sri Indrapoera one Japanese who had baled out of an aeroplane was shot while trying to avoid a patrol and two others were captured.

25th January, and preceding days. Several ships bombed and machine gunned by enemy aircraft off the west coast north of Padang; little damage and no casualties, except that S.S. "van Imhoff" was sunk while carrying 53 German internees, several of whom were wounded. Palembang I was bombed on the 23rd, one British soldier and one coolie being killed, one American soldier, one Chinese and two coolies wounded.

25th January, some bombs dropped at Sabang on an auxiliary vessel which was already burnt out.

26th January, 4 bombers dropped 25 bombs on the Dutch Government steamer "Wega", destroying it. Other less effective raids at Pangkalansoesoe, Pagatalan River and Belawan.

26th January, heavy bombing attacks on shipping at Emmahaven (Padang); two steamers and many barges burnt out and another steamer damaged, all godowns and the harbour office set on fire; no casualties.

28th January, a further raid on Emmahaven resulted in the sinking of one steamer, minor raids on points in Banka and Billiton Islands.

29th January, Sabang wireless station and quay bombed, no damage; Padang bombed, no damage.

31st January, two steamers bombed in Muntok roadstead, Banka, one set on fire and beached. On this day work in the tin plant at Sitem, Rhio Archipelago, was stopped, some of the machinery and the staff being removed to Java and vital parts of the remaining machinery being removed. The output of the tin plants on Banka and Billiton was reduced and the surplus machinery was removed to Java.

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On 20th January, No. 223, Bomber Group, R. A. F., from Singapore was reformed at Palembang to continue its operations in support of the troops in Malaya from there. It was therefore of urgent importance to provide A. A. defence at the bombers' new base aerodromes. As A. A. reinforcements were not yet due to arrive, it was decided to send from Singapore No. 6 Heavy A. A. Regiment less one battery (16 heavy guns) and one battery and one troop of No. 35 Light A. A. Regiment (16 light guns) to Palembang. The remaining 8 Bofors of No. 35 Light A. A. Regiment were to go to Pakanbaroe. In order to avoid the great delay involved, and because of doubts concerning the capacity of the bridges and ferries on the roads from the west coast, it was decided that these guns, with their ammunition and transport, should be sent in small ships up the rivers flowing past Palembang and Pakanbaroe to the east coast of Sumatra. 6 Heavy Regiment, less one battery, but with 78 Light Battery and one troop of 89 Light Battery, arrived at Palembang with six 3.7" guns and the appropriate light guns on 30th January. Only a few rounds of shrapnel arrived with the six heavy guns. Very little ammunition was available also for the light guns, but the Dutch lent some of theirs which could be used in the British guns, but had a somewhat different functioning which made shooting more difficult for crews who were not accustomed to it. A series of misfortunes then ensued. S.S. Anting with the Bofors for Pakanbaroe and 89 Light Battery less one troop, and the ammunition for all the Bofors, was sunk by enemy air attack on passage from Singapore. The personnel less two casualties, were picked up and landed at Oosthaven, but the equipments and ammunition were lost. More ammunition just arrived in Batavia was rushed up through Oosthaven, and thence by rail, as soon as possible. S. S. Subadar with the remaining 10 heavy guns and the bulk of the 3.7" ammunition received direct hits from enemy bombs and had to be beached in the Berhala Strait. Strenuous endeavours were, therefore, made to find replacement guns and ammunition and to rush them up also through Oosthaven. By some means still unknown, however, Subadar succeeded in refloating herself and arrived with guns, ammunition and personnel at Palembang on 11th February. In the meantime A.A. personnel, divorced from their equipment, were receiving training in infantry tactics in defence of aerodromes, which was to stand them in good stead a few days later.

Meantime the air forces units which had moved to Palembang were forced to operate with slight A.A. defence of their aerodromes and a sketchy warning system, which resulted in heavy losses of aircraft on the ground. This was further aggravated by the fact that the surroundings of the aerodromes were either jungle or at that time of the year were under water which made dispersal of grounded aircraft a very difficult problem.

From the beginning of February enemy air action against Sumatra was as follows:—

1st February, shipping near Banka, and several places on the island were attacked, no fighters could be made available to counter these enemy attacks. Palembang was twice bombed and machine gunned by 4 enemy aircraft, two men being killed and 11 wounded in addition to some damage being caused.

Places in Banka were brought down from the air at Palembang to assist between Singapore and was decided to move from Java to the island and Billiton to strengthen aerodrome area and it with less than 24 hours.

3rd February, O. C. 6 Heavy A. A. Regiment, under the command of the R. A. F. and in close cooperation with the Commander, Palembang, was reinforced by the enemy. Reinforcing British forces were wrecked at Lanno and showed Lhongka aerodrome south.

4th February, attacks on Singapore continued.

5th February, Medan was bombed by aircraft; Pangkalan machine gunned with

6th February, Palembang was bombed by 2 bombs; gunned by 7 navy aircraft to take off; 3 were injured; one navy 0 was killed. Hurricanes on the ground.

Billiton was again bombed.

7th February, Palembang was bombed by enemy bombers and Blenheims, 1 Hudson, 1 Blenheim and 11 Hurricanes and 3 Hurricanes in

Muntok heavily bombed, many times.

During these early days of service to the enemy, becoming more close by the Dutch authorities.

Pakanbaroe aerodrome machine

8th February, Palembang was bombed by fighters, 4 Hurricanes ground slightly damaged. Enemy reinforcements Enimahaven.

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group, R. A. F., from Singapore for its operations in support of the new base aerodromes. As A. A. arrive, it was decided to send from at least one battery (16 heavy guns) 35 Light A. A. Regiment (16 light 8 Bofors of No. 35 Light A. A.

In order to avoid the great delay owing to the capacity of the bridges and to assist, it was decided that these guns, should be sent in small ships up to Pakanbaroe to the east coast of the battery, but with 78 Light Battery arrived at Palembang with six 3.7" on 30th January. Only a few rounds of guns. Very little ammunition was the Dutch lent some of theirs which it had a somewhat different function for crews who were not accustomed to use. S.S. Anting with the Bofors less one troop, and the ammunition by air attack on passage from Singaperbangsa, were picked up and landed at Palembang. More was rushed up through Oosthaven, as possible. S. S. Subadar with the bulk of the 3.7" ammunition bombs and had to be beached in small launches were, therefore, made to go on and to rush them up also through unknown, however, Subadar succeeded in getting guns, ammunition and personnel at Palembang. In the meantime A.A. personnel, divorced from training in infantry tactics in order to stand them in good stead a few days

which had moved to Palembang, were ordered to defend their aerodromes and suffered in heavy losses of aircraft on the ground by the fact that the surroundings were not at that time of the year were not of grounded aircraft a very difficult

enemy air action against Sumatra was

Banka, and several places on the island could be made available to counter Palembang was twice bombed and enemy aircraft, two men being killed in addition to some damage being caused.

Places in Banka and Billiton were also attacked. Fighters brought down from Tjililitan aerodrome in Java were retained at Palembang to assist in protecting shipping on passage between Singapore and Batavia from enemy air attacks. It was decided to move one battalion of the R. N. I. Army from Java to the Palembang area and another to Banka and Billiton to strengthen the defence of that very important aerodrome area and to deter the Japanese from trying to get it with less than a full scale attack.

3rd February, O. C. 6 Heavy A. A. Regiment was appointed commander of the A. A. defence artillery in South Sumatra, to work under the orders of O. C. No. 225 Fighter Group R. A. F. and in close co-operation with the Dutch Territorial Commander, Palembang. Medan and Sabang were reconnoitred by the enemy and Tandjong Balai was bombed. Two reinforcing British bombers en route from Rangoon were wrecked at Lanno on the N. W. coast of Achin; their maps showed Lhongka aerodrome 30 kilometres too far to the south.

4th February, attacks on shipping on passage between Batavia and Singapore continued.

5th February, Medan was reconnoitred by one low-flying enemy aircraft; Pangkalan Brandan lightship was bombed and machine gunned without damage.

6th February, Palembang I was machine gunned by 12 aircraft, bombed by 2 bombers and 9 fighters, and further machine gunned by 7 navy 0 type fighters. 10 Hurricanes managed to take off; 3 were missing, one was badly damaged on landing; one navy 0 was badly damaged. 4 Blenheims and 2 Hurricanes on the ground were slightly damaged.

Billiton was again bombed.

7th February, Palembang I was bombed and machine gunned by 6 enemy bombers and about 25 navy 0 type fighters; 6 Blenheims, 1 Hudson and 9 Hurricanes were destroyed; 3 Blenheims and 11 Hurricanes were damaged, 1 Blenheim and 3 Hurricanes missing.

Muntok heavily bombed, Medan and Sabang reconnoitred several times.

During these early days of February, works which might be of service to the enemy and which were situated in areas becoming more closely threatened were gradually destroyed by the Dutch authorities.

Pakanbaroe aerodrome machine gunned; 3 Dutch aircraft damaged.

8th February, Palembang I was attacked by 20 bombers and 24 fighters, 4 Hurricanes got off, 2 shot down; 2 planes on the ground slightly damaged; 1 enemy fighter destroyed, probable. Enemy reconnaissance of Sabang, Padang and Emmahaven.

202e70

*9th February*, Pakanbaroe aerodrome machine gunned by 3 Japanese fighters, army type 97; no damage, no casualties. Padang and Medan reconnoitred.

*10th and 11th February*, Padang reconnoitred.

*12th February*, Sabang reconnoitred.

*13th February*, Palembang I bombed and machine gunned three times; 3 enemy fighters and one bomber shot down; 1 British fighter shot down, 1 missing, 1 damaged.

*14th February*, enemy parachute attack on Palembang; enemy seaborne force closely approaching.

A force of enemy warships, transports and store ships was sighted near the Anambas Islands, N. E. of Singapore, on 2nd February. At first it was thought that these might be intended for a seaborne attack on Singapore, but on 4th February a review of all indications pointed to the probability of an enemy movement against South Sumatra in the near future. Almost daily sighting reports thereafter confirmed the continued presence of a considerable enemy force at the Anambas and the expected move on South Sumatra began at dawn on 13th February. Sighting reports at that time disclosed the presence of the following in four separate divisions, 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 2 large transports, 11 transports, 4 submarines, 1 tanker, 5 unidentified large vessels and 7 small vessels.

At about 0830 hours on 14th February some 700 enemy parachutists were dropped at Palembang from about 100 Lodestar communication planes, many of which had British markings. They were dropped in three parties, about five miles from their objectives, at Soengei Gerong, 100 men, Pladjoe, 300 men and Palembang 300 men. About half the R. N. I. Army battalion recently sent from Java, plus details normally stationed in that locality, were available to oppose the attacks, and they were assisted at all three places by British A. A. personnel and at Palembang I aerodrome by some armed R. A. F. personnel in addition. All serviceable aircraft were flown from Palembang I to Palembang II to get them out of danger of damage or destruction.

Palembang I is situated about 10 miles north of the town. At this place there were 15 Heavy A. A. Battery, one section 78 Light A. A. Battery and one troop 84 Light A. A. Battery, besides R. A. F. personnel and a small force of Dutch aerodrome defence troops with some armoured cars. The parachutists were dropped in parties of 7 to 9 from each aircraft. Their armament, some of which must have been dropped separately, was reported to include rifles and revolvers, sub machine guns, machine guns, some grenades and light mortars. Ammunition was dropped separately. Shortly after landing, the parachutists captured a Dutch armoured car from the aerodrome. With this they went towards Palembang and, using hand grenades, killed the driver of a petrol tank lorry. Other cars were similarly treated and the whole were overturned and formed into a road block which was covered by a light machine gun. The Japanese crew of the armoured car were eventually killed by artillery personnel, using a Bren gun, but it was not until the afternoon that the road block was cleared. This prevented the arrival of reinforcements from Palembang town and the removal of A. A. guns from the aerodrome. Three enemy bombers were destroyed by 15 Heavy A. A. Battery during the initial

attack, but as there were no further landing the artillery personnel concentrated on attacking and removing their guns.

Here, as in operations elsewhere surrounding the aerodrome. They nearest 3.7" gun, at fuze 1.5. A possession of a Bofors gun site was by direct fire from a 3.7, and similar finding set and a crowd of curious.

At Soengei Gerong and Pladjoe refineries and the gun sites were no was no means of getting the guns by steamer, and none was available detachments withdrawn after they. At Pladjoe the A. A. guns remained protected by fighting patrols found 16 enemy aircraft destroyed. The entered the oil refinery before the afternoon, with the assistance of the

By the evening of the 14th, P. a mixed force of Dutch, British action on the road between the aerodrome still in possession of Pladjoe. It Palembang I in the morning. British day amounted to:—

Killed—1 Officer.

16 Other ranks.

Wounded—36 Other ranks.

Missing—6 Other ranks.

No record is available of Dutch and troops, particularly the Ambonese, action and the Dutch Territorial Corps the remaining Japanese parachutists.

In all probability the Dutch troops and R. A. F. personnel, could have if the latter had remained unsupported however, it was definitely established from the Anambas Islands, referred to as the southern Sumatra. Consequently, more than one division, with strong air support, all practicable river approaches. A garrison available in Southern Sumatra maintain a successful defence and the naval and air action taken against it was decided to withdraw from that

As soon as the destination of the force with a reasonable degree of accuracy, destroyers had been collected at the attacking it. The Allied striking

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one machine gunned by 3 Japanese  
no damage, no casualties. Padang

re-connoitred.

red.  
bbed and machine gunned three  
d one bomber shot down; 1 British  
g, 1 damaged.

attack on Palembang; enemy  
marching.

es and store ships was sighted near  
ore, on 2nd February. At first it  
ended for a seaborne attack on  
view of all indications pointed to  
against South Sumatra in the near  
thereafter confirmed the continued  
at the Anambas and the expected  
on 13th February. Sighting  
of the following in four separate  
e transports, 11 transports, 4 sub-  
ssels and 7 small vessels.

some 700 enemy parachutists were  
Lodestar communication planes,  
they were dropped in three parties,  
at Soengei Gerong, 100 men,  
nen. About half the R. N. I.  
plus details normally stationed in  
the attacks, and they were assisted  
sonnel and at Palembang I aero-  
nnel in addition. All serviceable  
Palembang II to get them out of

iles north of the town. At this  
ery, one section 78 Light A. A.  
attery, besides R. A. F. personnel  
fence troops with some armoured  
parties of 7 to 9 from each air-  
ust have been dropped separately.  
ers, sub machine guns, machine  
Ammunition was dropped separ-  
tists captured a Dutch armoured  
y went towards Palembang and  
a petrol tank lorry. Other cars  
re overturned and formed into a  
t machine gun. The Japanese  
lly killed by artillery personnel,  
he afternoon that the road block  
f reinforcements from Palembang  
to the aerodrome. Three enemy  
A. A. Battery during the initial

attack, but as there were no further enemy air attacks after the parachute  
landing the artillery personnel concentrated on repelling the enemy ground  
attacks and removing their guns.

Here, as in operations elsewhere, some enemy snipers got into trees  
surrounding the aerodrome. They were cleared by firing at them the  
nearest 3.7" gun, at fuze 1.5. An enemy party which had obtained  
possession of a Bofors gun site was destroyed, together with the Bofors,  
by direct fire from a 3.7, and similar action was taken with a radio direction  
finding set and a crowd of curious Japanese who were investigating it.

At Soengei Gerong and Pladjoe the enemy objectives were the oil  
refineries and the gun sites were not seriously interfered with. As there  
was no means of getting the guns away from Soengei Gerong except  
by steamer, and none was available, the guns were destroyed and the  
detachments withdrawn after they had finished engaging enemy aircraft.  
At Pladjoe the A. A. guns remained in action throughout the day, being  
protected by fighting patrols found from artillery personnel. They claimed  
16 enemy aircraft destroyed. The A. A. artillery anti-parachutist squad  
entered the oil refinery before the arrival of the Dutch troops, and by  
afternoon, with the assistance of the latter, the situation was well in hand.

By the evening of the 14th, Palembang I had been evacuated, but  
a mixed force of Dutch, British artillerymen and R. A. F. held a posi-  
tion on the road between the aerodrome and the town. The Dutch were  
still in possession of Pladjoe. It was decided to attack and recapture  
Palembang I in the morning. British A. A. units' casualties throughout the  
day amounted to:—

Killed—1 Officer.

16 Other ranks.

Wounded—36 Other ranks.

Missing—6 Other ranks.

No record is available of Dutch and R. A. F. casualties. The Dutch native  
troops, particularly the Ambonese, are reported to have fought well in this  
action and the Dutch Territorial Commander was confident of dealing with  
the remaining Japanese parachutists on the 15th.

In all probability the Dutch troops, together with the British artillery  
and R. A. F. personnel, could have disposed of the Japanese parachutists  
if the latter had remained unsupported. On the morning of 15th February,  
however, it was definitely established that the enemy seaborne expedition  
from the Anambas Islands, referred to earlier in this account, was attack-  
ing southern Sumatra. Consequently a force comprising probably not less  
than one division, with strong air support, was advancing on Palembang by  
all practicable river approaches. Against such a scale of attack the small  
garrison available in Southern Sumatra was manifestly inadequate to  
maintain a successful defence and on the 15th, when it was obvious that  
the naval and air action taken against this attack was unable to stop it, it  
was decided to withdraw from that area.

As soon as the destination of the Japanese convoy could be predicted  
with a reasonable degree of accuracy, a naval striking force of cruisers and  
destroyers had been collected at the western end of Java with a view to  
attacking it. The Allied striking force proceeded east of Banka Island

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and through the Gaspar Strait, to the north of that island, during the night 14th-15th February, but failed to find the enemy. Although subjected to heavy bombing attacks it suffered no loss on that account, but one Dutch destroyer ran aground on a reef and had to be abandoned.

All available air striking forces, British, Dutch and American were directed against the shipping of the Japanese convoy and landing craft despatched up river from the convoy. Accurate figures are not available, but many hits and near misses were scored on warships and transports and heavy casualties were undoubtedly caused to enemy troops moving up the rivers in small craft. These results were achieved in the face of strong enemy opposition provided by Navy O type and M. E. 109 fighters. The demolitions at the oil refinery at Soengei Gerong had not been completed before the enemy occupation; in a later raid our bombers took the undestroyed portion of the refinery as their target and were successful in adding to the destruction.

R. A. F. aircraft continued to operate throughout 15th February from Palembang II, Djambi and Lahat aerodromes against enemy small craft entering the Palembang, Telang and Oepang Rivers and enemy shipping in the Banka Straits.

From various causes there was some confusion during the withdrawal of R. A. F. ground personnel, the British A. A. artillery and the Dutch troops to, and through, Oosthaven. This led to the destruction of some equipment which might otherwise have been saved. The local type of wooden bridge, although capable in emergency of taking 3.7" guns and their tractors, was roofed, and these roofs had to be sawn off before the guns could pass. This delayed the withdrawal and owing to misunderstanding some bridges near Oosthaven were destroyed, in accordance with the previously prepared demolition scheme, before the guns had passed. Owing to the suddenness of the move and the lack of a full scale movement control staff, loading of ships at Oosthaven was somewhat haphazard and this also led to the abandonment of some equipment which might have been saved. By the morning of the 16th all aircraft had been removed from Sumatran aerodromes and were operating from Java.

The leading ship of the Australian Corps had meanwhile arrived at Oosthaven, in accordance with the plan for employing the first Division of the Corps to arrive in the defence of South Sumatra. "B" Squadron of the 3rd Hussars, which was intended to proceed to Palembang, had also been disembarked, but owing to the changed situation it was re-embarked for Batavia. Troops landed from the Australians' ship took up positions outside Oosthaven to cover the embarkation, but the withdrawal was not pressed by the enemy or subjected to air attack. The withdrawal from Oosthaven was completed by 20th February.

42. *Java*.—The enemy air force was surprisingly slow in paying hostile attention to Java and the earlier visits were from reconnoitring aircraft which, in all probability, were flown off carriers. On 30th January the first report was received of an enemy aircraft over the island, when one Japanese fighter was observed near Cheribon flying off in a northerly direction. The first air attack took place on 3rd February and was on a considerable scale. Sourabaya was attacked by about 26 bombers and 50 fighters, Malang by 15 bombers and 10 fighters and Madioen by 28 bombers and 9 fighters, and other places in East Java also were attacked by varying numbers of aircraft. 10 defending fighters were shot down or

badly damaged by forced landing at Madioen. The chief reason for units were equipped largely with older, or more modern aircraft with the Brewster Buffalo. One enemy four, probably, over Madoera 14 were destroyed at Sourabaya and

At this time anti-aircraft artillery Java aerodromes. It was therefore then disembarking at Batavia to the island, including those at So Madioen, Jogjakarta and Buitenzorg. 5th February an express train car collided with a goods train and 36 officers and men injured.

40 enemy bombers and 20 fighters on 5th February and, although fighters, they caused much damage, and probably two bombers. The damaged; these losses, together fighters available for the defence

On 7th February 7 Junkers 88 near Buitenzorg; 6 of them circled seventh flew off south of Bandoeng native women working in fields 1 aircraft were sighted over Tjepoe was bombed again, four casualties three of the enemy aircraft were they were in position.

Sourabaya docks were again at 8th, 51 persons being killed and pursuit planes were available to Sourabaya was attacked twice, one enemy fighters. Enemy air activity over Malang was attacked on the 9th. R. N. I. Army armoured car company and Kemajoran and Tjililitan 7 Japanese fighters; in this raid 1 sance aircraft and 3 fighters shot ground; enemy loss was one fighter

On 10th February 9 enemy bombers from reaching Sourabaya. This 9

After the above incidents there over Java, coincident with the 1 on South Sumatra.

On the 18th 6 enemy fighters American bomber being slightly damaged by the British anti aircraft guns of which 5 bombers were shot down Tjepoe.

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the north of that island, during the search to find the enemy. Although submarines suffered no loss on that account, but a reef and had to be abandoned.

British, Dutch and American were attacking a Japanese convoy and landing craft. Accurate figures are not available. Losses on warships and transports were caused to enemy troops moving up the island were achieved in the face of strong opposition by O type and M. E. 100 fighters. The Japanese Gerong had not been completed. Later our bombers took the undesired target and were successful in adding

operate throughout 15th February from aerodromes against enemy small craft in the Oepang Rivers and enemy shipping

some confusion during the withdrawal of British A. A. artillery and the Dutch was led to the destruction of some equipment. The local type of wooden equipment of taking 3.7" guns and their had to be sawn off before the guns were removed and owing to misunderstanding destroyed, in accordance with the preference before the guns had passed. Owing to the lack of a full scale movement the withdrawal was somewhat haphazard and some equipment which might have been removed 16th all aircraft had been removed operating from Java.

The Corps had meanwhile arrived at Java for employing the first Division of the South Sumatra. "B" Squadron of the 1st Air Corps, had also proceeded to Palembang. In the changed situation it was re-embarked. The Australians' ship took up positions in the area, but the withdrawal was not completed. The withdrawal from Java.

was surprisingly slow in paying visits, were from reconnaissance aircraft over the island, when one was flying off in a northerly direction on 3rd February and was on a considerable number of about 26 bombers and 10 fighters and Madiaen by 28. In East Java also were attacked and fighters were shot down or

badly damaged by forced landings at Sourabaya and 4 lost and 2 damaged at Madiaen. The chief reason for these losses was that the Dutch fighter units were equipped largely with obsolete types such as the Curtiss Interceptor, or more modern aircraft with comparatively low performance such as the Brewster Buffalo. One enemy fighter was shot down at Malang and four, probably, over Madoera Island near Sourabaya. 12 naval aircraft were destroyed at Sourabaya and 4 American bombers at Malang.

At this time anti-aircraft artillery was almost entirely lacking at the Java aerodromes. It was therefore arranged to send British A. A. units then disembarking at Batavia to cover ports and important aerodromes in the island, including those at Sourabaya, Batavia, Malang, Bandoeng, Madiaen, Jogjakarta and Buitenzorg, as well as the port at Tjilatjap. On 5th February an express train carrying 77 Hvy. A. A. battery to Sourabaya collided with a goods train and 3 officers and 12 other ranks were killed and 60 officers and men injured.

40 enemy bombers and 20 fighters attacked the naval air base at Sourabaya on 5th February and, although intercepted by Dutch and American fighters, they caused much damage. Two enemy fighters were shot down and probably two bombers. Three Allied fighters were lost and two damaged; these losses, together with those suffered on the 3rd, left no fighters available for the defence of Sourabaya.

On 5th February 7 Junkers 88 were sighted over Semplak aerodrome near Buitenzorg; 6 of them circled over Batavia for an hour, while the seventh flew off south of Bandoeng. Two enemy aircraft machine gunned native women working in fields north of Bandoeng. Three enemy naval aircraft were sighted over Tjepoe, the oil area in East Java. Sourabaya was bombed again, four casualties and only slight damage being caused; three of the enemy aircraft were shot down by the A. A. guns which by then were in position.

Sourabaya docks were again attacked, this time by 18 bombers, on the 8th, 51 persons being killed and 52 injured; three flights of American pursuit planes were available to engage the bombers. On the 9th Sourabaya was attacked twice, one enemy bomber being shot down by American fighters. Enemy air activity over Tjepoe was reported on the 8th and 9th. Malang was attacked on the 9th, considerable damage being done to the R. N. I. Army armoured car camp adjacent to the aerodrome. Batavia city and Kemajoran and Tjililitan aerodromes were machine gunned by 7 Japanese fighters; in this raid Allied losses were 1 bomber, 2 reconnaissance aircraft and 3 fighters shot down, and 5 aircraft burnt out on the ground; enemy loss was one fighter, probable.

On 10th February 9 enemy bombers were prevented by Allied fighters from reaching Sourabaya. This occurred again on the 11th.

After the above incidents there was a short lull in enemy air activity over Java, coincident with the preparations for carrying out the attack on South Sumatra.

On the 18th 6 enemy fighters attacked the aerodrome at Malang, one American bomber being slightly damaged and 4 enemy fighters damaged by the British anti aircraft guns. Sourabaya was attacked by 24 aircraft, of which 5 bombers were shot down. 27 enemy planes were sighted over Tjepoe.

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Duitsenzorg aerodrome was dive bombed and machine gunned by 5 Junkers 88 on the 19th, 3 Hudsons and 2 Sikorskis of the K. N. I. L. M. being burnt out. A few minutes later a further 44 enemy aircraft appeared; one hangar was burnt.

Following the withdrawal from South Sumatra, Royal Netherlands Navy patrols were organised, by 20th February, in Sunda Strait to prevent infiltration of enemy using small craft. The Second Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, United States Army, and forty-five 75 mm guns without personnel, were handed over to the R. N. I. Army authorities, by whom they were employed for beach defence.

On 19th February 25 fighters and 12 bombers attacked the aerodrome at Andir, Bandoeng. Two Dutch fighters were shot down and one reconnaissance aircraft was destroyed on the ground. One enemy fighter was shot down. Large enemy formations were prevented by defending fighters from attacking Sourabaya; three enemy fighters and three American fighters were shot down.

On the 20th Malang was attacked by 9 enemy fighters which dived in low over the trees with stopped engines. Five B-17's which had just come in and were refuelling were burnt out, 12 U. S. personnel being wounded. Kalidjati aerodrome was attacked by 10 bombers, 2 Glenn Martins on the ground being destroyed and 2 damaged. Banjoewangi in the extreme east of Java was attacked by 13 bombers, 39 civilians being killed and 15 wounded. Twenty-five enemy aircraft approached, but did not attack Sourabaya.

Kalidjati aerodrome was again attacked on the 21st, by 15 bombers and 13 fighters. 4 enemy bombers and 4 navy 0 fighters were shot down; one enemy fighter was rammed by a Dutch plane, the pilot of which was saved by his parachute. On the ground 1 aircraft was destroyed and 4 damaged. The same day Sourabaya, Malang and Madioen were attacked, only slight damage and casualties being caused, while 2 enemy aircraft were shot down.

On 22nd February the aerodromes at Klaten, Kemajoran, Sempak, Jogjakarta, Semarang, Malang, Pasirian and Loemadjang were attacked. In these attacks 17 allied aircraft were destroyed and 14 damaged; 3 enemy fighters were shot down by the British A. A. artillery at Jogjakarta.

On the 23rd Malang, and on the 24th Andir, aerodrome was attacked. Two enemy bombers were shot down.

The later activities described above presaged the enemy attack on Java which was obviously under preparation and gave some indication of the scale of air attack by which the seaborne attack could be supported, now that the enemy was established on air bases in South Sumatra and Bali. In spite of exposure to air attack the enemy continued to keep a large concentration of ships at Muntok in the Banka Straits, which indicated its intended use in the immediate future for a further advance. On the 24th a reconnaissance aircraft, in the Makassar Strait, later shot down, reported a "fleet" to the northward. The same day 7 transports were seen at Makassar, two of which were definitely sunk by bombing, and in the area between the Java and Flores Seas, south of Makassar Strait, 1 light cruiser, 7 destroyers, 6 transports, and 4 submarines were seen. The latter party had already been attacked by an Allied submarine which sank one ship and probably sank another. It was assumed that the transports seen

were troopships and that the "fleet" of February 80 to 100 ships had been concluded that at least two enemy ships were off north Central Java by dawn on 10 March, which could come from Banka Strait.

In the above circumstances it was a race to get reinforcements into Java. The Allied air forces in Java had 10 bombers plus 20 Dutch Glenn Martin American B-17's. In the next few months could be expected, reinforcements—American dive bombers, 50 Hurricane fighters. This situation, viewed together with the limited number of airfields, led inevitably to the conclusion that the Japanese could not be replaced more quickly than they could be replaced. The limited number of airfields without a straight duel with the enemy air forces and shipping and protection of their own

Of the Australian Corps the 1st and the 7th Division would arrive first. As facilities in Java were limited and it was known that the leading brigade of the 7th Division would not arrive until about 8th March and the weather was so inclement, the decision, with the natural deduction that Java was impracticable, was expediently made to disembark the Corps at the N. E. I., and the Naval and General ter Poorten on 15th February. The plan of disembarking the Corps in N. E. I. had developed, the natural desire to return to Australia, which itself was the best experienced and best equipped theatre.

A brief review of the forces available in Java could not be expected to indicate the probable scale of attack.

An approximate statement of  
Against this the enemy could bring  
borne, about half being fighters :

The Allied naval resources were not a striking force. As a simultaneous attack was practically certain, the problem of dividing the forces would be too weak to succeed. It would be difficult, Java being the main objective. Wherever the naval force was sent, it would be an attack because there were insufficient forces.

The Dutch land forces amounting seventeen battalions, little armoured cars. British Imperial 3rd Hussars with 25 light tanks, including a machine gun battalion. Anti-Aircraft Artillery consisting



1 and machine gunned by 5 Junkers of the K. N. I. L. M. being 44 enemy aircraft appeared; one

Sumatra, Royal Netherlands Navy, in Sunda Strait to prevent the Second Battalion of the 131st Army, and forty-five 75 mm to the R. N. I. Army author beach defence.

bombers attacked the aerodrome were shot down and one recon ground. One enemy fighter was prevented by defending fighters and three American light-

9 enemy fighters which dived in Five B-17's which had just come U. S. personnel being wounded. bombers, 2 Glenn Martins on the Banjoewangi in the extreme east civilians being killed and 15 approached, but did not attack.

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were troopships and that the "fleet" was en route from Jolo where on 20th February 80 to 100 ships had been seen. From all these sightings it was concluded that at least two enemy divisions from the eastward could be off north Central Java by dawn on 27th February, in addition to the force which could come from Banka Straits and the Anambas.

In the above circumstances it was clear that the Allies had lost the race to get reinforcements into Java in time. Already by 15th February the Allied air forces in Java had dwindled to about 75 fighters, 40 medium bombers plus 20 Dutch Glenn Martins, 14 American dive bombers and 20 American B-17's. In the next fortnight, after which a Japanese attack could be expected, reinforcements amounting to 20 American fighters, 10 American dive bombers, 50 Hurricanes and 8 B-17's were due to arrive. This situation, viewed together with the probable scale of enemy air attack, led inevitably to the conclusion that the Allied air forces would waste more quickly than they could be replaced. In Java they were operating from a limited number of airfields without depth and were engaged not merely in a straight duel with the enemy air forces, but also in attacks on enemy shipping and protection of their own.

Of the Australian Corps the Divisions were so loaded in convoys that the 7th Division would arrive first and the 6th Division second. Unloading facilities in Java were limited and it was calculated from previous experience that the leading brigade of the 7th Division could not be operative until about 8th March and the whole Division by 21st March. This situation, with the natural deduction that the arrival of the Australian Corps in Java was impracticable, was explained to H. E. the Governor-General of the N. E. I., and the Naval and Army Commanders, Admiral Helfrich and General ter Poorten on 15th February. Apart from the physical difficulties of disembarking the Corps in N. E. I. ports in view of the situation which had developed, the natural desire of the Australian Government for the return to Australia, which itself was now directly threatened, of their most experienced and best equipped troops had to be considered.

A brief review of the forces available may serve to show why the defence of Java could not be expected to be prolonged, having regard to the probable scale of attack.

An approximate statement of the Allied air forces has been given above. Against this the enemy could bring 400 to 500 aircraft, including carrier-borne, about half being fighters and half bombers.

The Allied naval resources were 3 to 4 cruisers and about 10 destroyers as a striking force. As a simultaneous attack from both ends of the island was practically certain, the problem was intensified. If the available force were divided it would be too weak in both places; if kept concentrated it would be difficult, Java being 500 miles long, to reach the vital point in time. Wherever the naval force was kept, it would be liable to heavy air attack because there were insufficient fighters available to protect it or its bases.

The Dutch land forces amounted only to three weak divisions comprising seventeen battalions, little artillery and a few light tanks and armoured cars. British Imperial troops in the island were B. Squadron 3rd Hussars with 25 light tanks, less than 3,000 Australians in various units including a machine gun battalion and a pioneer battalion, and British Anti-Aircraft Artillery consisting of two Heavy and three Light Regiments

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of which one heavy and one light were without their equipments which had been lost in South Sumatra. These A. A. units together with various other British units and details totalled some 5,500 all ranks. There was one American field artillery regiment.

Japanese naval resources were almost unlimited in comparison with Allied; and it was estimated that they could deploy some six divisions as a landing force against Java.

All the above was given most careful consideration and finally it was recommended to the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington that the Australian Corps should be diverted to Burma, but naval and air reinforcements for ABDACOM should continue to be sent to Java. (135).

By 21st February the Allied fighter strength in Java had been reduced to less than 40, medium and dive bombers to about 30 and heavy bombers 10. Owing to the enemy's occupation of Timor and Bali no more fighters could reach Java from the east and a consignment of 50 Hurricanes then en route in a British aircraft carrier could not arrive in time to be effective. Reinforcement of heavy bombers via India had been stopped by order from Washington and could not in any case have been effective. Steps were therefore begun for the immediate evacuation from the island of some 6,000 R. A. F. and R. A. A. F. personnel who were unarmed and surplus to fighting units, and about 1,400 Americans similarly situated.

Orders were received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, on 21st February to the effect that Java was to be defended to the last by all combatant troops at that time in the island for whom arms were available. Land reinforcements then on their way from the West would not proceed to Java but be diverted to Burma, Ceylon and Australia. The Supreme Commander was given discretion to augment the defence of Java with available naval units and with U. S. aircraft then at his disposal and being assembled in Australia. (136). In accordance with these orders U. S. S. Langley with fighter aircraft was directed to proceed to Java at utmost speed. She was sunk off Tjilatjap on the morning of 28th February.

As related earlier, it was decided that ABDACOM headquarters should be dispersed and the bulk of its personnel left Java on the evening of 26th February. Commodore Collins remained in command of the British naval forces still in Java, Major General Sitwell in command of the army forces with Brigadier Blackburn A. I. F. directly in command of the Australians and Air Vice Marshal Maltby in command of the British air forces. These officers were under the command of the Dutch Naval, Army and Air Commanders, who commanded all Allied forces of their respective Services in Java. Rear Admiral Palliser, R. N., also remained on Admiral Helfrich's staff.

A word about shipping is desirable before leaving the subject of Java. During the first half of February Tanjung Priok, the port of Batavia, became greatly congested owing to the limited unloading facilities, aggravated by back-loading from Singapore, the stoppage of ships destined for Singapore and the loss of Oosthaven. At one time 94 sizable seagoing ships were concentrated in the harbour and roadstead. This was the situation for some four days after the Japanese had taken possession of the aerodromes in South Sumatra, but the shipping was not subjected to serious attack. It was clear, however, that this luck could not continue and drastic steps were taken to disperse the shipping, including the despatch

of a portion of it without unloading, created by the arrival of the large Corps in such circumstances can

43. *Port Darwin Sub-Area.*— of the Darwin Sub-area have been sub-area remained under ABDACOM vary to 25th February, and land ruary. As all reinforcements for dive-bomber aircraft and anti-air Australia, the Darwin Sub-area for munications. The allocation of N. E. I. and places on the line of formed the chief problem for the

Developments in the Japanese regards our ability to continue the ment route, the safety of Darwin lia. Considerable enemy shipping by the Japanese, for example 4 c 30th January, and this constituted points in Australia. The enemy tions southward from the Bismar Islands being bombed on 28th Samarai, at the S. E. corner of Port Moresby was attacked on 21 from Darwin to Malang was attacked 200 miles west of Port Darwin. Britain, was occupied by the ene

Incidents similar to the above Koepong convoy was bombed, as February Darwin was subjected severe losses of shipping, aircraft

In these circumstances it was press for the retention in Australia aircraft which were being erected

On 29th January the Supreme situation for the Combined Chief apart from north Australia and be dealt with, namely through the Straits, and on Singapore with a future. To meet these advances, no substantial reinforcement of weeks and the air striking force Keeping this situation in view, diversion for the defence of the ABDACOM, it was essential to the ABDA area to resist the Jap

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of a portion of it without unloading. The situation which would have been  
created by the arrival of the large number of ships carrying the Australian  
Corps in such circumstances can easily be imagined.

43. *Port Darwin Sub-Area.*—Negotiations leading to the establishment  
of the Darwin Sub-area have been described elsewhere. Air forces in the  
sub-area remained under ABDACOM control only for 26 days from 31st Jan-  
uary to 25th February, and land forces for 18 days from 8th to 25th Feb-  
ruary. As all reinforcements for the ABDA area of American fighter and  
dive-bomber aircraft and anti-aircraft and field artillery came through  
Australia, the Darwin Sub-area formed part of an important line of com-  
munications. The allocation of such reinforcements between places in the  
N. E. I. and places on the line of communications in the Darwin sub-area  
formed the chief problem for the Supreme Commander in this area.

Developments in the Japanese advance made Australia apprehensive as  
regards our ability to continue the use of the Torres Straits as a reinforce-  
ment route, the safety of Darwin and the threat to the mainland of Austr-  
lia. Considerable enemy shipping remained at Rabaul after its occupation  
by the Japanese, for example 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 13 transports on  
30th January, and this constituted a standing menace to Port Moresby and  
points in Australia. The enemy appeared to be extending their air opera-  
tions southward from the Bismarek Archipelago, Gizo in the Solomon  
Islands being bombed on 28th January; Salamaua was attacked and  
Samarai, at the S. E. corner of New Guinea, reconnoitred, on the 31st.  
Port Moresby was attacked on 2nd February. A bomber aircraft en route  
from Darwin to Malang was attacked by 3 fighters on 9th February about  
200 miles west of Port Darwin. Gasmata, the southernmost point in New  
Britain, was occupied by the enemy on 8th February.

Incidents similar to the above continued and on 16th February the  
Koopang convoy was bombed, as related in another section, and on 19th  
February Darwin was subjected to a most damaging air raid in which  
severe losses of shipping, aircraft and harbour facilities were suffered.

In these circumstances it was natural for the Australian Government to  
press for the retention in Australia of some part of the reinforcing American  
aircraft which were being erected in that country.

On 29th January the Supreme Commander in a periodical review of the  
situation for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, pointed out that,  
apart from north Australia and Burma, three main enemy advances had to  
be dealt with, namely through the Molucca Straits, through the Makassar  
Straits, and on Singapore with a probable extension to Sumatra in the near  
future. To meet these advances, no naval striking force was then available,  
no substantial reinforcement of land forces was due to arrive for several  
weeks and the air striking force averaged 6 to 8 heavy U. S. A. bombers.  
Keeping this situation in view, although Australia was pressing for the  
diversion for the defence of that country of reinforcements allotted to  
ABDACOM, it was essential to assemble the maximum reinforcements in  
the ABDA area to resist the Japanese advance. (137).

Before receiving the above review the Combined Chiefs of Staff inform-  
ed the Supreme Commander that Australia had asked the United States to  
allot them some pursuit planes already in Australia or shortly due to  
arrive there. They had asked in particular for the allotment to Port

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Moresby of one squadron of the U. S. fighters then being erected in Townsville. The Supreme Commander was asked to state his views and in particular to say whether, in his opinion, the C. C. O. S. should divert to Australia some of the aircraft allotted to him, or alternatively, whether it should assume responsibility for covering the N. E. approaches to Australia, operating his aircraft from bases outside the ABDA area as provided for in para. 2 of his directive. (138). Meanwhile ABDACOM had suggested to the Australian General Staff that the three fighter and three dive bomber squadrons then on their way through Australia should be allotted one each to N. E. I., Koepang and Darwin, in that order of priority. As they all had to pass through Darwin, any balance not forwarded could be stopped there by the Supreme Commander if a threat to that place appeared imminent. (139).

The Supreme Commander said that he did not consider that it would be sound to make him responsible for the defence of the N. E. approaches to Australia which would involve virtual assumption of responsibility for all defence matters in that area, because it is impossible to divorce the defence of approaches by air from defence by other means. It was inadvisable to extend the already large ABDA area as it was difficult enough to distribute available resources to cover it as it stood. The Supreme Commander considered that higher authority should decide the distribution of resources between Australia and ABDA, as they already did between MIDEAST and ABDA. (140). The Combined Chiefs of staff decided to divert from United States squadrons being formed in Australia one fighter group of 80 aircraft to operate under the command of the Royal Australian Air Force. (141). In view of the serious damage and heavy losses of fighter, and other, aircraft incurred in the Japanese air attacks on Java then in progress, ABDACOM requested the C. C. O. S. to allot the first eight squadrons of fighter aircraft becoming available in Australia to the ABDA area (142) and this was arranged by the C. C. O. S. (143).

When the Darwin Sub-area was added to the ABDA area, the forces allotted to the defence of the portion of northern Australia included in the sub-area were those already there. The army forces included field, coast defence and anti-aircraft units totalling approximately 14,000 personnel. Of these troops, one pioneer battalion, one field regiment and certain small units were Australian Imperial Forces and the balance Australian Military Forces who could not be employed outside Australia and its territories. Air forces consisted of one general reconnaissance squadron and one general purpose squadron, based on Darwin.

The Australian Government requested the release of these two squadrons as soon as possible, for employment elsewhere in Australia, by replacement from ABDACOM resources. (144).

General Brett assumed command of that part of the ABDA area which was included in north-west Australia, when ABDA headquarters were about to be dissolved. (145).

#### "ABDACOM" 1.

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## APPENDIX "A".

## "ABDACOM" DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, DATED 3RD JANUARY 1942.

Following for General WAVELL from Chiefs of Staff.

*Begins.* By agreement among the Governments of Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments.

1. *Area.*—A strategic area has been constituted to comprise initially all land and sea areas including general regions of Burma, Malaya, Netherlands, East Indies and Philippine Islands more precisely defined in Annexure 1. This area will be known as ABDA area.

2. *Forces.*—You have been designated as Supreme Commander of ABDA area and of all armed forces afloat ashore and in air of ABDA Governments which are or will be (a) stationed in area (b) located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by respective Governments for service in or in support of the ABDA area. You are not authorised to transfer from territories of any ABDA Government land forces of the Government without consent of local commander or his Government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and if required a Commander of the Combined Naval Forces and the Commander of Combined Air Forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your area nor any commitment made by it for reinforcing its forces in your area except after giving to other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.

5. *Strategic concept and policy.*—The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for conduct of war in your area is not only in immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible but to take offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest moment through employment of concentrated air power. The piece-meal employment of air forces should be minimised. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

6. General strategic policy will be therefore :—

- (a) to hold Malaya barrier defined as line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia as basic defensive position of ABDA area and to operate sea, land and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of barrier in order to oppose Japanese southward advance ;
- (b) to hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the area and Burma as essential to support of China and to defence of India ;
- (c) to re-establish communications through Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support Philippines garrison ;
- (d) to maintain essential communications within the area.

7. *Duties responsibilities and authorities of Supreme Commander.*—You will co-ordinate in ABDA area strategical operations of all armed forces of ABDA Governments where desirable to arrange formation of task forces whether national or inter-national for executing specific operations and appointing any officers irrespective of seniority or nationality to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command you are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose of reinforcements which from time to time may be despatched to the area by ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorised to require from commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsibilities as supreme commander.

11. You are authorised to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through channels specified in paragraph 18 you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furthering of your mission.

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13. *Limitations.*—Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of ABDA area and to forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through commanders duly appointed by their respective Governments. Interference is to be avoided in administrative processes of armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments including free communication between them and their respective Governments. No alterations or revision is to be made in basic tactical organizations of such forces and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be sub-divided into small units for attachment to other national components of task forces except in cases of urgent necessity. In general your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective co-ordination of forces in execution of your mission.

14. *Relations with ABDA Governments.*—The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of duties and responsibilities as herein defined and in the exercising of authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that from a date to be notified all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provision of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates after making due representation to you still considers obedience to your orders would jeopardise national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in ABDA area he has the right subject to your being immediately notified of such intention to appeal direct to his own Government before carrying out orders. Such appeals will be made by most expeditious methods and copies of appeals will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. *Staff and assumption of command.*—Your staff will include officers of each of ABDA Powers.

You are empowered to communicate immediately with national commanders in area with view to obtaining staff officers essential your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in position effectively carry essential functions of supreme command so your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. *Superior Authority.*—As supreme commander of ABDA area you will always be responsible to ABDA Governments through agency defined in Annexure II.

#### ANNEXURE I.—BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA.

The ABDA area is bounded as follows:—

*North.*—By boundary between India and Burma, thence east-ward along Chinese frontier and coastline to latitude 030 degrees north, thence along parallel 030 degrees north to meridian 140 degrees east. (NOTE.—Indo-China and Thailand are NOT included in this area.)

*East.*—By meridian 140 degrees east from 030 degrees to the Equator, thence east to longitude 141 degrees east, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea (and to) coast on south coast, thence east along southern New Guinea coast to meridian 143 degrees east, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

*South.*—By the northern coast of Australia from meridian 143 degrees east westward to meridian 114 degrees east, thence north westward to latitude 015 degrees south, longitude 092 degrees east.

*West.*—By meridian 092 degrees east.

2. Forces assigned to ABDA and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

#### ANNEXURE II.

1. On all important military matters not within the jurisdiction of supreme commander of ABDA area, U. S. Chiefs of Staff and representatives in Washington of British Chiefs of Staff will constitute agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decisions by President of U. S. and by British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among chief matters on which decision will be required are:—

- (a) Provision of reinforcements.
- (b) Major changes in policy.
- (c) Departures from supreme commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

- (a) Any proposals coming either from ABDA Governments will be discussed in Washington and in London.
- (b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee, representatives in Washington, will formulate any opinion.
- (c) On receipt of these opinions from Washington of British Chiefs of Staff, recommendations to President and by British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Prime Minister will agree with these recommendations.

3. Since London has machinery for the Dutch Government is in London the British Government will formulate their views and agreement and for inclusion in the final decision.

4. Agreement having been reached between the British Prime Minister of Defence the orders to be issued in Washington in the name of both of them.

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with respect to the various portions of the area to be exercised through commanders. Interference is to be avoided in the ABDA Governments including free Governments. No alterations or re- of such forces and each national commander its own commander and will not be her national components of task forces or instructions and orders will be limited in execution of your mission.

ABDA Governments will jointly and responsibilities as herein defined and limited. Commanders of all sea, land and air forces will be informed by their respective Governments of instructions issued by you in conformity with such commanders as emanating from the area.

Immediate subordinates after making due to your orders would jeopardise national security. The general situation in ABDA area he notified of such intention to appeal direct to you. Such appeals will be made by most of the staff will include officers of each of the national commanders in the area.

at the earliest possible assumption of command. Communication as soon as possible to ABDA area as described in paragraph 18.

to effectively carry essential functions of the area may be promulgated to all concerned. Under of ABDA area you will always be guided by the policy defined in Annexure II.

#### BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA.

Burma, thence east-ward along Chinese border 10 degrees north, thence along parallel 030 degrees east. (NOTE.—Indo-China and area.)

10 degrees to the Equator, thence east to south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea, thence east along southern New Guinea then south down this meridian to the

from meridian 143 degrees east westward to north westward to latitude 015 degrees

at areas are authorised to extend their jurisdiction

#### ANNEXURE II.

within the jurisdiction of supreme commander. Representatives in Washington of British Government and submitting recommendations for Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Required are :—

#### 2. This agency will function as follows :—

(a) Any proposals coming either from Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be submitted to Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

(b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinion.

(c) On receipt of these opinions the U. S. A. C's. of S. and representatives in Washington of British C's. of S. will develop and submit their recommendations to President and by telegraphing to Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has machinery for consulting Dominion Governments and since Dutch Government is in London the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement and for including these in the final telegrams to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between President and Prime Minister and Minister of Defence the orders to Supreme Commander will be despatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

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## APPENDIX "C"

## FOOTNOTES.

Serial No.	Reference.
1	TROOPERS to ARMINDIA, 60946 of 30th December 1941.
2	TROOPERS to C.-in-C. INDIA, 61815 of 3rd January 1942.
3	TROOPERS to MIDEAST, etc., 63252 of 9th January 1942.
4	Gen. WAVELL to TROOPERS and BRITMAN WASHINGTON, 00048 of 14th January 1942.
5	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM rptd. COS LONDON, DBA 20 of 22nd February 1942 (or 21st February 1942?).
6	ABDACOM to BRITMAN WASHINGTON for CCOS rptd. TROOPERS for COS, 02076 of 22nd February 1942 (CCOS 19).
7	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM rptd. COS LONDON, DBA 23 of 23rd February 1942.
8	ARMINDIA to TROOPERS, 32/C of 1st January 1942.
9	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, ARMINDIA, BURMA, 67854 M. O. 10 of 31st January 1942.
10	TROOPERS to ARMINDIA rptd. BURMARMY, ABDACOM, 72302 M. O. 12 of 22nd February 1942.
11	Appendix "A", "Annex. I".
12	ABDACOM to TROOPERS for COS rptd. ARMY MELBOURNE for STURDEE, 0001 of 10/1.
13	CCOS to ABDACOM rptd. COS LONDON for Australian Government, DBA 2 of 24th January 1942. DOMINIONS OFFICE to P. M. of AUSTRALIA, 67230 of 27th January 1942.
14	P. M. AUSTRALIA to ABDACOM, No. 1 of 7th February 1942.
15	ABDACOM to ARMY MELBOURNE, 00513 of 29th January 1942.
16	C.-in-C. E. F. to FOJ, 0437Z of 15th January 1942.
17	ADMIRALTY to All Concerned, 1511A of 20th January 1942.
18	ABDACOM to All Concerned, 00457 of 28th January 1942.
19	TROOPERS to EASFAR, MIDEAST, ARMINDIA, rptd. EAST AFRICA C.-in-C. E. I., 61519 of 1st January 1942.
20	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, ARMINDIA, rptd. MIDEAST, MALAYA, BURMA, 65582 5/D, 2 of 25th January 1942.
21	Note by Naval staff, ABDACOM of 8th February 1942.
22	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, rptd. COS LONDON, DBA 7 of ?
23	ABDACOM to TROOPERS, rptd. SINGAPORE, BURMARMY, ARMINDIA, MIDEAST, 00613 of 1st February 1942.
24	AIR MINISTRY to EASFAR, X/344 of 5th January 1942.
25	ABDAIR to AIR MINISTRY, OPS 1009 of 12th February 1942.
26	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, 4 of 29th January 1942.
27	BURMARMY to ARMINDIA (quoting RAFDEL) A 324 of 13th January 1942.
28	HQUSAFIA MELBOURNE to ABDACOM, 67 of 9th February 1942.
29	Details of the United States air organization in the Netherlands East Indies are not available.
30	Gen. WAVELL to CCOS WASHINGTON, 00048 of 14th January 1942. CCOS WASHINGTON to SUPREME COMMANDER, 182035 of January 1942. ABDACOM to CCOS WASHINGTON, 00206 of 21st January 1942.
31	ABDACOM to CCOS WASHINGTON, 00100 of 17th January 1942.

## Serial No.

32	Gen. WAVELL to Gen. M
33	Gen. MACARTHUR to C
34	ABDACOM to Gen. MA
35	CCOS WASHINGTON to
36	ABDACOM to Gen. MA
37	Gen. BRERETON to AB
	BARNES to ABDAC
	ACNB to ABDACOM
38	MACHIN to ABDACOM, 1942.
39	CAVITE to GLOW, 89
40	BRITMAN WASHINGT
41	BRITMAN WASHINGT
42	BRITMAN WASHINGT
43	BRERETON to ABDAC
44	BRITMAN WASHINGT
45	Gen. WAVELL to Gen. M
	Gen. MACARTHUR to
46	BRITMAN WASHINGT
47	BRITMAN WASHINGT
48	Gen. MACARTHUR to
49	MACHIN to ABDACOM
50	HQ USA MELBOURNE
51	BRITMAN WASHINGT
52	ABDACOM to CCOS, etc
53	ABDACOM to Gen. MA
54	BRITMAN WASHINGT
55	JSM WASHINGTON to
56	S. W. P. C. Intelligence
57	JSM WASHINGTON to 1942.
58	JSM WASHINGTON to 1942.
59	JSM WASHINGTON to runny 1942.
60	TROOPERS to ABDAC
61	JSM WASHINGTON to 1942.
62	Gen. MACARTHUR to C
63	J. S. M. WASHINGTON February 1942.
64	ABDACOM to CCOS W
65	ACNB (Australian C. O. T. O. O. 0054Z of 11
66	JSM WASHINGTON to 1942.
67	JSM WASHINGTON to
68	ABDACOM to Gen. MA
69	EASFAR to TROOPER 1942.

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Serial No.	Reference.
70	ABDACOM to TROOPERS, 00030 of 12th January 1942.
71	H. Q. SINGAPORE FORTRESS No. 9 in S. F. 334/1/G. of 9th January 1942.
72	ABDACOM to TROOPERS, 00040 of 14th January 1942.
73	A. V. M. MALTBY'S appreciation, dated 18th January 1942.
74	AHQ FE to ABDAIR, A. O. 998 of 20th January 1942.
75	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, 65356 of 20th January 1942, (C. O. S. S. W. P. 8).
76	ABDACOM to BRITMAN WASHINGTON, 00187 of 20th January 1942.
77	Supreme Commander's note, dated 21st January 1942.
78	TROOPERS to MALAYA, 65610 M. O. 10 of 21st January 1942. GENERAL SINGAPORE to TROOPERS, O. 920 of 22nd January 1942.
79	Adv. H. Q. MALAYA COMMAND to ABDACOM, O. 953 of 23rd January 1942.
80	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE, 00426 of 27th January 1942.
81	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, 29071 of 28th January 1942.
82	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE, 00468 of 28th January 1942.
83	Adv. H. Q. MALAYA COMMAND to ABDACOM, O. 913 of 22nd January 1942.
84	G. O. C. MALAYA to ABDACOM, letter No. O.-837 of 20th January 1942.
85	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, 65386 of 20th January 1942. Adv. HW MALAYA COMMAND to ABDACOM, O. 913 of 22nd January 1942.
86	GENERAL SINGAPORE to TROOPERS, 28788 of 22nd January 1942.
87	TROOPERS to MALAYA, 66158 of 23rd January 1942.
88	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE 00270 of 23rd January 1942.
89	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, 66844 of 26th January 1942.
90	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, 67523 U. S. Q. M. and 67524 of 30th January 1942.
91	GENERAL SINGAPORE to TROOPERS, 29298 of 2nd February 1942.
92	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, rptd. MALAYA, 69071 of 6th February 1942.
93	ABDACOM to WESGROUP SINGAPORE, 00554 of 30th January 1942.
94	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, O. 237 of 2nd February 1942.
95	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM and TROOPERS, O. 232 of 2nd February 1942.
96	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, 456 of 11th February 1942.
97	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE, 01111 of 12th February 1942.
98	GENERAL SINGAPORE to TROOPERS rptd. ABDACOM, 012 of 14th December.
99	AUSTFORCE to ABDACOM, 29780 of 14th February 1942.
100	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, 29284 of 14th February 1942.
101	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE, 01197 of 14th February 1942.
102	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, 29785 of 14th February 1942.
103	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, 29786 of 14th February 1942.
104	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE, 01226 of 15th February 1942.
105	ABDACOM to GENERAL SINGAPORE, 01228 of 15th February 1942.
106	GENERAL SINGAPORE to ABDACOM, 29790 of 15th February 1942.
107	GENERAL SINGAPORE to TROOPERS through ABDACOM, 29777 of 13th February 1942.
108	ABDACOM to CCCF rptd. C.-in-C. E. F. ADMIRALTY, A. C. N. B., 01282 of 16th February 1942.

Serial No.	
109	TROOPERS to ABDACOM ARMINDIA to ABDAIR ABDACOM to ARMY BURMARMY to ABDAIR January 1942. ARMINDIA to TROOPERS ABDACOM to TROOPERS TROOPERS to ABDAIR
110	AHQ. INDIA directive to Gen. WAVELL to TROOPERS ARMINDIA to TROOPERS AHQ. INDIA to EAST TROOPERS to EAST
111	ABDACOM to BURGROUP
112	BURMARMY to ABDAIR ABDAIR to NORGROUP BURGROUP to ABDAIR ABDACOM to Gen. WAVELL 1942. ABDACOM to BURGROUP CCOS WASHINGTON NORGROUP to ABDAIR NORGROUP to ABDAIR BRITMAN WASHINGTON NORGROUP to ABDAIR ABDACOM to MALAYA NORGROUP to ABDAIR CCOS WASHINGTON
113	NORGROUP to ABDACOM BURGROUP to ABDAIR AIR MINISTRY to AIR MINISTRY to ABDACOM to AIR AHQ INDIA to AIR AIR MINISTRY to ABDACOM to MID AIR MINISTRY to ABDACOM to WES AIR MINISTRY to AHQ INDIA to AIR NORGROUP to AIR AIR MINISTRY to NORGROUP to AIR AIR MINISTRY to
114	NORGROUP to AHQ INDIA
115	NORGROUP to ABDAIR
116	NORGROUP to AHQ INDIA

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January 1942.  
 F. 334 I.G. of 9th January 1942.  
 January 1942.  
 8th January 1942.  
 January 1942.  
 January 1942, (C. O. S. S. W. P. 8).  
 00187 of 20th January 1942.  
 January 1942.  
 21st January 1942.  
 RS, O. 920 of 22nd January 1942.  
 DACOM, O. 953 of 23rd January  
 0426 of 27th January 1942.  
 0071 of 28th January 1942.  
 0468 of 28th January 1942.  
 COM, O. 913 of 22nd January 1942.  
 O. 837 of 20th January 1942.  
 January 1942.  
 DACOM, O. 913 of 22nd January  
 28788 of 22nd January 1942.  
 January 1942.  
 0270 of 23rd January 1942.  
 January 1942.  
 Q. M. and 67524 of 30th January  
 29298 of 2nd February 1942.  
 A. 69071 of 6th February 1942.  
 00554 of 30th January 1942.  
 0. 237 of 2nd February 1942.  
 and TROOPERS, O. 232 of 2nd  
 56 of 11th February 1942.  
 1111 of 12th February 1942.  
 rptd. ABDACOM, 012 of 14th  
 February 1942.  
 3284 of 14th February 1942.  
 1197 of 14th February 1942.  
 3785 of 14th February 1942.  
 6586 of 14th February 1942.  
 4226 of 15th February 1942.  
 228 of 15th February 1942.  
 29790 of 15th February 1942.  
 8 through ABDACOM, 29777  
 ADMIRALTY, A. C. N. B., 01282

Serial No.	Reference.
109	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, etc., 63795 of 12th January 1942. ARMINDIA to ABDACOM, VVY/1004/G. of 16th January 1942. ABDACOM to ARMINDIA, 00141 of 15th January 1942. BURMARMY to ABDACOM, 0374 of 18th January 1942 and G.7 of 20th January 1942. ARMINDIA to TROOPERS, 1487/G. of 23rd January 1942. ABDACOM to TROOPERS, 00345 of 25th January 1942. TROOPERS to ABDACOM, etc., 67854 M. O. 10 of 31st January 1942.
110	AHQ. INDIA directive to A. V. M. STEVENSON, dated 30th December 1941. Gen. WAVELL to TROOPERS, 0726Z of 6th January 1942. ARMINDIA to TROOPERS, VVY/421/G. of 7th January 1942. AHQ. INDIA to EASFAR, A. 1035 of 8th January 1942. TROOPERS to EASFAR, 63251 of 9th January 1942.
111	ABDACOM to BURGROUP, 00087 of 17th January 1942.
112	BURMARMY to ABDACOM, A. 40 of 17th January 1942. ABDAIR to NORGROUP, 00154 of 19th January 1942. BURGROUP to ABDACOM, A. 431 of 20th January 1942. ABDACOM to Gen. MAGRUDER, CHUNGKING, 00216 of 21st January 1942. ABDACOM to BURGROUP, 00217 of 21st January 1942. CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, DBA. 1 of 24th January 1942. NORGROUP to ABDACOM, A. 474 of 24th January 1942. NORGROUP to AHQ. INDIA, A. 501 of 27th January 1942. BRITMAN WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, No. 1 of 28th January 1942. NORGROUP to ABDACOM, A. 540 of 31st January 1942. ABDACOM to MACHIN, 00639 of 1st February 1942. NORGROUP to ABDAIR, A. 553 of 2nd February 1942. CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM 1 of 6th February 1942.
113	NORGROUP to ABDACOM, X. 441 of 21st January 1942. BURGROUP to AHQ. INDIA, A. 446 of 21st January 1942. AIR MINISTRY to ABDACOM X. 655 of 22nd January 1942. AIR MINISTRY to AHQ. INDIA, X. 70 of 22nd January 1942. ABDACOM to AIR MINISTRY 00277 of 23rd January 1942. AHQ INDIA TO AIR MINISTRY, T. 154 of 23rd January 1942. AIR MINISTRY to ABDACOM X. 847 of 24th January 1942. ABDACOM to MIDEAST, 00386 of 27th January 1942. AIR MINISTRY to ABDACOM, X. 141 of 27th January 1942. ABDACOM to WESGROUP, 00456 of 28th January 1942. AIR MINISTRY to MIDEAST, X. 241 of 28th January 1942. AHQ INDIA to AIR MINISTRY, A. 1101 of 30th January 1942. NORGROUP to ABDAIR, A. 558 of 2nd February 1942. AIR MINISTRY to AHQ INDIA, X. 583 of 1st February 1942. NORGROUP to ABDAIR, A. 670 of 9th February 1942. AIR MINISTRY to AHQ INDIA, X. 460 of 11th February 1942.
114	NORGROUP to AHQ INDIA, A. 587 of 6th February 1942.
115	NORGROUP to ABDAIR, A. 801 of 20th February 1942.
116	NORGROUP to AHQ INDIA., 98 of 23rd February 1942.

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Serial No.	Reference.
117	NOIC RANGOON to RAMY, 0446Z. of 22nd January 1942.
118	C.-in-C. E. F. to ABDACOM, 168 of 23rd January 1942.
119	C.-in-C. E. I. to ABDACOM, 6531 Z. of 24th January 1942.
120	ABDACOM to ARMINDIA, 00343 of 25th January 1942.
121	ADMIRALTY to C.-in-C. E. I., 1957A. of 31st January 1942. C.-in-C. E. I. to Various, 1226Z. of 14th February 1942.
122	BURMARMY to ABDACOM, O. 785 of 20th February 1942.
123	ABDACOM to BURMARMY, 01855 of 21st February 1942.
124	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, 64523 of 15th January 1942 and 64921 FF. I of 17th January 1942.
125	ARMINDIA to TROOPERS, 934/G. of 15th January 1942.
126	TROOPERS to ABDACOM, 66276 of 23rd January 1942. ABDACOM to TROOPERS, 00397 of 27th January 1942.
127	ABDACOM to BURMARMY, 00218 of 21st January 1942.
128	ABDACOM to TROOPERS, 00202 of 21st January 1942.
129	ABDACOM to ACH DARWIN, OPX. O. 2272 of 24th February 1942.
130	ABDACOM to ARMY MELBOURNE, 00431 of 27th January 1942.
131	ARMY MELBOURNE to ABDACOM, M. C. 4617 of 28th January 1942.
132	ABDACOM to ARMY MELBOURNE, 00576 of 31st January 1942.
133	P. M. AUSTRALIA to ABDACOM, No. ? of 7th February 1942.
134	EASFAR to CLG, 263/7 of 8th January 1942.
135	ABDACOM to BRITMAN WASHINGTON, 01517 of 18th February 1942.
136	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, DBA. 19 of 21st February 1942.
137	ABDACOM to CCOS WASHINGTON 00488 of 29th January 1942.
138	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, DBA. 5 of 30th January 1942. For the Directive, see Appendix "A".
139	ABDACOM to ARMY MELBOURNE, 00576 of 31st January 1942.
140	ABDACOM to BRITMAN WASHINGTON, 00649 of 1st February 1942.
141	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, DBA. 8 of ?
142	ABDACOM to BRITMAN, WASHINGTON, 00810 of 6th February 1942 (CCOS. 2.)
143	CCOS WASHINGTON to ABDACOM, DBA. 12 of 8th February 1942.
144	P. M. AUSTRALIA to DOMINIONS SECRETARY, 86 of 28th January 1942.
145	HQUSAFIA MELBOURNE to ABDACOM, 204 of 24th February 1942. ABDACOM to HQUSAFIA, 02303 of 24th February 1942.

**SAFE FILE: Alaska**



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. McCRAE:

I am not satisfied with the partial report from CNO in regard to Alaskan defense preparations. This applies not only to the main Alaskan coast but to the Aleutian Islands all the way out. The weather temperature in these Islands is not low. It is not lower than that of Hyde Park, New York.

I think that this should be taken up by Admiral King, Admiral Stark and the Joint Board.

Your enclosure giving status of naval shore facilities in Alaskan area is particularly disappointing in the percentage of its readiness.

F.D.R.

203a01

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file*

SECRET

January 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a partial report from the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Districts Division) in response to the President's recent inquiry about the war readiness in the Alaskan Area.

Respectfully,

*J. R. Beardall*  
J. R. BEARDALL

AC3a02

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.  
Op-30-HF  
(SC)EG-3

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: The Director, Naval Districts Division  
To: The Naval Aide to the President  
Subject: Material and Operational Readiness, Alaskan Area.  
Reference: (a) Your Memo to CNO (Naval Districts Division)  
of January 13, 1942.  
Enclosure: (A) Material Readiness.

1. In reply to reference (a), the following information is furnished:

2. As to naval operational readiness, this, of course, is a matter of Operating Forces available for service in the area, under the following headings:

- (a) The Pacific Fleet must necessarily deal with major overseas threats in this direction. It is assumed that information as to readiness here is available to you from the Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) (1) The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier Forces charged with local naval operating tasks in the area, are considered seriously inadequate to deal with even minor threats by our clever and determined enemy. The outstanding deficiency here is in aircraft and patrol classes such as gunboats and subchasers. These cannot be supplied at

DECLASSIFIED

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OED letter, May 8, 1972

RHP, NARS Date SEP 28 1973

[REDACTED]

(5) The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, has repeatedly pointed out his lack of forces for meeting his tasks, but the Department has been unable to supply more than above listed without denuding other Naval Coastal Frontiers.

3. By material readiness, it is assumed that status of naval shore facilities is meant. This is indicated in enclosure (A). As to adequacy of material stocks, etc., it is suggested that since this would involve the material bureaus, the Fleet Maintenance Division would properly supply the information.

*E. J. Gillam*  
E. J. GILLAM  
Acting

-----  
Copy to: CNO (with copy of reference (a))  
Cominch (with copy of reference (a))

[REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED  
EO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973



NAVAL SHORE FACILITIES IN THE ALASKAN AREA

1. Naval Air Station, Sitka. Seaplane facilities for 24 VPB or VSO, usable, 73% complete on December 31, 1941.
2. Naval Air Station, Kodiak. Land and seaplane facilities for 48 VPB and for emergency use of four Marine Squadrons, usable, 53% complete on December 31, 1941.
3. Submarine Base, Kodiak. Facilities for six submarines, not usable, 5% complete on December 31, 1941.
4. Naval Air Station, Unalaska. Facilities for 24 VPB only usable for tender based aircraft, 25% complete on December 31, 1941, gun emplacement 0% complete.
5. Submarine Base, Unalaska. Facilities for six submarines, not usable, 0% complete.
6. Naval Section Bases at Ketchikan, Port Armstrong, Sitka, Juneau, Port Althorn, Cordova, Seward, Kodiak, Sand Point and False Pass. Facilities for support of local defense forces; all usable and scheduled for completion in January, 1942.
7. Naval Aerological Stations at Attu, Amchitka, Atka, Kanaga, Kiska and Unalak. Temporary facilities under construction at Kiska and Kanaga -- Kanaga facilities to be removed in the Spring of 1942 to Adak.
8. Naval Radio Stations at Sitka, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor in use.

ENCLOSURE (A)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

10-14-66

*Carl L. Spicer*

Contact report, later amplified, by a patrol plane which searched the harbor of Kiska:

June 11 0320 (Z)

In Kiska there are four Japanese ships. Two of them are at the entrance and are tentatively identified as torpedo boats, 500 tonners, of the Tomozuru class. Inside is one ship believed to be a heavy cruiser and one believed to be a destroyer. Commander Alaska Sector estimates that this heavy cruiser may be the one which was torpedoed on 4 June. Complete reconnaissance not possible because of fog. Cincpac has directed the maximum use of submarines, and has ordered Com Alaska Sector to "Exert maximum effort to bomb Japs out of Kiska".

-----

Pacific Fleet units are investigating floating wreckage in the vicinity of the Midway Battle. They have found a lot of it, which indicates fire. They have also recovered 2 Jap prisoners in a rubber boat.

a03601

Safe : Alaska  
PSP

10-21-66

Carl F. Spicer

PROPOSED TRIP  
TO

ALASKA  
OR  
ICELAND

### AIRPLANE

A C-54, four-motored transport plane, similar to the one used for the return trip from Casablanca, can be provided.



## ICELAND

### THE TRIP.

Rail trip to Presque Isle from Washington is recommended in order to reduce insofar as is possible the time which must be spent flying. The weather during the months of July and August is the best available throughout the year with the exception of June. The trip can be made in one hop from Presque Isle to Reykjavik.

An alternate flight is by way of Goose Bay, Labrador, spending the night there and then flying on to Reykjavik the next day. Another alternative is to fly from Presque Isle to Goose Bay, spend the night, fly the next day to Narsarsuaq, Greenland, spend the night there, then on the third day, fly to Reykjavik. However, this route is not recommended due to the uncertainty of Greenland weather.

The return trip can be made by way of Newfoundland, landing at the Gander Lake (Newfoundland) Airport.

### ITINERARY.

#### Rail.

Depart: Washington Evening of D day.

Arrive: Presque Isle, Maine Evening of D + 1 day.

Spend night on train.

#### Air.

Depart: Presque Isle Early morning of D + 2 day.

Arrive: Reykjavik Late afternoon of D + 2 day.

Distance: 2150 miles. Flying time: 12 hrs. 45 min.

(Alternate):

Depart: Presque Isle Morning of D + 2 day.

Arrive: Goose Bay, Labrador Afternoon of D + 2 day.

Depart: Goose Bay Morning of D+3 day.

Arrive: Reykjavik Afternoon of D+3 day.

Distance: 1470 miles. Flying time: 8 hrs. 15 min.

#### WEATHER.



Graphs indicate the number of days per month that an airplane flight would normally be expected possible between the terminals indicated. All factors - fog, rain, icing - have been considered.

The graphs are broken down into the mean number of days per month, the minimum number of days per month, and the maximum number of days per month that this trip could have been made during the past several years.

#### DISCUSSION.

##### I. Facilities.

Facilities in Iceland for the proposed visit are extremely limited. There are only two possibilities worthy of consideration; (1) the University of Iceland at Reykjavik, (2) the "Hotel DeGink" at Keflavik Airport about 40 miles from Reykjavik. It is assumed

203004

that the University of Iceland would be unoccupied due to the summer vacation. No detailed information is available as to the type of facilities it would provide but most of the University is housed in one large building. Our agreement with the Icelandic Government does not provide for requisitioning and billeting, so that negotiations would be necessary to secure the use of the University. In addition, any modifications which would be required would be subject to the approval of the Icelandic authorities.

The Hotel DeGink, near the Keflavik Airport, is a newly constructed frame building. It was built by the Air Transport Command to accommodate overnight guests passing through Iceland. The building is of cantonment type construction and consequently a constant fire hazard exists. The high winds which prevail increase the hazard.

The road between Reykjavik and Keflavik, approximately 40 miles, is narrow, rough and winding and for the most part unpaved.

## II. Security.

From a security angle, Iceland would be most undesirable. It lies within 1,000 miles of German air bases in Norway. German planes are over the Islands frequently, and within the past week, one plane has strafed some of our troops.

The large German-speaking population of Iceland no doubt supports considerable Axis sentiment and information may be transmitted from the Island either by fishing boat or clandestine radio. In spite of the proposed reduction of the Iceland garrison, sufficient troops, antiaircraft and ground, will remain to furnish protection against sporadic raids or air attacks. It can be expected that the Icelandic Government will cooperate in security measures provided such measures do not require abrogation of the agreement under which we occupy Iceland.

ac3cc5

During the latter part of July and the entire month of August, the movement of troops into Iceland and the movement of the Fifth Division out of Iceland to the United Kingdom will be in progress. It is open to conjecture how much, if any, attention this activity will receive from enemy air forces.

A cruiser anchored in the harbor could be used to provide limited accommodations, but in this case the danger from air attack is greater than when on land where bomb shelters are available.

### III. Summary.

It is not believed that accommodations of a suitable nature are, or can be made available in Iceland for the purpose under consideration.

Political implications may make extremely difficult our tenancy of Iceland and prohibit the reduction in garrison now contemplated. Harbor and anchorage facilities at Reykjavik will be taxed to the utmost during the movement of troops into and out of Iceland. These activities may possibly draw the attention of enemy air or sea forces.

403c06





REYKJAVIK, ICELAND.  
Hafnarstraeti (Main Street) on a Sunday Morning.



REYKJAVIK, ICELAND.  
Looking northeast over Leingoto Street in Reykjavik. Taken  
from top of Catholic Cathedral, northeastern part of Reykjavik  
can be seen in background. 3/21/43.

A03c07



Reykjavik Airdrome, Iceland.

Q03c08



Docks, Reykjavik, Iceland.

003009

## ALASKA

### THE TRIP.

By rail to Ottawa, arriving there the following day and spending the afternoon of that day and second night in Ottawa, departing from Ottawa early the next morning. The trip to Edmonton can be made in one day with good weather and an early start. It is assumed that adequate facilities for an overnight stop in Edmonton are available. Departing the following day, it is an easy journey to Fort Nelson with the Alcan Highway in sight practically the entire distance from Dawson Creek to Fort Nelson. Army facilities at Fort Nelson can be made available for an overnight's stop at that place. Departing for Fairbanks the following day, there is again ample opportunity to view the northern end of the Alcan Highway.

If it is decided to go by rail to Great Falls, Montana, the flight from Great Falls to Fort St. John can be made in about four hours and from there on to Fairbanks, the trip can be varied so as to permit an inspection of the Alcan Highway.

### ITINERARY.

#### Rail.

Depart: Washington evening of D day.

Arrive: Ottawa noon of D+1 day.  
Spend night in Ottawa.

#### Air.

Depart: Ottawa morning of D+2 day.

Arrive: Edmonton evening of D+2 day.

Distance: 1775 miles. Flying time: 12 to 14 hours.  
Spend night in Edmonton.

Depart: Edmonton morning of D+3 day.

Arrive: Fort Nelson noon of D+3 day.

Distance: 535 miles. Flying time: 4 hours 15 minutes.  
Spend night in Fort Nelson.

203C10



Depart: Fort Nelson morning of D-4 day.

Arrive: Fairbanks afternoon of D-4 day.

Distance: 939 miles. Flying time: 8 hours 50 minutes.

(Alternate)

Rail.

Depart: Washington evening of D day.

Arrive: Great Falls, Montana, morning of D-3 day.

Air.

Depart: Great Falls, Montana, morning of D-3 day.


Arrive: Fort St. John afternoon of D-3 day.

Distance: 774 miles. Flying time: 4 hours 20 minutes.

From Fort St. John to Fairbanks the trip may be varied as desired.

WEATHER.

TOTAL NUMBER OF FLYABLE DAYS



Graphs indicate the number of days per month that an airplane flight would normally be expected possible between the terminals indicated. All factors - fog, rain, icing - have been considered.

The graphs are broken down into the mean number of days per month, the minimum number of days per month and the maximum number of days per month that this trip could have been made during the past several years.

603e11

## DISCUSSION.

### I. Facilities.

Accommodations exist in the permanent construction at Ladd Field, situated 4 miles east of Fairbanks. The only single unit is the Commanding Officer's house. This is a modern building with bedroom and bath accommodations on the first floor and several bedrooms and baths on the second floor. Nearby are officers' and non-commissioned officers' apartments and a barracks building, all with a combined capacity of over 300 without crowding. The personnel now occupying these buildings could be moved under canvas for the period of the visit. Officers' and non-commissioned officers' families have been removed from Alaska. Hospital facilities adjoin and the airfield is only 1500 yards from the proposed area.

### II. Security.

Security in this case offers no problem. The installation is on United States Territory included within an Army Post. Obstacles can be erected to separate the area from other Post activities. Troops for guard purposes are available at the Post or can be moved in from other Alaskan Posts. (Present strength - 2,000). The distance from the nearest enemy air base (2,000 miles) practically eliminates the possibility of air attack. If deemed advisable, anti-aircraft can be moved in from Anchorage.

#### (Alternate)

If the accommodations at Ladd Field are not considered adequate, Fort Richardson, 2 miles east of Anchorage, is suggested as an alternate location. Here, 12 sets of permanent officers' quarters can be used to provide accommodations for any distinguished guests without intrusion of privacy. Sufficient additional housing is available for administrative and clerical personnel. As in the case of Ladd Field, the Post is built adjoining the airfield. Troops are available for all security purposes.

AC3c12

(Present strength - 12,000). An antiaircraft unit is available.

The use of Fort Richardson would eliminate the rail trip from Fairbanks to Anchorage, however a recent survey of the railroad indicates that it is in such poor condition that the trip might be considered a hazardous one. Furthermore, lack of signal equipment prohibits night travel which will necessitate two days with an overnight stop for the trip.

### III. Summary.

Adequate accommodations are available at two Army Posts.

No political problem is presented in a trip to Alaska, except the visit to Ottawa. Remoteness from possible enemy attack and the presence of American troops assures adequate security. The weather during the time of year selected for the trip permits practically daily flights.

G03C13



LADD FIELD, ALASKA, Fairbanks in the distance.  
Area proposed is shown encircled in red.

003014





LAND FIELD, ALASKA.

Area proposed is shown encircled in red.

003015



LADD FIELD, ALASKA.

- (1) Commanding Officer's quarters.
- (2) Bachelor Officers' quarters.
- (3) Officers' quarters.
- (4) Non-commissioned officers' quarters.
- (5) Barracks.
- (6) Hospital.

Construction has been completed since picture was taken.

AO3c14




FORT RICHARDSON (Elmendorf Field), ALASKA. Anchorage in the distance.  
12 sets of officers' quarters have been constructed in the area shown  
encircled in red.

RECEIVED  
10-21-66  
10-21-66

Date- 10-21-66

Signature- Carl J. Spicer


903c17



Another view of PORT RICHARDSON (Elmendorf Field), ALASKA.

203c18





RC3C19